“The trends are moving in the right direction,” Jerry McGinn, who co-authored the study for the Center for Strategic and International Analysis think tank, told Defense News.

However, the study — described as a progress report on reforms to the defense manufacturing and acquisition system — still found numerous problems with ramping up and sustaining wartime production.

For example, “according to several measures — manufacturing lead times, critical munitions and materials stockpiles, and supply chain security — the U.S. industrial base has a long way to go to achieve resilience,” warned the analysis by CSIS’s Center for the Industrial Base.

CSIS did find measurable improvements since November 2025, when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth vowed to “transform the entire acquisition system to operate on a wartime footing.”

Hegseth also promised to “inspire American industry to become a wartime industrial base that focuses on speed and volume.”

Most striking is the number of new companies in the defense field.

“Roughly 10,000 new firms have entered the market in the past two years and nontraditional companies received over $120 billion in contract obligations in FY 2025, adding competition and innovation to the sector,” CSIS noted. “Munitions contract obligations have risen 330 percent since FY 2010. Spurred by this increased demand and depleted inventories, the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale.”

The military is also responding to depleted stockpiles of expensive guided weapons that have been rapidly consumed by the Iran and Ukraine wars.

The Pentagon’s 2027 budget request for munitions allocated 49% to low-cost munitions — defined as costing less than $600,000 apiece — rising to 70% by 2031.

The U.S. is also strengthening its defense supply chain, such as “multiyear procurement agreements, direct-to-supplier investments, and leaner acquisition pathways,” as well as investing in defense companies such as L3Harris Missile Solutions, according to CSIS.

However, while this signals government commitment to defense production, it “also complicates competitive dynamics within the industry as new entrants and established suppliers alike seek to meet rapidly growing demand for munitions at scale.”

Also notable is federal investment in rare earths, which has seen production soar from 95 tons in 2022, to 8,900 tons in 2025. Nonetheless, “the erosion of domestic rare earth manufacturing capacity and the rise of Chinese control took decades to unfold, however, and it will take several years of enduring effort for the United States and its allies to build, scale, and sustain the production capacity of these key defense inputs.”

Exports of U.S. arms, or cooperative multinational projects such as the F-35 fighter, have also become a pillar of America’s defense industry. Foreign Military Sales, or FMS, have more than tripled, from less than $20 billion in 2015 to more than $80 billion in 2025.

The Trump administration wants to take this further with the “America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” launched in February 2026.

“The United States will use foreign purchases and capital to support domestic reindustrialization, expand production capacity, and improve the resilience of the United States defense industrial base,” the White House executive order declared.

Ultimately, the federal government can control defense production through the products it demands, the prices it is willing to pay, and the incentives it offers.

“It’s a monopsony,” McGinn said. “Government sets the market. Government can regulate the market. So, if the government wants different outcomes, it changes how it buys.”

The search comes after dozens of MQ-9s were swatted out of the sky during the Iran war, according to a May 13 Congressional Research Service report.

With the Air Force currently possessing about 135 Reapers — which cost approximately $30 million apiece — such a loss rate is not sustainable, especially against a force like Iran, whose air defenses are less sophisticated than those of China or Russia.

“The Joint Force’s reliance on low-density, high-value ‘exquisite’ (>$30 million) manned and unmanned aircraft is unsustainable against adversaries utilizing layered defenses enabled by increasingly low-cost antiaircraft capabilities,” warned the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation for a new drone, which the Pentagon wants to “execute missions that the MQ-9A performs today.”

Rather than build a better Reaper, DIU is opting for an expendable replacement. The Massed Modular Aircraft, or MMA, project aims to develop a UAV designed to operate in such large numbers that it can absorb heavy losses and still overwhelm enemy defenses.

Particularly of interest is the size of the MMA. Drone swarms may be the next big thing in unmanned warfare, but generally those hordes are made up of small, inexpensive UAVs with limited range and payload.

But the DIU solicitation envisions a drone that has long range and a heavy payload — and is still inexpensive enough for mass production. The solicitation calls for a payload of at least 2,800 pounds, a bit less than the MQ-9’s 3,800-pound capacity.

The MMA should also have an unrefueled combat range of at least 2,300 nautical miles, according to the solicitation, and a one-way transfer range of at least 8,000 nautical miles. Additionally, the drone should reach speeds of at least 200 miles per hour and have the ability to operate from a 6,000-foot runway or improvised airstrips.

