The raid took place June 25 and involved multiple facilities of the Orlando-based Cole Engineering Services, that company confirmed. Cole Engineering is located in the same office park housing the Army’s Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation, or PEO STRI. Officials would not confirm whether the office was involved in the raid, or if other companies and entities were also a part of it.

Cole Engineering CEO Bob Donahue addressed the raid in a companywide email sent last week and shared with Army Times on Monday.

“While it remains early in the process, I want to be clear that we have no reason to believe that the company or any of our employees have been engaged in any kind of wrongdoing,” Donahue wrote. “As I said in my earlier note to you, By Light has always and continues to maintain an intense focus on conducting our business in an ethical and proper fashion.” By Light is the parent company of Cole Engineering, a prominent defense contractor focused on tactical simulation tools.

Donahue added that the company had initiated its own investigation, engaging a “former well-known, long-time Department of Justice senior prosecutor” to conduct it.

“We have launched this review to ensure we have the facts, and our policies and procedures are best practices,” Donahue wrote. “This action also reaffirms By Light’s longstanding commitment to and reputation for outstanding mission performance while conducting ourselves in a manner that is above board and beyond question.”

The company, he said, would continue to cooperate fully with government authorities.

“To put to rest rumors that may have circulated, let me also confirm for you that no one in the company has been arrested or charged,” Donahue said.

Reached for comment, the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, which falls under the Defense Department Inspector General’s office, provided nearly identical statements.

The entities “executed multiple search warrants in Florida on June 25, 2024,” Army CID spokesman Keith Smith said in a statement. “As the investigation is still in progress, no additional information can be provided at this time.”

Neither the Army nor PEO STRI responded to requests for comment or questions about the raid or whether the program office was involved. According to their website, PEO STRI’s mission is to “rapidly develop, deliver and sustain testing, training and information operations capabilities to enhance readiness across the operational spectrum.”

In 2021, Cole Engineering became the prime contractor for the Army’s new cyber training environment project, securing a contract worth as much as $957.7 million over eight years to complete the work. PEO STRI has already employed the system at events such as the Cyber Flag 2022 training exercise.

Last April, the company landed another $500 million, three-year contract for the Reconfigurable Virtual Collective Trainer system for aviation crew members.

Army CID and DCIS play a role in policing contracting fraud, which can include deceptive practices and overcharging, as well as violations of the Procurement Integrity Act, which prohibits the release of source selection, contracting or proposal information by government employees.

I strongly argue that the administration and Congress must unite to fund the Air Force to ensure the continuity of this vital program. They also need to explore alternative design and acquisition strategies to significantly reduce the cost of NGAD and expedite the delivery of this critical capability.

By way of background, the family of systems known as NGAD — which includes a manned, penetrating, counter-air platform and unmanned collaborative combat aircraft — is the result of extensive Air Force and Department of Defense research, which began in 2014. This research concluded that America’s current air dominance assets would not remain sufficiently competitive against the systems of potential adversaries (especially China) into the 2030s.

Then-acquisition chief Frank Kendall was instrumental in this analysis and program from the start. He even made it the linchpin of one of his seven operational imperatives after becoming secretary of the Air Force. With China confirming that it is working on a sixth-generation fighter system to be completed by 2035, the importance of the NGAD program for the Air Force has become all the more apparent.

Enter the Fiscal Responsibility Act and its caps on defense spending; deficit concerns; and the bow-wave effect of must-pay bills for programs like the B-21 bomber, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and rising personnel costs; the Air Force now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma for FY26 and beyond.

There’s not enough money to pay for all of it.

Moreover, the manned portion of NGAD is predicted to be even more expensive than the F-35 fighter, which, if true, does not bode well for America’s ability to eventually procure an adequate number of fighters. If the program encounters significant delays, the U.S. may once again find itself delivering a capability that has not kept pace with where the threat has advanced.

What, then, should we do?

First, I urge Congress and the DOD to provide adequate funds to the Air Force so that all these important programs remain on track.

Second, I urge the Air Force to consider innovative design and acquisition strategies — perhaps along the lines of the “century series” approach that former Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper once spoke of. This approach would involve less-expensive and quicker-to-produce fighters with iterative designs that could change every few years if necessary. Engaging in discussions with industry on such an approach is crucial, as it represents a very different way of doing business and we need to ensure its feasibility.

