The Danish Air Force officially established Squadron 729 on Feb. 16, which will operate the four MQ-9B long-range unmanned aircraft out of Aalborg Air Base, located in northern Denmark, starting from 2028.

Earlier this month, Canada, which has acquired 11 of the same General Atomics-made drones that it will receive around the same time, signed a defense cooperation agreement with Denmark at the Munich Security Conference. The systems are planned to be based in different locations, including Nova Scotia on the east coast and British Columbia on the Canadian west coast.

The team-up brings together two Arctic nations that have repeatedly drawn the ire of Donald Trump since he assumed his second term as U.S. president in early 2025. Trump harbors a grudge against Canada for not wanting to be part of the United States, and against Denmark for having no interest in giving him the Danish autonomous territory of Greenland.

The defense-technical nexus around the MQ-9B drone holds promise in forging a closer connection between Ottawa and Copenhagen, as there is currently no formal maintenance-sharing or data-sharing arrangement between the two nations, according to issue experts.

“A joint logistics or maintenance hub would absolutely be strategically beneficial for them – maintaining equipment and operating bases in the region is very expensive – sharing facilities and having an integrated logistics system can make operations easier and more efficient for all parties involved,” Jens Marquard Sørensen, director of a Danish consulting company, said.

Still, both countries must first evaluate whether their operational plans match up.

For example, basing the Danish fleet at Aalborg Air Base would colocate the equipment with air force maintenance expertise there, but it’s a long way from strategic patrol points in Greenland, said Sørensen.

“The long distances [from Aalborg] to Greenland may pose operational challenges – flight times are long, increasing wear on drones before they arrive for a mission, and they would lose fuel going there. … It also means that any kind of rapid reaction using the MQ-9Bs is not possible, so having a forward operating station in the Arctic itself would be a notable advantage,” he said.

To put this into perspective, the straight-line distance between the Danish air base and Nuuk is approximately 3,324 kilometres (2,065 miles), and commercial jets covering the same route average flight times of about four to five hours.

Rune Raunow, a defense consultant at the Copenhagen-based Rethink Advisory, which advises the Danish Armed Forces, said a Denmark-Canada pact around the U.S.-made surveillance drones would be especially relevant for contingency plans, refueling or emergency landings.

Cooperation on sensors, too, could factor into the equation, Raunow said. While the Canadian government has opted for L3 Harris Wescam MX-20D sensor systems for intelligence and surveillance missions, Denmark has not publicly disclosed its preference.

“The drones are essentially just a platform; what will be more relevant is whether they will buy the same set of communication networks, sensors, optic detection systems, etc. … Being able to track threats in these very remote places would be extremely easier if they were using the same equipment,” Raunow said.

Canada’s MQ-9B purchase was driven by its need to bolster Arctic operations and provide continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, according to government statements.

While stationing its fleet in southern bases is consistent with existing airfields and maintenance infrastructure, these areas are still far from the high Arctic and other regional chokepoints, where the country has increased monitoring needs.

Sørensen suggests that if NATO was to re-open the Keflavík Air Base in Iceland, as a common allied base, even just for emergencies, it could also serve as a possible site for the countries’ MQ-9B fleets. He noted that this location is the easiest point for patrolling north, east, and south of Greenland.

Keflavík Air Base was closed in 2006 and was primarily operated by the U.S. Navy on behalf of NATO. Today, allies conduct routine and rotational fighter and bomber deployments from there, focused on air policing missions.

As a member of NATO, Iceland has no armed forces of its own.

Sørensen added that its position south of the Arctic Circle makes operations easier and less prone to weather-related disruptions, offering a closer alternative than flying from Nuuk or Canada.

“Shipping routes are also always open year-round, making it cheaper to maintain a station or base than anywhere else in the region – technicians, spare parts or even larger equipment can be transported relatively cheaply via regular civilian shipping routes versus shipping to Greenland, which can cost up to 20$ per kilogram in some areas,” Sørensen said.

Other locations to consider may include Northern Canada, which Hans Peter Michaelsen, a defense analyst and former member of the Royal Danish Air Force, highlights as geographically close to the Danish Arctic territory. However, he notes that many of these areas face significant infrastructure limitations that would obstruct the construction of year-round drone facilities.

The Republic of Kosovo has requested to buy 246 Javelin missiles and 24 lightweight command launch units, among other items, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in a statement released on Jan 11.