The DIU solicitation states that the drone should have “sufficient available size, weight, power (25kW), and cooling (5kW) to host a variety of internal and/or external payloads,” with a level of autonomous operations that would allow one operator to control several drones.

The solicitation does not specify the MMA’s dimensions, though the specifications suggest a drone comparable in size to the MQ-9. It also did not list a desired price point, though presumably it would be less than the $30 million price tag of an MQ-9.

The timeline for the MMA project, meanwhile, is ambitious. DIU is calling for “full-scale prototype flight testing within 21 months of award, with a targeted Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY2031. IOC for MMA is envisioned as 20 mission-ready aircraft delivered to an operational unit, able to be deployed.”

Pentagon solicitations continue to reflect a mindfulness of lessons from the Ukraine War, as well as the experiences during the Iran War. In both conflicts, the defender exhausted interceptors before the attacker ran out of drones.

“Keeping a constant airborne MMA presence to launch weapons, gather intelligence, perform electronic warfare missions, or relay communications will force an adversary to stay on the defensive,” DIU said. “This relentless pressure will exhaust the adversary, forcing them to burn through expensive anti-aircraft missiles and resources faster than they can be replaced.”

Crafted by architect Kengo Kuma in partnership with the Global War on Terrorism Memorial Foundation, the memorial’s design is the culmination of eight years of input from 20,000 Americans, including veterans from every branch of service and every conflict since World War II, according to a foundation release.

According to the memorial’s description, visitors will first encounter steel and stone relics recovered from the 9/11 attacks at each of the site’s three entrances, “marking where the journey began,” the release states.

In a primary section coined “the embrace,” a classically inspired amphitheater rises over the path below and features an arch made of reclaimed steel from the era’s combat operations.

The arch, which will also be adorned with native vegetation, is designed to filter light and will be oriented to align with Section 60 in Arlington National Cemetery, the resting place of roughly 1,000 service members killed in the post-9/11 wars.

Below the arch, a predominantly marble “path of honor” includes embedded boot prints “that represent the weight of war and the varied experiences of those who served and their families,” the release says. The path will also connect to adjacent memorials on the National Mall.

Extending from the footprint paths are shallow reflecting pools in which visitors can dip their feet before stepping back onto the stone to leave footprints of their own, an “interactive component [that] offers visitors the chance to walk alongside a loved one once more,” the foundation says.

“This design was shaped by history and held sacred from the beginning — forged by sacrifice and informed by the voices of warriors and their families,” Michael “Rod” Rodriguez, president and CEO of the Global War on Terrorism Memorial Foundation and a retired U.S. Army Green Beret, said in the release.

“Throughout history, societies have built sacred places to welcome their warriors home, places where a grateful people can say, ‘We see you. We honor you. You are not forgotten.’” Rodriguez added. “The GWOT generations deserve that same enduring tribute. Today, we take one step closer to welcoming them home.”

In addition to input gathered since 2018, a 23-member advisory council comprising Gold Star family members, veterans and their families worked alongside designers to craft what the foundation has called a “living place … that will illuminate at night and invite reflection, healing and unity for generations to come.”

As the site’s architect, Kuma’s work on the memorial resonated on a deeply personal level, he said in a recent interview. The artist lost his close friend Yoichi Sugiyama, who worked for Fuji Bank, in the Sept. 11 attack at the World Trade Center.

“This memorial is not an abstract commission for our team, it is a sacred responsibility,” Kuma said in the release. “Our role was not to impose a design, but to listen. The voices of those who served and the families who stood beside them became our source of inspiration. We wanted to create a place of reflection and connection, a living memorial where nature, light and the materials of this war come together as an embrace for a grateful nation.”

Foundation officials are slated to meet over the coming months with various city planning commissions to finalize design approval, according to the foundation’s proposed timeline.

With approval, the foundation is aiming for a 2027 groundbreaking and a project completion date of late 2028.

In a letter shared with Reuters by U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, U.S. Central Command said it had “received multiple threat reports concerning adversary exploitation of commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in theater.”

The message, sent on April 14, offered no further specifics, but CENTCOM’s area of responsibility includes the Gulf, where U.S. forces are facing off against the Iranian military over the Strait of Hormuz.