It’s time for us to come together, think outside the box and find new ways to support our military’s needs.

The only thing we can say for sure is that China is ruthlessly advancing its NGAD equivalent and does not appear to be slowing down due to budgetary concerns. Moreover, China is continuing aggressive actions in the South China Sea and has stepped up military drills that simulate a blockade and possible invasion of Taiwan.

The 2030s will be upon us in an instant, so we can’t afford to delay NGAD. Doing so would mean risking loss in a future conflict.

Deborah Lee James is a former secretary of the U.S. Air Force. She serves as chair of the Defense Business Board and is affiliated with several organizations and businesses.

The Government Accountability Office unveiled its annual report on the Defense Department’s buying practices, covering many of the largest items in the military’s shopping cart, from aircraft carriers to intercontinental ballistic missiles.

GAO studied more than 30 of the most expensive items on order, costing a little more than $1 trillion. The total cost of those fell by about $1.7 billion since the year before, due to changes in inflation and a drop in purchases.

Still, several of these big-ticket items are running above the contracted price. The estimated total may rise, the report warned, plus there are issues with speed.

For the largest weapons programs still awaiting delivery, it’s taking 10 years for the Pentagon to place an order and then receive the system. That’s longer than the average noted last year.

But for programs that have started delivering, the delays are even longer. The average time, the authors found, rose from 8 years to 11 years.

Alongside these major programs, GAO also studied some meant to be smaller and more nimble. These “middle-tier acquisitions,” or MTA, work like a toll road alongside a highway — a quicker route for weapons that the Pentagon needs more urgently.

The trouble is that the speed limit isn’t much faster, the report found.

“Although the MTA pathway was designed for speed, GAO found most MTA programs do not plan to implement leading practices to facilitate that speed,” it said.

These programs are meant to reach the field within five years, according to the Pentagon’s own guidance. However, GAO found some middle-tier programs are still following a “linear” process: five years for prototyping and another five for development.

“While the MTA pathway offers flexibilities to create efficiencies in the acquisition process, the warfighter may continue to wait years — if not more than a decade — for a solution that may ultimately no longer be relevant,” according to the report.

One of the core problems the Pentagon faces as it tries to buy weapons moving forward is purchasing software. Weapons, like technology more broadly, depend more on the lines of code that make them work. To avoid going obsolete, that software must stay up to date.

But the DOD struggles to buy this evergreen technology, and one of the reasons listed in the report is employees. The department doesn’t have enough people who understand software, the report argued. Instead, many of the most software-intense programs in the Pentagon require the expertise of contractors.

“DOD has taken initial steps to establish a cadre of personnel with software expertise, but its efforts are in early stages,” the report said. “While DOD expects to request more funding, as of March 2024, the cadre consisted of one federal employee with limited assistance.”

GAO offered three main recommendations: strategies to make MTA programs move faster, clearer guidance on the Pentagon’s software workforce, and the funding and goals needed for that workforce.

The top deputy for Pentagon acquisition and sustainment, who has since moved to a policy role, partially agreed with the recommendations and said some may be included in the DOD’s next update to its buying practices, expected this month.

A former Navy vice chief of naval operations faces up to 30 years in prison after he was arrested Friday along with two business executives on criminal charges involving a U.S. government contract bribery scheme while in uniform, according to the Justice Department.

An indictment unsealed Friday alleges that retired Adm. Robert Burke, 62, took part in the scheme from 2020 to 2022, while serving as commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa from 2020 until his retirement in 2022.

The alleged crimes also involve Yongchul “Charlie” Kim and Meghan Messenger, both of New York, who are the CEOs of a company referred to only as “Company A” in the Justice Department’s indictment announcement.

Burke’s civilian defense attorney, Timothy Parlatore, told Navy Times that Burke “vigorously contests these charges,” and that there was “no quid pro quo.”

“The timeline in the indictment is inaccurate,” Parlatore said. “We look forward to going to trial and expect that he will be found not guilty.”

Burke turned himself in to local authorities earlier on Friday, he added.

Attorneys for Kim and Messenger could not immediately be reached for comment.

Burke, Kim and Messenger are each charged with bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, while Burke faces additional charges of performing acts of a personal financial interest and concealing material facts from the United States.

According to the Justice Department, the alleged crimes started when Company A provided a training pilot program to “a small component” of the Navy from August 2018 to July 2019.