If the sale of the Lockheed Martin- and Raytheon-made weapons goes ahead, it would make Kosovo the third Javelin customer in the region. In 2022, Albania’s defense minister said the country had purchased Javelins, and last month Romania received approval to purchase 263 missiles for $80 million.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, a Russia ally who was recently re-elected for another term amid election fraud complaints by the opposition, was quoted by ABC News as having expressed “deep disappointment” regarding the news of Kosovo’s procurement request.

It was previously reported that Belgrade was interested in buying SPIKE LR2 anti-tank guided missiles from Israeli defense manufacturer Rafael.

The Javelin announcement comes at a time of heightened tensions between Kosovo and Serbia. In an outbreak of violence in a Kosovan village last fall, a number of ethnic Serbs killed a Kosovar police officer during a firefight, which ultimately resulted in police killing three of the ethnic Serbs while retaking the site.

Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti later claimed that the ethnic Serb paramilitary force trained in Serbia ahead of the September raid on what appeared to be a U.S.-made military Humvee vehicle produced by AM General.

The accusation, which was immediately denied by Belgrade, would entail a violation by the Serbian authorities of a contract struck with Washington on the end-use of American military equipment.

At the time, a U.S. State Department spokesperson told Defense News that the government was “looking into this matter.”

China established itself as a leader in the public safety marketplace, primarily through the production of commercial drones from Da Jang Innovations, known as DJI. A 2019 report found that 73 percent of public safety unmanned aerial systems operators in the U.S. were flying the DJI Mavic series, and by 2021, the company reportedly controlled as much as 90 percent of the North American consumer market.

Rising geopolitical tensions have frayed relations between the U.S. and China, and American government officials are expressing alarm over the widespread use of Chinese UAS in the country. In a letter to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency sent in March, lawmakers warned that DJI could be providing “richly detailed, regularly updated pictures of our nation’s pipelines, railways, power generation facilities and waterways,” to the Chinese government.

Matt McCrann, CEO of DroneShield, an Australian and U.S. maker of the “DroneGun” and other counter-UAS tech, said that while Chinese products still dominate in this market, any C-UAS system must be able to defend against any type of drone.

“C-UAS solutions need to be drone agnostic, meaning that they can detect, and when authorized, defeat more than just DJI drones,” he said.

The company this month introduced the “DroneGun Mk4,” a portable countermeasure with enhanced range and upgraded features such as low-size weight and power (low-SWaP).

The expansion of use cases across federal agencies is primarily due to the rise of drones being used to carry out criminal activities in or around airports, prisons and other critical infrastructure, creating an ever-present potential threat. Full production of the Mk4 is expected to be reached in the second half of 2023.

“We are seeing a significant uptick in the number of federal end-users [for DroneGuns] both domestic and international who have active counter-drone requirements and whose authority to operate is expanding,” said Tom Branstetter, director of business development at DroneShield.

Drone guns in Ukraine

Anti-drone guns have gained important traction as effective gap-fill or last mile countermeasure. More companies are coming out with their own versions, such as a recent new player in this space, Ukraine’s Kvertus Technology. The firm has developed the KVS G-6, which uses radio-signals to jam Russian systems.

“We are starting to see a lot of consolidation in the C-UAS space, with now a lot of quality systems available today. But, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to the challenge of drone threats,” Branstetter said. “The key is the ability to implement those technologies collaboratively and in a way that provides the greatest level of capability while simultaneously meeting key customer requirements.”

DroneShield’s guns have reportedly been used by the Ukrainian military since the early days of the war. When asked whether the latest variant would be provided to troops, McCrann said that “the Mk4 has a clear application for Ukraine and can add immediate value to their counter-drone efforts, we’ll continue to standby to support however we can.”

Key considerations of the platform that could be beneficial for the Ukrainians and other end-users is its overall form factor and component design. Not wanting to burden users with having to learn and operate an overly complex system, especially as they often operate multiple technology kits in the field, it is designed to leverage muscle memory established with other weapons.

“It provides similar components that are very familiar to military and security personnel. This familiarity becomes especially important when under stress, the design simplicity allows any operator to deploy it at a moment’s notice,” Branstetter said.

Shrinking the form factor of any C-UAS weaponry can lead to trade-offs, including limiting the range at which they are effective, forcing operators in some cases to get closer to the threat to neutralize it.

