{"id":68663,"date":"2024-10-25T13:58:29","date_gmt":"2024-10-25T13:58:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2024\/10\/25\/getting-more-out-of-us-australian-defense-cooperation\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T01:05:19","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T01:05:19","slug":"getting-more-out-of-us-australian-defense-cooperation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/opinion\/2024\/10\/25\/getting-more-out-of-us-australian-defense-cooperation\/","title":{"rendered":"Getting more out of US-Australian defense cooperation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

When surveying America\u2019s attempts to upscale its defense ties with Indo-Pacific partners, it\u2019s commonly assumed that the Australia-US relationship is amongst the lowest-hanging fruit. There are good reasons for that view. One is the alliance\u2019s long and deep history, which Australians regularly refer to as the \u2018bedrock\u2019 of Canberra\u2019s security policy. Another is the importance Australia has placed on an enhanced U.S. military presence in an era of heightened great power competition. And a third is the AUKUS agreement, which promises to deliver U.S. Virginia-class nuclear submarines to the Royal Australian Navy<\/a>, as well as deepen collaboration in the development of next-generation defense technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it would be a grave mistake to think that there are no challenges in deepening U.S.-Australia defense integration<\/a>. For instance, Canberra and Washington tend to view challenges in the Indo-Pacific through different ends of a strategic telescope. Granted, both see China as the main threat (or \u2018pacing challenge\u2019, to use the U.S. term), and both see the main domain to be secured as the maritime one. Yet they differ over where the most likely locus of future conflict might be: the U.S. is focused on Taiwan and potential war on the open oceans; whereas Australia sees the main challenge in terms of thwarting efforts to deny it access to sea lanes of communication and trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, the U.S. sees the risk of war in high-end terms, ranging across vast maritime distances; whilst for Australia the primary tasks for its much smaller armed forces are more local, and littoral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are also other points of potential disjuncture. Australia does not outsource sovereign decisions about whether or not to go to war, and it has different interests that shape its threat perceptions. Indeed, while there is broad bipartisan agreement about the value of the alliance, this does not automatically translate into an Australian willingness to follow Washington unquestioningly into every conflict. A case in point is Taiwan, where Australian domestic debates offer no consensus on whether defending Taipei is a vital national interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fortunately, there are clear steps both Washington and Canberra can take to better align their mutual defense postures. This is helped by the fact that both nations remain closely aligned in strategic outlook. And, importantly, we see this task as being much easier to accomplish if it is targeted in terms of the specific effects the U.S. and Australia are seeking to generate, rather than through adapting often amorphous terms like \u2018integrated deterrence\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When looking at the desired effects of U.S.-Australian security and defense alignment, three arenas stand out. The first of these is resources, or the capabilities both nations can bring to bear in future crises. Here, while Australia has been rapidly developing the ability to acquire long range strike weapons in order to hold adversaries at risk, it should be acknowledged that Australia will be able to contribute very little extra in terms of the capacity to deter China in the short term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even when Australia\u2019s capabilities are enhanced via AUKUS, still at least a decade away, its forces will be far better suited to green-water deterrence. Hence enhancing the ability of U.S. and Australian militaries to conduct joint operations at the land-sea nexus would be an important step towards closer alignment. So too would stronger U.S. support for Australia\u2019s proximity advantage relative to South Pacific island nations, which will continue to be aggressively courted by China via proposed investment and security partnerships. And finally, developing the ability to better respond to Chinese sub-threshold hybrid operations in a maritime context \u2013 including by articulating a more convincing regional narrative about the need to uphold international law and strategic stability \u2013 would better anchor joint Australian and U.S. maritime operations, especially in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\t