The Navy terminated a contract with that company in late 2019 “and directed Company A not to contact Burke,” according to the Justice Department.

Burke served as the vice chief of naval operations, the second-highest officer in the Navy, from June 2019 to June 2020, according to his official biography.

But Kim and Messenger allegedly went on to meet with Burke in Washington, D.C., in July 2021, part an alleged effort to reestablish the company’s ties to the Navy.

“At the meeting, the charged defendants allegedly agreed that Burke would use his position as a Navy Admiral to steer a sole-source contract to Company A in exchange for future employment at the company,” the Justice Department said. “They allegedly further agreed that Burke would use his official position to influence other Navy officers to award another contract to Company A to train a large portion of the Navy.”

Kim allegedly estimated that that contract would be worth “triple digit millions,” according to the Justice Department.

Burke allegedly ordered his staff in December 2021 to award a $355,000 contract to the company to train personnel under his command in Spain and Italy, according to the Justice Department, and Company A carried out the training in January 2022.

Burke allegedly tried to convince a fellow “senior Navy Admiral” to award another contract to the company. That senior admiral is not identified in the Justice Department’s indictment announcement.

“To conceal the scheme, Burke allegedly made several false and misleading statements to the Navy, including by creating the false appearance that Burke played no role in issuing the contract and falsely implying that Company A’s employment discussions with Burke only began months after the contract was awarded,” the Justice Department said.

Burke retired after handing over command of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa in the summer of 2022, according to the Navy.

A few months later, in October 2022, Burke went to work for Company A “at a yearly starting salary of $500,000 and a grant of 100,000 stock options,” according to the Justice Department.

Before leading the Navy in Europe and Africa, Burke was the vice chief of operations from June 2019 to June 2020, and also served as the chief of naval personnel.

In a statement Friday, the Navy said “has fully cooperated with this investigation from the onset.

“We take this matter very seriously and will continue to cooperate with the Department of Justice,” the Navy said.

Semiconductors are the backbone of nearly all electronics and their complexity requires the use of third-party IP, a pre-designed component that has been licensed from an external vendor and integrated into a chip’s design. Third-party IP is increasingly common as it allows for faster time to market and reduced costs.

However, the reliance on external IP also introduces potential security risks, as the integrity and trustworthiness of the IP provider cannot always be guaranteed. And those risks are not limited to a single sector. They have far-reaching implications across the government, as compromised semiconductor chips could lead to vulnerabilities in weapons systems, communications networks, and other vital infrastructures, hindering essential functions that could undermine national security.

Congress has taken steps toward addressing the challenges posed by third-party IP. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, signed into law in December, includes language that recognizes the need for increased transparency and collaboration between IP vendors and the government. This legislation comes after the ratification of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which aims to onshore semiconductor chip production and secure the supply chain while marking an important milestone in the effort to tackle this long-standing problem.

There are still many gaps that must be addressed to provide the government the highest levels of assurance regarding third-party IP. To further mitigate delays, cost overruns, and potential security risks associated with using third-party IP in semiconductor chips for critical applications, IP vendors could document and provide their security requirements and safeguards at the onset.

This would provide transparency for the user of the IP — the system-on-a-chip, or SoC, developer, or in this case, the U.S. government — and allow it to better vet the IP, regardless of how many months or years down the line a review is needed. This evidence should be measurable to provide quantifiable security assurance. By providing that higher level of visibility, the government, or any other user, can more easily assess whether the IP meets necessary program security requirements.

Unfortunately, vendors often provide their IP without any accompanying security evidence as part of their documentation, leaving users in the dark about potential risks and the level of assurance to assign to the IP. Vulnerabilities can be assessed and mitigated through a security “sign off” process that relies on meeting security requirements established early on in the development process.

The vendor rarely knows what the end application is, so SoC developers must be able to evaluate the IP in the context of their specific requirements. Having the necessary security evidence to review as part of the IP documentation package provides the microelectronics design community with IP that has been “signed off” for meeting security assurance requirements. It demonstrates that specific security weaknesses and vulnerabilities have been mitigated, security features implemented, and potential risks averted. Programs exploring the viability of third party IP could then determine whether said IP suits their needs — or if additional information or modifications are necessary to further ensure the security of the final product.

IP vendors want to offer their customers all of the necessary assurances they require, just as long as it doesn’t involve giving access to the inner workings of their IP. They have a legitimate desire to safeguard their IP to maintain a competitive advantage and a predictable revenue stream. For the sake of providing a higher level of assurance and transparency, the IP provider can’t be required to give up their most sensitive information.