As for the future of this technology, the company executives said that users need layered options to stay ahead of developing threats, whereby unmanned systems are already a multi-domain danger as seen through recent developments in autonomous underwater platforms or unmanned ground vehicles.

“C-UAS solutions, strategies and requirements are not really focused on countering potential multi-domain at scale yet, but we will see that shift soon,” McCrann said.

On April 6-7, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations will host the Safe Arctic 2023 exercises across nine regions of the country’s Arctic zone, it said in a statement. Participants include representatives from nine unnamed African, Latin American and Eurasian countries, it said. The exercises will demonstrate rescue methods as well as vehicles, aircraft and other types of equipment produced by Russian manufacturers.

In the run-up to the drills, Moscow has also been carrying out a 12-day Arctic research expedition to conduct additional tests of Russian gear designed to ensure regional safety.

While the nature of these events is not necessarily military, they do point to a larger trend in Russia’s Arctic defense strategy: an increased interest in non-Arctic partnerships to help it secure regional interests. This was underlined in a revised strategic planning document published by the Kremlin, which highlighted a greater openness towards international collaborations. In the past, Moscow arguably exercised a larger degree of caution when involving nations not bordered by Arctic zones in regional projects.

Russian activities in the Arctic are more threatened today than they were a few years ago. With Finland officially joining NATO, and Sweden set to follow, Russia risks becoming even more isolated than it is currently, as it would be the only Arctic state that is not a member of the alliance. This implies a considerable expansion of NATO’s borders with Russia and further military cooperation between the allies, who recently concluded the month-long Arctic Forge exercise involving troops from 16 NATO member-states.

These developments are bound to be unwelcomed by Moscow, which since March 2022 has been shunned from taking part in Arctic Council working groups. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic 7– Canada, the U.S., Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland – had made the temporary decision to pause the Council’s work, only to issue a statement months later that projects would resume but without Russian participation.

The Safe Arctic exercises will be held as part of the events of Russia’s chairmanship of the AC in 2021-2023, which all other members have chosen to boycott. Since ties have been frozen, there has been a large debate among experts regarding whether Arctic cooperation can be restored.

In a survey carried out by Chatham House in December 2022, 56 percent of respondents, consisting of stakeholders and experts working on Arctic affairs, wanted AC member nations to re-establish cooperation with Russia. Skeptics said re-connecting with Moscow could symbolize a diplomatic win for the country and validate its hostile behavior.

Russia is increasingly looking to engage with other partners, including ones that the West sees as strategic competitors. A report by the Arctic Institute published last month, finds that the Kremlin is actively encouraging Chinese, Indian and Middle Eastern companies to invest in Arctic initiatives that formerly involved Western firms.

“After Western companies withdrew from the Russian Arctic due to sanctions, Russia’s Novatek is now looking to the Emirati firm Green Energy Solutions to receive important technology to construct liquefied natural gas projects and to the Turkish company Karpowership for a floating power plant,” the article states.

The Russian Federation is also exploring with India the possibility of creating a trans-Arctic container shipping road along the Northern Sea Route as an alternative route to transport cargo from New Delhi to Europe. If secured, this would prove to be a considerable development between South Asia and the Arctic.

On March 27, Canada announced Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon is the sole available aircraft that conforms to all operational requirements outlined in the Canadian Multi-Mission aircraft project. The effort is meant to provide the military with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare capabilities and more.

“In view of exploring this option in more detail, Canada has submitted a Letter of Request through the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales program outlining the requirements and requesting an offer,” Public Services and Procurement Canada, a federal department, said in a statement. “These include up to 16 P-8A aircraft and associated equipment and initial servicing, as well as access to intellectual property and technical data.”

The letter does not commit Ottawa to buying the fleet. A final decision will ultimately rest on affordability, capability offered and advantages to Canadian industry.

The country has sought a replacement for its CP-140 Aurora fleet for some time. The Lockheed Martin-made aircraft has been in service with the Royal Canadian Air Force since the 1980s and will need to be retired by 2030.

A Boeing spokesperson told Defense News that the company and its Canadian industry partners — CAE, GE Aviation Canada, IMP Aerospace and Defence, KF Aerospace, Honeywell Aerospace Canada, Raytheon Canada, and StandardAero — are committed to delivering industrial and technical benefits to significantly expand the country’s defense industry.