The disclosure was the first official confirmation that U.S. forces had been targeted in an active war zone, Wyden and a bipartisan group of legislators said in a letter sent on Thursday to the Pentagon.

“Commercial location data can be used to identify where U.S. troops congregate and their pattern of life, which can be exploited by adversaries to target attacks such as missiles, drones, and roadside bombs, as well as for counterintelligence purposes,” the letter warned.

Wyden said in a statement that it was time to “start treating the adtech industry as a national security threat.”

The Pentagon did not return messages seeking comment. The lawmakers said in their letter that their efforts to obtain more information from military officials about the reported targeting had been unsuccessful.

LOCATION DATA TRADE FUELS PRIVACY CONCERNS

Location data is widely used in digital advertising, which is a key source of revenue for many tech companies. Such data is typically collected from smartphones or other devices by apps or service providers before being sold to data brokers who collate and resell the data, sometimes via complex networks of intermediaries.

Although the threat to privacy inherent in selling the details of people’s day-to-day movements on the open market has long been a matter of public discussion, its potential as a national security risk has recently drawn concern as well.

As far back as 2016, one U.S. defense contractor was able to leverage commercially available location data to track special operations forces from their bases in the United States to a sensitive staging post in Syria, according to an account first disclosed by the Wall Street Journal.

More recently, journalists at Wired and two German news outlets drew on billions of coordinates collected by a data broker to expose the granular comings and goings of people stationed at or around 11 U.S. military and intelligence sites in Germany.

Two groups that represent digital advertisers, the Interactive Advertising Bureau and the Association of National Advertisers, did not return emails seeking comment.

The letter from U.S. lawmakers to the Pentagon said that, given what military officials know about the trade in location data, they should have acted faster to protect their personnel, for example by disabling the unique advertising ID attached to military-issued devices, automatically turning off location sharing on smartphones in the field and steering staff away from Google’s Chrome web browser toward more privacy-focused alternatives.

One of the letter’s cosigners was U.S. Representative Pat Harrigan, a North Carolina Republican who was formerly a U.S. Army Special Forces officer.

Harrigan said that browsers like Chrome “are built from the ground up to collect and share user data” and that every day they remain on government-issued devices “is another day we are handing our adversaries a weapon against our own troops.”

In a statement, Alphabet’s Google said that Chrome had “industry leading security.” The company added that it had “long advocated for stronger rules and safeguards against data brokers.”

Within weeks of the United States launching its bombing campaign, SpaceX executives met Pentagon officials and argued the military had been paying about $5,000 for connection per terminal while effectively using a higher tier of service worth closer to $25,000, according to two sources familiar with the matter and Pentagon documents reviewed by Reuters.

The disagreement over Starlink’s use on LUCAS suicide drones — a cheap U.S. model comparable to Iran’s Shahed that can circle over a target area before diving to detonate on impact — is part of increasing tensions between SpaceX and the Pentagon over Starlink pricing in recent months, according to interviews with five people familiar with the matter and the documents.

The Pentagon, which is seeking to help Iranian citizens bypass government-imposed communications blackouts, has also been at odds with SpaceX over pricing for a plan to provide the populace direct-to-cell connections with Starlink akin to 5G service, two of the sources said.

The ongoing disputes, which have not previously been reported, underscore how the Pentagon’s growing reliance on SpaceX is handing Musk greater leverage over a critical layer of U.S. national security – at a time when SpaceX is seeking to boost revenue ahead of an IPO next month that could be among the biggest in history.

Unlike consumer Starlink terminals available at stores including Walmart, SpaceX sells a military-specific version called Starshield to the Pentagon under a 2023 agreement. Starshield terminals can connect to both commercial Starlink satellites and a separate, more secure constellation, also called Starshield, according to a person familiar with the matter.

SpaceX argued the LUCAS drones were operating under conditions that aligned more closely with its aviation tier subscription rather than a lower priced land or mobility service. Pentagon officials argued that the $25,000 price tag — a monthly fee — was designed for aircraft, not kamikaze drones that used Starlink connection for a matter of minutes or hours, according to one of the sources.

The Pentagon, which was ramping up strikes on Iran, ultimately agreed to pay SpaceX’s proposed price increase, almost doubling the cost of each LUCAS drone. The Pentagon was initially paying about $30,000 per unit.

SpaceX didn’t respond to a comment request.

