{"id":66763,"date":"2024-01-25T15:02:01","date_gmt":"2024-01-25T15:02:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2024\/01\/25\/to-deter-china-the-us-and-taiwan-should-seek-asymmetric-symmetry\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T01:04:29","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T01:04:29","slug":"to-deter-china-the-us-and-taiwan-should-seek-asymmetric-symmetry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/opinion\/2024\/01\/25\/to-deter-china-the-us-and-taiwan-should-seek-asymmetric-symmetry\/","title":{"rendered":"To deter China, the US and Taiwan should seek asymmetric symmetry"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On Oct. 19, President Joe Biden, in only his second address from the Oval Office, told Americans: \u201cWe\u2019re facing an inflection point in history \u2014 one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come.\u201d It is hard to argue with that assertion, given the wars raging in Europe<\/a> and in the Middle East<\/a>. But it still bears remembering that America\u2019s biggest challenge in all domains of national power remains China<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That fact only amplifies the criticality of the decisions needed to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, even more relevant now across the Taiwan Strait since China\u2019s preferred outcome in the recent Taiwanese presidential election did not materialize. All indications point to continued turbulence and tension<\/a> in the most pivotal region of the world. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deterrence<\/a> has been failing all too routinely. Central to deterrence is an adversary\u2019s perception of both the intent and the capability to respond in a compelling way to aggression. In the case of the defense of Taiwan, President Biden has been consistent in his public statements of U.S. support in case of Chinese aggression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, there has been a certain level of inconsistency in the commitments that the U.S., particularly from certain parts of the departments of State and Defense, has made with regard to providing Taiwan with the defense articles it needs<\/a> to enhance deterrence vis-\u00e0-vis China\u2019s overwhelming forces<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rhetorical focus on asymmetric means to deter the People\u2019s Liberation Army is one such example. The U.S. has in recent years mandated Taiwan acquire only asymmetric weapons systems. While not completely unfounded, this almost absolutist U.S. emphasis on asymmetry may be counterproductive, as an asymmetric strategy can be enhanced by conventional systems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The debate on what constitutes an asymmetric capability lingers and has impacted Taiwanese requests for systems, such as F-16 jets, M1A2 tanks, E-2D battle management aircraft, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, MH-60R helicopters, and the domestically produced indigenous defense submarine program, the Yushan amphibious assault ship, and a new class of frigates<\/a>. Yet, an asymmetric strategy is not defined by the tactical weapons that create the effects necessary for strategic victory. An asymmetric strategy, through the effects its operational plans call for, is reflected in how the weapons in its inventory are deployed and employed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine presents several illustrative examples in how it is implementing its strategy with weapons that are not traditionally considered asymmetrical. HIMARS is not an asymmetrical operational or tactical system in design or structure. Weighing in at 18 tons, carrying six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, it is supported by an MTVR MK37 vehicle to load and unload a single HIMARS six-strong GMLRS pod. The MK37 has a gross vehicle weight rating of 31 tons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite these non-asymmetric attributes, HIMARS is creating asymmetric effects in the hands of the Ukrainians. \u201cWe are seeing real and measurable gains from Ukraine in the use of these systems. For example, the Ukrainians have struck over 400 targets with the HIMARS, and they\u2019ve had devastating effect,\u201d said Gen. Mark Milley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What does this have to do with Taiwan? The U.S. position has been that it does not support Taiwan\u2019s request for certain systems, as they are deemed not to be asymmetric platforms based on the definitions of select elements within the U.S. government. The Ukrainian HIMARS example underscores the point that strategies and operational concepts can be and, in Taiwan\u2019s case, should be and are asymmetrical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, in East Asia we can create an asymmetric symmetry by encouraging allies and partners to operate the same systems. There is commonality in combined operations and integrated strategies enabled by common tactical system employment. When extended to partners and allies, this has a multiplying effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is truth in the dictum that states: \u201cThe whole is greater than the sum of its parts.\u201d In fact, a senior U.S. Department of Defense official recently detailed the magnifying impact of P-8s \u2014 arguably not an asymmetric system \u2014 operating across the Indo-Pacific, with partners and allies as diverse as Australia, India, New Zealand and South Korea flying these aircraft along with the U.S. Navy. The same could be said about E-2Ds, F-16s and MQ-9 drones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The scale and scope of Chinese military operations in the Western Pacific have grown exponentially. A day rarely passes where an allied aircraft or vessel is not harassed by the PLA in international airspace or waters. Even more common are the intrusions of Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan\u2019s air defense identification zones.<\/p>\n\n\n\t