{"id":66617,"date":"2024-03-22T15:35:06","date_gmt":"2024-03-22T15:35:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2024\/03\/22\/how-us-forces-can-adopt-ukraines-unconventional-multidomain-approach\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T01:06:57","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T01:06:57","slug":"how-us-forces-can-adopt-ukraines-unconventional-multidomain-approach","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/opinion\/2024\/03\/22\/how-us-forces-can-adopt-ukraines-unconventional-multidomain-approach\/","title":{"rendered":"How US forces can adopt Ukraine\u2019s unconventional multidomain approach"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

For all the reports of battlefield setbacks along the front line, Ukraine<\/a> is conducting a novel hybrid<\/a> campaign combining long-range drone strikes and unconventional warfare. The question is: Could the United States similarly integrate conventional and unconventional operations in future campaigns?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite renewed interest in the 2020 National Defense Strategy, irregular warfare often remains focused on ideas linked to legacy Cold War constructs focused on overthrowing regimes using guerilla forces. Too often, analysts make a sharp distinction between conventional and unconventional conflict when in fact all war involves both forms working in tandem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Sun Tzu<\/a>, it was the balance of the orthodox and unorthodox that kept an adversary off balance. Even Hannibal<\/a> \u2014 the archetype at Cannae<\/a> for conventional maneuver \u2014 actually used a mix of sabotage and political intrigue to set conditions for his seminal campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

French support to the American revolution involved both front companies supporting pirates attacking British shipping lanes<\/a> as well as foreign material support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the Second World War, the British integrated the Special Operations Executive with its military campaigns while the Office of Strategic Services supported U.S. campaigns with morale operations designed to undermine enemy cohesion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faced with resource shortages and the brutal reality of 21st century trench warfare, Ukraine has found new asymmetries by combining elements of conventional and unconventional warfare. First, Ukraine is pioneering long-range, low-cost, one-way attack drones<\/a> to strike strategic economic targets throughout the depth of Russia. The targets increasingly appear to be linked to critical infrastructure connected to Moscow\u2019s oil and gas transit and processing facilities \u2014 a critical requirement for generating revenue for Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the month of March \u2014 and coinciding with the Russian presidential election \u2014 the Security Service of Ukraine has reportedly<\/a> successfully attacked over 10 oil refineries, disrupting as much as 12% of Russia\u2019s oil processing capacity<\/a>, often using salvos of 35 drones<\/a> each costing less than $100,000. In other words, Ukraine likely spent only $40 million to damage up to $40 billion worth of Russian critical infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These conventional strikes focused on economic centers of gravity<\/a> most likely to hold the regime at risk. The attacks also forced Russia to pull additional air defenses back to protect its critical infrastructure, setting conditions for front-line air operations by Ukraine as new equipment, like F-16 fighter jets<\/a>, starts to arrive this summer. Of note, the activities coincide with increased targeting<\/a> of Russian air defenses since the summer along the front<\/a>. In other words, attacking Russian critical infrastructure achieves multiple objectives at low costs to Ukraine and sets conditions for future operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, Ukraine is combining unconventional warfare with these long-range precision strikes. In the lead-up to the election, there was been an increase in proxy raids<\/a> into Russian border areas, cyberattacks and ballot sabotage<\/a>, alongside calls for a wider symbolic uprising.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The surge of activity surrounding the election fits with broader trends in the conflict. Over the last two years these measures have included running deepfakes<\/a> and disrupting<\/a> Putin\u2019s speeches. This approach reflects time-tested unconventional warfare campaigns that create conditions likely to foster<\/a> local acts of sabotage, work stoppages and protests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine isn\u2019t just attacking the Kremlin\u2019s wallet by hitting its economic center of gravity; Kyiv is attacking the mind of the Russian population and amplifying the stark contrasts between regime rhetoric and reality lived by ordinary people.<\/p>\n\n\n\t