The Pentagon declined to comment on Reuters reporting that SpaceX increased its pricing, its decision to pay, or the plan to provide Iranian citizens with Starlink cell service. In a statement, a Pentagon official said the office responsible for acquiring the terminals, the Commercial Satellite Communications Office, is working to find other competitors.

“The Department of War is committed to fostering a competitive environment for commercial satellite communications,” an official said.

After the Reuters story was published, Elon Musk called it “false” without elaborating in a post on X. He added that the civilian Starlink system had been improperly used “for military purposes.” In a separate post, he said “the company” was at fault, not the Pentagon.

A spokesperson for Spektreworks, which makes the LUCAS drone, directed all questions to the Pentagon.

In a post on X, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said Reuters reporting was “wrong” without providing further information. SpaceX “remains a strong and valued partner to the Department of War,” he wrote.

But no other company provides a comparable alternative to Starlink, which has become an increasingly critical tool in modern warfare since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The satellite network provides global coverage, enabling battlefield communications and precision targeting even in remote areas. SpaceX’s constellation of roughly 10,000 satellites accounts for more than 60% of those in orbit — dwarfing the constellations being built by other companies, including OneWeb and Amazon Leo.

The risks of reliance on Starlink were first thrown into sharp focus during the Ukraine war, when Musk ordered Starlink service switched off in parts of the country in 2022 as Ukrainian forces advanced on Russian positions, disrupting a key counteroffensive, Reuters previously reported. More recently, U.S. Navy tests were disrupted last summer when a global Starlink outage cut off connection to unmanned military boats, leaving them bobbing in the ocean.

SPACEX HAS U.S. GOVERNMENT ‘OVER A BARREL’

Unlike traditional defense contractors, SpaceX holds greater leverage over the Pentagon because it also has a large commercial market for Starlink, alongside its rocket launch and artificial intelligence businesses, said Clayton Swope, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a national security-focused think tank. SpaceX generates about 20% of its total revenue from the U.S. government, according to an SEC filing.

SpaceX “certainly has the U.S. government over the barrel,” Swope said.

At the outset of the Iran war, Starlink was already a core part of U.S. military operations. In testing and early deployments, it supported a range of systems, from aerial attack drones such as the LUCAS to unmanned surface vessels used for maritime surveillance and strike missions. When the U.S. launched its bombing campaign, Starshield terminals were being used across more than a dozen drone systems, according to a source familiar with the matter.

But tensions between the Pentagon and SpaceX emerged quickly after the U.S. launched its February 28 assault on Iran. On March 1, SpaceX chief Elon Musk responded on X to a user’s post featuring an image of the LUCAS drone that said it “appears to have an integrated Starlink” terminal.

“It is a violation of commercial Starlink terms of service to use the terminal for weapon systems. This applies to all users and is shut down when discovered,” Musk posted. “There is a separate network called Starshield, which is operated by the US government.”

The Pentagon official, in a statement to Reuters, denied any violation of its agreement with SpaceX.

In the days that followed, SpaceX executives met Pentagon officials and argued the military was underpaying for the service, two sources familiar with the matter said.

Although the Pentagon initially agreed to the higher fee for satellite Wi-Fi connections used by attack drones, senior officials including Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg remained uneasy about the arrangement, one of the sources said. Pentagon officials, during an April ceasefire, met to revisit the pricing with Terrence O’Shaughnessy, a retired four-star Air Force general who now leads SpaceX’s defense business.

Still, the Pentagon is currently considering an additional purchase of more than 3,500 Starshield terminal subscriptions, including 100 with the higher-priced aviation tier, according to Pentagon documents reviewed by Reuters. The deal could generate hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue for SpaceX, though Reuters could not determine whether an agreement has been finalized, or what price is being discussed.

SPACEX PRICES IRK PENTAGON

Starlink has also proved crucial to other operations. After Iran cracked down on protests in January, killing thousands of people, the Trump administration smuggled in more than 6,000 Starlink terminals to provide internet access to citizens, the Wall Street Journal previously reported.

As the war intensified, however, Iranian authorities confiscated the terminals and deployed jamming devices across major cities to disrupt connections, according to a source familiar with the matter. Within a week of the conflict beginning, Pentagon officials began discussions with SpaceX about deploying direct-to-cell service that could bypass those disruptions, two people familiar with the matter said. The capability, similar to a 5G connection, would allow users to connect without terminals on the ground.