So, to address those concerns, vendors and developers — the U.S. government — should adopt a proactive, cooperative approach that prioritizes solutions that maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the IP. It needs to be grounded in a shared commitment to national security and the integrity of critical systems.

Likewise, a further step toward enhancing trust and mitigating risks would be to have independent security verification of the third-party IP. This objective evaluation would generate verifiable security evidence from the IP provider that could be used by the SoC developer to ensure secure integration, configuration, and use.

This independent verification would also help meet various compliance requirements, which often mandate a security assessment. By having an impartial entity validate the security claims and documentation provided by the vendor, the government could gain greater confidence in the trustworthiness of the IP.

Ultimately, the only way to truly address the mounting concerns — today, chiefly those from the U.S. government — that critical systems may be susceptible to failure due to compromised third-party IP components is for the vendors and developers to work together to comprehensively validate their security proactively. This will ensure these chips and the devices, products, and programs that rely upon them will operate as intended without the risk of being hacked by an unknown entity.

Jason Oberg is CTO and co-founder of Cycuity, a cybersecurity company that offers security assurance for semiconductor chip development.

The dismissals came at the request of the government — not the defense — citing prosecutorial errors.

Retired U.S. Navy officers Donald Hornbeck, Robert Gorsuch and Jose Luis Sanchez, and U.S. Marine Corps Col. Enrico DeGuzman had all admitted to accepting bribes from defense contractor Leonard Francis, nicknamed “Fat Leonard.”

The enigmatic figure — who was six feet, 3 inches tall and weighed 350 pounds at one time — is at the center of the Navy’s most extensive corruption cases in recent history.

The three pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of disclosing information on Tuesday. The judge also dismissed the entire case against U.S. Navy officer Stephen Shedd. Their defense lawyers could not be immediately reached for comment.

It marked the latest setback to the government’s yearslong efforts in going after dozens of military officials tied to Francis, who pleaded guilty to offering more than $500,000 in cash bribes, along with other gifts and wild sex parties in Southeast Asia, to Navy officials, defense contractors and others. The scheme allowed him to bilk the maritime service out of at least $35 million by getting commanders to redirect ships to ports he controlled and overcharging for services, according to the prosecution.

Francis owned and operated Singapore-based Glenn Defense Marine Asia Ltd., which supplied food, water and fuel to U.S. Navy vessels. He was arrested in 2013 in a sting operation in San Diego.

Prosecutors said in legal filings outlining their request for Tuesday’s dismissals that the action does not mean the defendants did not commit the charged crimes but because information was withheld from the defense and other mistakes were made, they wanted to ensure justice was served fairly.

In 2022, Judge Janis Sammartino had ruled the former lead federal prosecutor committed “flagrant misconduct” by withholding information from defense lawyers. In September, the felony convictions of four former Navy officers were also vacated. The four men pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $100 fine each.

The dismissals come weeks before Francis is due back in court to set a date for his sentencing.

Francis returned to the U.S. late last year after a daring escape from his house arrest in San Diego in 2022. He fled to South America weeks before he was scheduled to be sentenced last year, and was later captured in Venezuela, which extradited him to the U.S. as part of a prisoner exchange.

The escape was also seen by some as a misstep by the prosecution for allowing him to not be held behind bars.

That recent experience, coupled with the daunting national security challenges facing us today, makes it a great time to strengthen the DPA for the future. Here’s how we can do it:

The most essential action is to keep the Defense Production Act strictly focused on national security needs. The DPA became widely known during the COVID-19 pandemic but grew out of the success of World War II’s mobilization efforts. Signed into law in 1950, the DPA has three active titles today used in various manners to shortcut bureaucratic government processes to meet exigent circumstances.

Prior to the pandemic, for example, DPA titles were used to prioritize the production of aluminum for use in the development of lifesaving mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles during the Iraq War; to create beryllium factories for defense uses; and to counter Chinese foreign investment that impacts national security.

Today, it is currently used to great effect in reshoring and building industrial base capacity in areas such as rare earth processing, castings, forgings and advanced batteries. The increased use of DPA is welcome, but its popularity has also led to its invocation to support domestic production of solar panels and heat pumps, which has caused political controversy.