Bombardier, which had planned to offer its Global 6500 aircraft as a replacement for the Aurora, has argued that a Canadian-made solution must be considered on an equal footing.

“Canada has the opportunity to leverage its [domestic] aerospace industry to provide a multimission aircraft that will be the standard for decades to come,” Bombardier spokesman Mark Masluch said. “Performance should matter. Canadian jobs should matter. And sustainability matters most.”

Bombardier has been in contact with Defence Minister Anita Anand regarding the matter, and the company is “eagerly” awaiting a response, he said.

Rivals with a history

The competitors have been at odds for years, even entering into a trade dispute in 2018 over the sale of Bombardier’s 100-seat CSeries jets, which Boeing complained to the U.S. government were sold to air travel company Delta below their cost of production. Bombardier ultimately won.

Ottawa had issued a request for information in February 2022, outlining 13 mandatory requirements for the eventual platform. Among the core ones are an aircraft with secure and non-secure line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight communication tools; the ability to conduct multi-spectral sensing; and the ability to access external information sources in real time or near-real time.

What could play in the P-8A Poseidon’s favor is its air-to-air refueling capability, one that the Aurora aircraft lacks. In addition, the fact that four out of five of Poseidon’s operators are Five Eyes members may be beneficial on some level when considering tactical interoperability, shared logistics and infrastructure elements.

That intelligence-sharing alliance is made up of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Although there is no official contract yet, this does represent a step in the right direction for Boeing, after recent setbacks it suffered in regard to Canadian industry prospects. In 2021, its KC-46 failed to qualify for the Royal Canadian Air Force’s Strategic Tanker Transport Capability program. And in December 2022, the Public Services and Procurement Canada ruled out the participation of the F/A-18 block III Super Hornet in the future fighter capability project.

Why would a military want to go hybrid or fully electric? Steve duMont, President of GM Defense, explains that the transition would greatly enhance armies’ logistical and tactical capabilities.

“From an operational standpoint, light tactical hybrid vehicles offer the advantages of having low thermal and acoustic signatures, greater operational range and mission duration, charging power as well as enhanced off-road capacity through instantaneous, high-end torque. Most importantly, it provides silent drive and watch, critical capabilities to lower the chances of your opponent spotting you,” he said during an interview at the IDEX arms fair here.

Since its creation in 2017, the General Motors’ subsidiary has set out to capture the attention of the U.S. military, and now the United Arab Emirates, by presenting solutions to electrify ground vehicles. The hybrid-electric platforms it offers act as a bridge to all-electric vehicles. The U.S. Army has previously said that it was aiming to acquire “full electric” complex-weapon systems in the light and medium category for 2030-2035.

One of the main roadblocks to electrification is the requirement of having a charging infrastructure, which can be tricky in austere areas. Another impediment is the extent to which advanced militaries have already invested in petroleum-based structures, ranging from oil distribution and refinement to the movement of ships or trucks and storage spaces such as fuel farms.

Traditional military procedures tend to call for the resupply of diesel and gasoline, as not many modern militaries have experience with electrified vehicles and the technologies needed to charge them on the battlefield. However, companies today offer fast-charging, advanced solutions such as hydrogen-based power generation that enable soldiers to refuel their vehicles at a quicker pace.

At IDEX, GM Defense showcased its Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) Heavy Gun Carrier variant and the next-generation Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle prototype based on the Chevrolet Silverado as well as its Ultium battery platform. Engineers are now building and testing ISV configurations to meet multiple mission requirements including command-and-control, electronic warfare, counter-drone, reconnaissance and casualty evacuation.

The company previously won its first contract to provide U.S. forces with a nine-passenger ISV in 2020, which was based on the Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 midsize truck architecture and featured 90% commercial-off-the-shelf parts. Following this, it integrated a commercially available high-volume production battery into its expeditionary ISV, transforming it into a five-passenger, all-electric military concept vehicle in less than 13 weeks.

DuMont emphasized that one of the priorities for the company is leveraging and maximizing commercial baselines. He said that commercial architectures play a crucial role in defense markets, enabling lower costs and easier maintenance.

The firm is rapidly expanding. During the conference, it signed its first cooperation agreement with the UAE government entity Tawazun Council as a first step towards a potential procurement. Company representatives said that the region had been on their radar for some time and eventually could pave the way for the co-development of some products that would include the localization of their systems at some level.