SpaceX, which generated $11.4 billion in revenue from Starlink in 2025, proposed charging as much as $500 million to launch the capability, along with a $100 million monthly fee to operate it, according to one of the people and Pentagon documents – prompting alarm from defense officials over the price.

Reuters could not determine whether an agreement has been reached.

Led by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, the group will visit Canada, Greenland, Norway and Iceland to “examine U.S. and allied Arctic security, infrastructure and research capabilities amid growing geopolitical competition in the region from Russia and China,” according to a press release.

The itinerary is set to include briefings at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on Arctic defense and strategic competition in the region.

President Donald Trump’s administration has sought to expand Washington’s strategic footprint in Greenland. Earlier this year, Trump suggested that U.S. forces could seize the semiautonomous Danish territory on national security grounds.

His push elicited a sharp rebuke from officials in both Greenland and Denmark, with the latter rejecting any potential for negotiation or territorial acquisition. The episode also roiled relations between the Trump administration and traditional European allies more broadly.

The all-female delegation that sets off on Friday is also expected to meet with U.S. military personnel, Indigenous communities, allied officials, Arctic researchers and regional leaders on emerging operational and strategic dynamics across the region.

Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, and Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire make up the Democratic side of the delegation, while Sens. Cynthia Lummis of Wyoming, Katie Britt of Alabama, and Cindy Hyde-Smith of Mississippi represent the GOP.

Rubio, speaking to reporters following a meeting with foreign ministers in Sweden on Friday, contended that the raison d’etre of NATO was undermined when allies refused to allow the U.S. to use installations on their soil during a war.

“One of the arguments I always made was that these bases in the region provided us logistical options that we wouldn’t otherwise have,” Rubio said. “And when some of those bases are denied to you — during a conflict that we’re involved in — then you question whether that value is still there.”

The U.S.-NATO relationship has been increasingly strained in the wake of the war in Iran, which began on Feb. 28. President Donald Trump believes that NATO allies should have offered much more assistance, especially with regard to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In basic terms, several of those nations say the war, started by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu without their consultation, is not their problem.

“I was never swayed by NATO,” Trump said in an interview in April. “I always knew they were a paper tiger.”

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has moved to scale back its military footprint across Europe, a shift Rubio emphasized predated tensions over Iran.

But some contradictory signals have been sent. On Thursday, Trump announced that the United States would deploy 5,000 additional troops to Poland — the same number of troops the Pentagon said earlier this month would be withdrawn from Germany.

Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski welcomed Thursday’s reversal, while his Swedish counterpart, Maria Malmer Stenegard, told reporters the U.S. position “is confusing indeed, and not always easy to navigate.”

Rubio, for his part, asserted that the United States military has global commitments in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East and Western Hemisphere that it has to meet — and that this requires a constant reevaluation of force posture.

“It’s well understood in the alliance that the United States’ troop presence in Europe is going to be adjusted,” Rubio said, underscoring that the process is already ongoing. “I’m not saying they’re going to be thrilled about it, but they are certainly aware of it.”

“This is not a punitive thing,” he insisted.

Regardless, Rubio said that Trump’s “disappointment” with the alliance’s response to U.S. operations in Iran will “have to be addressed” at the next NATO leaders’ summit, set for Turkey in July. He suggested that the gathering in Ankara will rank among the most consequential in NATO’s history.

In a short statement, the Defense Commissary Agency said only that the change took effect Wednesday and applied to commissaries worldwide. Commissaries in states or localities that mandate bags fees would still have to comply with those laws.

“The policy, introduced on April 6, which required commissary patrons to pay for single-use plastic and paper bags, has been rescinded,” the statement reads.

In a separate statement, Rep. Jen Kiggans, R-Va., a former Navy helicopter pilot, took credit for the reversal, saying the commissary agency’s decision followed months of advocacy.

Kiggans penned a letter to Anthony Tata, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, and she spoke about the issue directly with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth after his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last week, she said.

“I was deeply frustrated when DeCA announced it would impose a charge for paper and plastic bags — an added cost that complicates a benefit intended to support our service members, retirees and their families,” Kiggans said in a statement. “I appreciate Secretary Hegseth for listening to my concerns and taking swift action to eliminate this fee.”

The policy required commissary customers to pay 5 cents each for plastic bags and 10 cents for paper bags.