This was a focus at an initial House hearing in March. That hearing struck exactly the right tone: It is essential to keep DPA focused exclusively on defense and national security issues, in particular threats from our pacing competitor, China. As I wrote with my co-authors in 2022, using DPA outside of direct national security purposes threatens the viability of this unique tool for rebuilding a robust, resilient and globally competitive American industrial base.

With that national security purpose firmly in mind, there are several ways to strengthen the existing DPA provisions. At the national level under Title I, the DPA is governed by a mishmash of old and overlapping executive orders spanning numerous administrations that need to be refreshed and simplified. While detailed plans are not solutions by themselves, the administration should conduct a thorough review of relevant executive orders and regulations to better orient DPA policies and practices to address future national security challenges.

DPA Title III has been a tremendous tool to address aggressive Chinese industrial policy in areas such as rare earth processing, batteries, magnets and microelectronics. The non-delegable requirement for the president’s signature on each DPA determination, however, has significantly slowed the process by which DPA projects are developed and executed. Allowing the delegation of that determination in the upcoming 2025 reauthorization of the DPA, perhaps to the secretary level of those agencies with Title III authority, would significantly streamline the development of Title III projects.

Another significant improvement would be the use of purchase commitments under Title III. Purchase commitments would allow the Department of Defense to create a guaranteed demand signal for an industrial capability over a mutually agreed upon period of time, thereby reducing risks for industry to make investments in areas such as critical materials.

Purchase-commitment projects, however, are not an option currently because Congress has appropriated DPA funds over the past three years using standard procurement funds, which expire in two years, contrary to traditional DPA appropriations, which do not expire. That needs to change to start using this important authority.

While the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States continues to do critical national security work evaluating foreign investment under the authority of Title VII, there are important aspects of that title that have been dramatically underused. Title VII, for example, permits the government to establish voluntary agreements or plans of action with industry “to help provide for the national defense.” The administration, for example, could consider establishing voluntary agreements to prepare standby industrial capacity for potential surge use during conflict.

Title VII also permits the president to establish the National Defense Executive Reserve, a volunteer group of industrial executives like WWII’s War Production Board to advise on or support mobilization efforts. Creating an active NDER unit to support industrial preparations for potential major conflicts sounds like an incredibly appropriate action to consider right now.

The DPA is a powerful tool that enables our nation to prepare for or respond to national security emergencies. Let’s build on the strengths of today’s DPA and make it the foundation for America’s arsenal of the future.

Jerry McGinn is the executive director of the Greg and Camille Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. He previously served as a senior acquisition official with the U.S. Defense Department.

“If you believe they were abused … tell them to make their claim against the U.S. government,” said John O’Connor, defense attorney for Reston, Virginia-based military contractor CACI, during closing arguments at the civil trial in federal court. “Why didn’t they sue the people who actively abused them?”

The lawsuit brought by the three former Abu Ghraib detainees marks the first time a U.S. jury has weighed claims of abuse at the prison, which was the site of a worldwide scandal 20 years ago when photos became public showing U.S. soldiers smiling as they inflicted abusive and humiliating treatment on detainees in the months after the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.

The suit alleges that civilian interrogators supplied by CACI to Abu Ghraib contributed to the torture the plaintiffs by conspiring with military police to “soften up” detainees for interrogations.

CACI, in its closing arguments, relied in part on a legal theory known as the “borrowed servant doctrine,” which states an employer can’t be liable for its employees’ conduct if another entity is controlling and directing those employees’ work.

In this case, CACI says the Army was directing and controlling its employees in their work as interrogators.

Lawyers for the plaintiffs disputed that CACI relinquished control of its interrogators to the Army. At trial, they introduced evidence that CACI’s contract with the Army required CACI to supervise its own employees. Jurors also saw a section of the Army Field Manual that pertains to contractors and states that “only contractors may supervise and give direction to their employees.

Muhammad Faridi, one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, told jurors that the case is simpler than CACI’s lawyers are trying to make it.

He said that if CACI interrogators conspired with military police to inflict abuse on detainees to soften them up for interrogations, then the jury can find CACI liable even if CACI interrogators never themselves inflicted abuse on any of the three plaintiffs.

All three plaintiffs testified to horrible treatment including beatings, sexual assaults, being threatened with dogs and forced to wear women’s underwear, but said the abuse was either inflicted by soldiers, or by civilians who couldn’t be identified as CACI workers. In some cases, the detainees said they couldn’t see who was abusing them because they had bags over their heads.