In addition, DuMont told Defense News that Ukraine had reached out with a request for information regarding the company’s technologies.

Since receiving Starlink access terminals last year, the Ukrainian military has not shied away from making use of them. Officers from the Aerorozvidka aerial reconnaissance unit stated in past interviews that their drone pilots rely on Starlink to carry out missions, connecting the UAV team with the artillery one to generate target acquisition on Russian equipment and positions.

More recently, Ukraine officials disclosed that the country’s military was looking to establish strike forces that would be provided with Starlink equipment to create fleets of interoperable drones.

Musk made somewhat contradictory remarks during his appearance on a Russian state TV show last month, saying that his company banned Starlink from being used in long-range drone strikes by Ukrainian forces. Whether these restrictions are enforced or not, one thing is clear: since being unveiled in 2015, the prospects of Starlink have long expanded beyond the original intention of providing undersupplied regions with high-speed access to the internet.

“I do not think that SpaceX ever ruled out potential military use, but it was not a case they emphasized,” said David T. Burbach, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in an interview. “Today, [there is] no question that Starlink’s prominence in the Ukraine war has militaries all over the world considering and looking to make greater use of it as well as similar mobile data constellations.”

Burbach said his views are his own do not necessarily reflect that of the U.S. Navy.

Starlink offers considerable advantages over other satellite communications networks, likely contributing to its attractiveness for equipping everything from infantry squads to armored vehicles to being integrated directly in drones as that becomes more feasible, he said.

Currently, Starlink antennas are too large and too heavy for small drones. However, there has been momentum from the defense industry to experiment. In November, Canadian company RDARS, announced that it had successfully integrated Starlink equipment to its Eagle Nest ground station, which was able to transmit data to the firm’s Eagle Eye military drone in-flight.

Via Starlink, the ground station communicates with a control center, allowing the operator to control and receive imagery from the drone. While RDARS solely integrated the dish to the drone’s ground station, the company has emphasized the potential of installing it on the drone itself.

Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in the Middle East, has stated that Starlink was used to connect unmanned aircraft, vessels and underwater vehicles operated by allied forces in a NATO exercise in Portugal. In December 2021, Australia-based Unleash Live teamed up with Starlink to facilitate remote drone flights. Through access to Starlink’s low-orbiting satellites, the company was said to have successfully managed the system’s flight from 200 kilometers (124 miles) away.

Advantages and Risks

Among the primary factors that set apart Starlink constellations from older satellite systems is its ability to operate in low-Earth orbit, at less than 2,000 kilometers above the earth, in contrast to competitors who orbit at altitudes up to 36,000 kilometers. Burbach explained that this allows the signal from Starlink satellites to be much stronger, offering higher transmission speed and requiring less power to operate.

This strong connection also makes them more resistant to jamming.

“The ground antennas of Starlink form a highly directional beam at the satellite it is using– the signal is then difficult to interfere except along the line between terminal and satellite,” he said.

Another benefit it has over geostationary systems is that its very large number of satellites are interchangeable, where if one is put out of service another one is able to take over. With respect to drones, Burbach states that if high bandwidth commercial satellite links can be installed inside of one or more while functioning in flight, then this would make it possible for the operating country to control it far outside of its borders.

For any country or military to rely on Starlink does entail a number of security risks as well. Perhaps the most important one being that it is possible to geolocate the terminals, possibly giving away the physical positions of forces.

Davide Scaramuzza, associate professor of robotics and perception at the University of Zurich, said that as a base station or flying drone emits radio signals, it can be intercepted by enemy forces using high power antennas across a wide array of commonly used bands.

Achieving this might be harder in practice than is let on for several reasons. On the one hand, as Todd E. Humphreys, professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas points out that beams a Starlink terminal produces “are narrow (less than 5 degrees and they hop around in frequency, which make it hard to get an actual lock on a terminal.”

This can in part be seen in Russia’s large inability to locate satellites one year into the war, at least on a significant scale.

On the other hand, Humphreys says that SpaceX applies geofences on user terminals to prevent their operation outside approved areas. The company also holds the power of revoking one’s access to the network if it finds this one being used in violation of the user agreement or permitted instances. One implication of this, is the possibility for a country depending on Starlink to lose access to these services in the middle of a war if the commercial operator decided so. For a military force, this would imply that it could no longer rely on or use these connections for weapons attacking the affected areas.