Providing the single-use bags costs the commissary agency $17 million per year, spokesperson Keith Desbois said when the agency announced the policy in March.

The commissary agency receives about $1.5 billion per year in taxpayer dollars to operate these discounted grocery stores as a benefit for the military community.

The Defense Department’s goal is an overall savings of 25% compared to commercial stores outside the gate.

Military Times reporter Karen Jowers contributed to this story.

The U.S. military is once again pursuing flying directed energy weapons to counter threats to American airspace, according to the Defense Department’s missile defense boss.

Speaking to members of Congress during a House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces hearing on April 15 on the Pentagon’s planned missile defense activities for fiscal year 2027, U.S. Missile Defense Agency director Air Force Lt. Gen. Heath Collins stated that his organization was “all in” on “bringing directed energy to the fight,” including integrating such weapons into unmanned platforms for domestic air defense against hostile missiles and drones.

“We are certainly putting more attention into bringing potentially game-changing directed energy capabilities to bear in an unmanned platform,” Collins stated in response to a question from Rep. Gabe Vasquez (D-New Mexico) regarding the MDA’s adoption of directed energy weapons.

“[An] air platform is what we’re focused on, so we can bring that capability to the edge of the fight and thin the herd on [unmanned aerial vehicles], potentially air threats and the like.”

While Collins did not identify specific directed energy capabilities of interest to the MDA, his written statement to the subcommittee notes that the agency is “accelerating the operational use of high-energy lasers on various platforms” to add a “critical, non-kinetic layer” to the existing U.S. missile defense architecture.

It’s unclear how much the MDA plans on spending on these efforts. While the “skinny” version at the Pentagon’s historic $1.5 trillion fiscal year 2027 budget request published in early April includes a significant boost to directed energy research and development for homeland missile defense under the Trump administration’s “Golden Dome for America” initiative, the documents do not contain any R&D or procurement efforts explicitly tied to the agency.

As Laser Wars readers likely already know, the Pentagon has been examining airborne laser weapons for missile defense since the 1970s, when the U.S. Air Force established its Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) program to explore the development of a laser-armed “aerial battleship” to protect strategic bombers from incoming interceptors.

In 2010, the service’s Boeing 747-based YAL-1 Airborne Laser Test Bed successfully destroyed several ballistic missiles in flight during testing but was subsequently canceled the following year due to “significant affordability and technology problems,” as then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it at the time.

As military laser weapons have evolved from bulky chemical-based systems to more compact and efficient solid-state designs in recent decades, U.S. military planners have increasingly explored integrating them into unmanned airborne platforms.

The High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS) effort, initiated in 2003 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, sought to develop a 150-kW system to integrate into both manned and unmanned aircraft before grinding to a halt in 2015.

The MDA itself pursued outfitting drones with laser weapons for ballistic missile defense for more than a decade through its Low Power Laser Demonstrator (LPLD) initiative before then-Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin threw cold water on the effort in 2020, citing the unique technical and environmental challenges inherent to mounting lasers on aircraft.

“I think it can be done as an experiment, but as a weapon system to equip an airplane with the kinds of lasers we think necessary — in terms of their power level, and all their support requirements, getting the airplane to altitudes where atmospheric turbulence can be mitigated appropriately — that combination of things doesn’t go on one platform,” Griffin told reporters in May 2020, per Breaking Defense. “So, I’m just extremely skeptical of that.”

Griffin isn’t wrong. Despite advances in laser technology, engineering a directed energy weapon that’s both powerful enough to destroy an incoming target and compact enough to integrate onto a relatively small airframe like a multirole combat aircraft or drone is a significant challenge.

Even if an integration were technically simple, operational feasibility is an major question: atmospheric conditions are limiting factors for laser weapons in any domain, but turbulence is a particularly thorny one for fast-moving airborne platforms tasked with maintaining a coherent beam long enough to successfully neutralize targets moving at equally high speeds.

Despite this skepticism, the dream of laser-armed drones appears alive and well. As recently as 2024, the MDA was gearing up for another run at airborne lasers, albeit with an initial focus on low-powered systems for tracking before ramping up to high-energy weapons.

In January 2025, the U.S. Navy released a slick vision of future naval operations that included notional drone wingmen outfitted with directed energy weapons running interference for manned aircraft. And in the last year, defense contractor General Atomics has released multiple renderings of its MQ-9B SkyGuardian and MQ-20 Avenger drones outfitted with laser weapons, although a company spokesman cautioned reporters that the systems were not designed for “any specific government program or contract.”