As evidence of CACI’s complicity, jurors heard testimony from two retired generals who investigated the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004; both concluded that CACI interrogators engaged in misconduct.

Faridi told the jury that while many of the soldiers who abused detainees were convicted and sentenced to prison, CACI has not yet been held accountable.

“When our country’s military found out about the abuse, they didn’t cover it up,” Faridi said. “Our country’s military held the military police members who were perpetrating the abuse accountable. CACI escaped liability.”

And Faridi said that even when the Army asked CACI to hold its its interrogators responsible, it still sought to evade responsibility. In May 2004, the Army asked CACI to fire one of its interrogators, Dan Johnson, after one of the Abu Ghraib photos showed Johnson interrogating a detainee who was forced into an awkward crouching position that investigators concluded was an illegal stress position.

CACI contested Johnson’s dismissal, writing that the “photo depicts what appears to be a relatively relaxed scene” and saying that “squatting is common and unremarkable among Iraqis.”

“I’ll leave that to you to consider whether you find that offensive,” Faridi told the jury Monday.

At trial, CACI employees testified they defended Johnson’s work because Army personnel had asked them through back channels to do so. O’Connor said that out of the many hundreds of photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib, the photo of Johnson is the only one depicting a CACI employee, and it shows him questioning not one of the plaintiffs but an Iraqi policeman after someone had smuggled a gun into the prison and shot at military police.

O’Connor also apologized for parts of his case that were “long, annoying and boring” but said he had no choice because the U.S. government claimed that some evidence, including the identities of interrogators, was classified. So jurors, rather than hearing live testimony, were subjected to long audio recordings in which the interrogators’ voices were doctored and their answers were often interrupted by government lawyers who instructed them to not answer the question.

The trial was delayed by more than 15 years of legal wrangling and questions over whether CACI could be sued. Some of the debate focused on the question of immunity — there had long been an assumption that the U.S. government would hold sovereign immunity from a civil suit, and CACI argued that, as a government contractor, it would enjoy derivative immunity.

But U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema, in a first-of-its-kind ruling, determined that the U.S. government cannot claim immunity in cases involving fundamental violations of international norms, such as torture allegations. And, as a result, CACI could not claim any kind of derivative immunity, either.

The move, included in the VA’s fiscal year 2024 spending bill that was signed into law in March, restricts the department from conducting certain research on the animals in the future.

“VA is on the cutting edge of research, and I am proud to say that it will be eliminating the use of research on animals within the next two years,” Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-Florida, said during a House subcommittee hearing Tuesday. “We’re pushing VA to find other scientific methods to conduct this vital research,” she said.

The legislative language follows a long debate over whether animal testing at VA should be limited, or whether such studies are critical for medical research.

“A growing majority of taxpayers — Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike — oppose wasteful and cruel government testing on pets and primates and don’t want to be forced to foot the bill,” Justin Goodman, a senior vice president with the watchdog group White Coat Waste Project, told Military Times in a statement.

In 2016, the VA reported it experimented on roughly 16 cats, 220 dogs and 18 primates, he said, noting that it has not experimented on any dogs or cats at all since early 2022.

Not everyone though has supported a total halt to such research, contending it has allowed for advancements to support veterans with disabilities. Some medical research, the department has previously noted, can be done only with canines because they are more similar to humans than other species like rats or mice are, in terms of size and physiology.

VA Secretary David Shulkin wrote for USA Today in 2017 that canine research needed to continue as it has delivered important discoveries like the implantable cardiac pacemaker and the artificial pancreas. He did later say on social media he remains opposed toward any new dog research.

A VA-sponsored study reported in 2020 that medical testing on dogs by the department may be scientifically necessary in some cases. It did not offer a clear defense or indictment of the work, but encouraged alternatives to live-animal tests should be pursued, Military Times previously reported.

“VA has historically undertaken research using sensitive species only when absolutely necessary to fulfill our vital mission to care for those who have served in our military,” a VA spokesperson told Military Times in a statement.

The department was already taking steps to eliminate or reduce such testing, they said, adding that it oversaw a more than a 90% decrease in those studies over the last nearly 20 years.

“Ending tests on dogs, cats and primates is a welcome starting point, but it’s far from the finish line,” Shalin Gala, a vice president with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, told Military Times in a statement.