Burbach of the Naval War College said a more subtle risk is that the system operator, SpaceX, has an extensive access to information about clients, and by extension Ukraine.

‘If I were the Russians, I would be very interested in trying to get into Starlink by compromising an employee or even getting an agent on staff,” he said. “We know several foreign intelligence services have done so with other social media firms.”

Global expansion

SpaceX has undergone an important expansion recently, opening a representative office in Azerbaijan in late 2022, and announcing it had applied to establish a Starlink branch in South Korea. In addition, a new satellite constellation should be up later this year to provide coverage in the Middle East. While its services are currently active in 45 countries, mostly NATO members or allies of the U.S.

Experts say that it is not a far remote possibility that the company could begin supplying customers in countries unfriendly to the West, who could also be interested in using Starlink for military applications.

While, as the University of Zurich’s Scaramuzza argues, it is false to assume that Starlink can be associated with a country, there are still important concerns to be raised regarding the development of its integration on unmanned platforms and overall uses. In January, footage from a pro-Russian paramilitary group on a telegram channel claimed that they had captured and disassembled a Ukrainian drone, finding a Starlink dish modified to fit onto the system. While these reports remain unconfirmed, such events could likely happen on a more frequent basis, as the demand for the internet services continues to rise and further integration with drone systems persists.

“Generally, it is very hard to operate a drone that you obtained from another country, especially when the security protocols such as encryption are designed well. Just like if your laptop got stolen and you had not saved all your passwords for online-banking on the device itself, your account would still be secure,” he said.

Despite this, it remains very easy to dismantle an enemy aircraft to learn more about the technologies used inside it and extract information. This has been seen extensively in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where each side has attempted to destroy enemy capabilities and improve its own.

The proliferation of Starlink, less regulated than Starshield, for military purposes remains in its very early days.

Samuel Bendett, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses’ Russian Studies Program concludes, “whatever happens in Ukraine is going to serve as a blueprint for future Starlink applications in drone warfare.”

A legitimate military target?

Last September, a Russian delegation to a UN working group on space security, insinuated that under international humanitarian law, Starlink could be designated as a legitimate military target. In a similar fashion, it has been reported that China is working on developing counter-systems to Starlink and that in the event of a conflict with the US, the satellites would be treated as an active target.

Heiko Borchert and Torben Schutz at the Defense Artificial Intelligence Observatory in Hamburg said that this is one of many complexities and sets of questions that will have to be answered as Starlink is further militarized.

“If it is to be considered a proper military target, the question then becomes how would Western governments respond in the event of an attack on a single satellite or constellation,” they said in a post.

Such matters are also challenging considering that SpaceX has not only received significant subsidies from the U.S. government, but that the U.S. Agency for International Development reportedly also paid the company to send over 1,000 Starlink terminals to Ukraine.

Borchert says that this is an important space to watch, concerning whether Washington would be willing to provide the same level of support to make Starlink available in the event of other conflicts to friendly governments.

Work on the base near the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea proceeded during much of 2022. It was slated to include new maintenance shelters, ramps and taxiway extensions, with a local construction contract for $21 million due to finish in recent weeks.

This modernization tallied with the arrival of a number of Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles at the Greek airfield, as reported by the Greek Reporter in late November. A spokesman for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Africa confirmed the arrival to Defense News, saying”the U.S. and Greece worked together to ensure the Larissa base had the capabilities” to support the MQ-9s.

“Larissa Air Base is a strategic location, allowing the MQ-9s to easily support both the eastern and southern flanks of NATO,” the spokesman said. “The move [to place them there] is not in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but this placement does support deterring and avoiding conflict with Russia.”

Officials declined to specify the number of drones based at the installation, citing operational security, though local reports have described eight.

Their deployment was authorized under amendments made to the U.S.-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) going back to 1990. Among the changes, most recently agreed in 2021, Washington is now allowed to carry out at both Larissa Air Base and Stefanovikio Army Aviation Base the following missions: operation, maintenance and support of U.S. maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, some technical ground processing, as well as sustainment and support of airlift and logistics support, including tanker aircraft.

The Greek military itself also is trying to get its hands on MQ-9 drones. Athens submitted a program for the acquisition of three of these systems to its Parliamentary Arms Committee, which was approved in July 2022.