Directed energy weapons offer an alluring alternative to traditional missile-based air defenses, with low cost-per-shot, deep magazines and the ability to engage targets at the speed of light.

But the Pentagon has been here before: airborne laser concepts have repeatedly surged on waves of optimism, only to collapse under the weight of technical complexities and ballooning costs.

Indeed, the Air Force’s Airborne High Energy Laser (AHEL) and Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) efforts, which respectively sought to mount laser weapons on an AC-130J Ghostrider gunship and F-15 Eagle fighter jet, proved too challenging to even advance to airborne tests. (Undeterred, the service is poised to restart airborne laser efforts in fiscal year 2027 amid a surge in broad institutional support for directed energy. Time is a flat circle.)

Whether the MDA is barreling towards a genuine directed energy inflection point or just another familiar R&D cycle remains an open question.

For now, the message from Collins is clear: when it comes to determining whether airborne laser weapons are a viable missile defense capability, the U.S. military is once again willing to find out the hard way.

The move has stakeholders urging not to lean too hard on algorithms to distinguish, for instance, a scientist-spy sharing secret nano-energy plans with China from a Chinese professor publishing AI safety studies. Hanging in the balance lies troops’ technological edge, veteran intelligence officials and academics say.

AI’s confusion over the timing and nature of research partnerships may obscure real espionage if humans are not the ultimate judge of foreign influence, they warn, with some academics fearing an AI-work slop redux of the “China Initiative,” where the first Trump administration charged dozens of ethnic Chinese scientists with fraud, only to drop nearly all charges.

“Automated vetting tools are extremely useful for vetting large datasets and identifying patterns of concern. But those tools are for decision support to help the people, the human analysts, assess context and intent,” said David Cattler, who, until September, led the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, which screens personnel seeking security clearances.

The renewed focus on academic research security comes as tensions between the U.S. and China over AI intensify, with China ramping up both the development of low-cost AI models and its alleged exploitation of U.S. models.

The U.S. intelligence community’s annual threat assessment reports that China “aims to displace the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030,” in part, “by using its sizeable talent pool, extensive datasets, government funding and burgeoning global partnerships.”

Partnership is a complicated term in military “fundamental research” — studies that are publishable, rather than proprietary or classified, with potential defense applications.

For instance, mere co-authorship with a China-based scientist does not suffice to deny a U.S. researcher money, according to evolving academic research rules targeting foreign influence. Rather, to make the call, the Pentagon must assess each academic’s disclosures of external funding sources and affiliations.

According to a recently-declassified May 2025 inspector general report, such disclosures went unchecked because the Pentagon had not “requested additional government full-time equivalent employees to thoroughly review… and to conduct oversight of over 27,000 academic research awards.”

Defense News first obtained the report and the Pentagon’s response to a draft version through an open records request.

When asked about additional staffing, a Pentagon official pointed to orders in a January research security directive for the Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) to identify “automated vetting and continuous monitoring capabilities” and create a common research grant database.

The mandate also calls for a year-long “damage assessment” of selected research transactions, including cases that the House Select Committee on China flagged, in part, using AI tools.

A September GOP-led Committee report alleged that the Pentagon subsidized 1,400 academic papers published between June 2023 and June 2025 involving partnerships with the Chinese government.

The Pentagon said in an emailed statement on Thursday that the department “is committed to protecting the integrity of U.S. research while fostering international collaboration. Our approach leverages advanced analytical tools to augment human expertise, ensuring a rigorous and fair review process.”

Machines Make the Same Mistakes

Several university representatives, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of policy discussions, note that AI-assisted risk assessments have, in the past, drawn false assumptions about U.S.-China research collaborations.

For instance, the AI-aided GOP House report mislabeled the state-backed Wuhan National Laboratory for Optoelectronics as the sponsor of a collection of nine essays, whereas the Wuhan lab supported only one essay that involved no U.S. authors or federal funding.

The report also mistook a Chinese military-affiliated author’s publication on single-electron transistors for a DOD-funded project, when it merely referenced work funded by the U.S. military.

House Select Committee officials declined to comment on the cases.

