{"id":67180,"date":"2024-06-13T20:58:19","date_gmt":"2024-06-13T20:58:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2024\/06\/13\/are-we-sure-china-views-sea-power-the-same-way-the-west-does\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T01:07:12","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T01:07:12","slug":"are-we-sure-china-views-sea-power-the-same-way-the-west-does","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/opinion\/2024\/06\/13\/are-we-sure-china-views-sea-power-the-same-way-the-west-does\/","title":{"rendered":"Are we sure China views sea power the same way the West does?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy\u2019s fleet. <\/i>Click here<\/i><\/a> to see the entire series.<\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy now includes multiple warship classes<\/a>, fifth-generation fighters<\/a> and an expanding submarine force<\/a>. These means \u2014 combined with, in the words<\/a> of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Samuel Paparo, illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive maritime gray zone activities<\/a> \u2014 seemingly imply that China\u2019s strategic ends are self-evident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, on closer examination, strategists are right to ask if the U.S. \u2014 or more broadly the West \u2014 understands the extent to which China values sea power as an enabler for grand strategy. Are we mirroring or projecting<\/a> our reasonable and rational expectations onto Beijing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem with mirroring is that it catalyzes policies aimed at eliciting certain behaviors on the assumption that two actors think alike. Such mirroring can be the product of institutionalization or a lack of imagination, something that took Western naval analysts decades to discern during the Cold War<\/a>. Even referring to China as the United States\u2019 strategic \u201cpacing challenge\u201d<\/a> implies an element of mirroring by benchmarking one against the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, policymakers should ask three questions to help frame our understanding of China\u2019s view on sea power to formulate<\/a> sound naval strategy<\/a> and optimize resources for the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, why isn\u2019t China employing its naval force like we do? <\/b>China is building<\/a> aircraft carriers, but construction is not the same as operation. Ample evidence suggests China will employ<\/a> its ships differently than the U.S. or U.K. navies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, Chinese carriers<\/a> sail almost exclusively in the so-called near seas, rarely venturing beyond the first island chain, which stretches from Japan\u2019s East China Sea islands through the Philippines. This is curious considering these waters are largely enveloped by the weapon zones of China\u2019s neighbors<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"In
A Chinese J-15 fighter jet prepares to take off from the Shandong aircraft carrier during a military exercise around Taiwan on April 9, 2023. (An Ni\/Xinhua via AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Conversely, Western naval doctrine prioritizes safeguarding high-value assets, employing carriers in the open ocean to exert sea and air control over a wide area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, whereas Western navies use carriers for power projection, China appears to use them to protect other naval forces. China has armed the capable Renhai-class cruiser with long-range anti-ship missiles that could make this ship<\/a>, rather than a carrier, the centerpiece of a task force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some assess that China\u2019s aircraft carrier program is a \u201cpropaganda showpiece<\/a>.\u201d Perhaps China\u2019s naval buildup is about number parity or another instance<\/a> of copycatting<\/a>. Or maybe China believes<\/a> carriers are a mark of superpower status.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Irrespective of the rationale, we fall into the trap of mirroring if we assume similar ships flying different ensigns will be employed similarly.<\/p>\n\n\n\t