Averting foreign interference “is not as easy as just having better AI capacities, because we know that some of those AI mistakes were the same human mistakes that led to inaccurate charges brought against researchers under the China Initiative,” Toby Smith, senior vice president for government relations and public policy at the Association of American Universities, said after learning of the AI gaffes.

About 30% of the China Initiative’s 77 cases involved academics not disclosing Chinese partnerships or funding sources, though disclosure was often not required, or no such partners or funding existed.

A jury found only one professor, Harvard nanochemist Charles Lieber, guilty, after he lied to Pentagon investigators about his participation in a Chinese talent recruitment program and made other false statements.

Smith said that relying on proxies — such as co-authorship, affiliation or nationality — to deduce security concerns led investigators to confuse co-authorship with direct interaction or shared data access, and to misinterpret historical ties as active partnerships.

“AI systems trained on bibliometric data,” or citation analytics, “and affiliation records can inherit the same flawed assumptions that underpinned the China Initiative,” he said. “The core lesson from the China Initiative is that identifying genuine research security risk requires judgment, context and proportionality — qualities that automated systems should support, not replace.”

Gisela Perez Kusakawa, executive director of the Asian-American Scholar Forum, said that the Pentagon has not communicated the types of data that the new AI tools will collect, use and share, nor sought community feedback, heightening concerns about ethnic profiling.

In an emailed statement, the Pentagon responded, “It is the standard practice of the department to not provide specifics regarding the criteria and weighting for threat assessments conducted, whether by manual or automated process.”

Kusakawa said, “We should be making sure that our research environment is welcoming, that we are encouraging these talents, especially in AI, to come to the United States and, frankly, have family in the United States, and make this a country that they contribute to and invest their and their children’s future in.”

Increasingly, that AI talent is not coming. Statistics suggest that Chinese AI experts are staying in China, even as America has managed to keep earlier expats.

Of about 100 Chinese-origin AI scholars who were researching at U.S. institutions in 2019 — when their papers were accepted at the world’s most elite AI conference, NeurIPS — 87% remained stateside as of 2025, according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace figures.

At the same time, the share of Chinese home-grown talent not moving abroad has skyrocketed since 2019, based on an Economist tally of similar data. In 2019, about 30% of NeurIPS authors educated in China were still in China. By 2022, that population had jumped to 58%, and up to 68% in 2025.

‘Key’ Financial Disclosures Were Missing

To ensure that no country has a stranglehold on general knowledge, “the goal cannot be to close the U.S. research system altogether,” said Cattler, the former Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency director and now founder of consultancy Ironhelm Works. “The goal must be to ensure that collaboration strengthens national security rather than inadvertently weakening it.”

Last year’s inspector general report concluded that Pentagon agencies that partner with academic institutions “could be at an increased risk of exposure to foreign influence” because military units were “missing key documents” that can help discern scientists’ foreign financial sources, outside employers and other details related to potential conflicts.

For instance, about 80% of Air Force funding transactions sampled in the report were missing documents that can reveal problematic relationships. Also, the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency — which bankrolled the Internet’s inventors — told evaluators that they had not, as required, annually checked that researchers named in progress reports were not involved in banned talent recruitment programs.

In response to questions about the screening lapses, the Pentagon said in an emailed statement that the department “is aware of the OIG’s findings in the report and the impacted directorates are working with [the Office of the Undersecretary for Defense and Engineering] to address the items identified.”

Jeffrey Stoff, a Chinese linguist and intelligence community analyst for 18 years who resigned in 2021 due to frustration with research security, maintains that DOD still needs more human expertise in language, culture and the minutiae of research restrictions.

“AI can and should be used for unsophisticated, labor-intensive tasks,” such as cross-referencing foreign organizations in financial disclosure forms against the names of blacklisted parties, but humans still need to inspect AI’s work, as not all nefarious ties are machine-readable, said Stoff, who now advocates for tighter safeguards as head of the nonprofit Center for Research Security and Integrity.

Cattler, giving more credit to AI, said that the scale of research collaboration demands that the Pentagon upgrade its approach to clocking potential spies.

With such a large population of research institutions and affiliated scientists, as well as a bombardment of often duplicative alerts, automation “improves the signal within that noise and can help orient the humans on really important matters,” he said.

“Sometimes people are deliberately deceptive when they are processed, and that could happen in a human exchange just as much as it could happen in something that a computer can see, but together, a human review and a computer review are incredibly powerful.”