But after reflecting on the Afghans left behind to live under the Taliban, the 10 civilians the U.S. killed on its way out, and the 13 Americans who died by an Islamic State suicide bomber at Abbey Gate, serious thought should be paid to how much the U.S. simply got wrong about the war from the very start.

A new book by Dutch journalist Bette Dam chronicles some of those missteps, such as President George W. Bush’s administration’s decision to reject a Taliban surrender in December 2001, and the dubious Afghan warlords the U.S. allied with over the two decades that followed.

Dam, who lived and worked in Afghanistan for 15 years, may draw ire for the unorthodox findings in her book, “Looking for the Enemy: Mullah Omar and the Unknown Taliban,” especially her reporting on the elusive life and final resting place of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s lodestar.

But if her work makes one thing clear about Afghanistan, it’s how little U.S. leaders, including top generals, diplomats, and politicians, understood about the situation there for 20 years.

U.S. leadership was consistently caught flat-footed, failing to deliver on their perennial promise to “turn the corner” in the war. The same leadership was again shocked by the Taliban’s breezy sweep across the country in summer 2021. Taking stock of the war will require humility at the top echelons of American power, and they could start by reading a book that challenges much of their orthodoxy.

Editor’s note: This interview has been edited for length and clarity

One of the biggest top lines from your work is the assertion that Taliban founder Mullah Omar lived out his final days close to a U.S. military base in his native Zabul Province in Afghanistan, and not, as the CIA and other experts have long argued, in Pakistan. How did you come to a conclusion so different from the mainstream here?

Early on, I couldn’t believe Mullah Omar was not in Pakistan. I describe in the book how already in 2012 people from Zabul, whom I knew from my first book, told me one evening when they were visiting friends in Kabul to go and look in Zabul, because it was Omar’s father’s land. I thought, ‘No, that’s not possible,’ and searched in Pakistan.

I made the same assumptions as the CIA, but after five years, my investigation forced me to say: Omar was indeed in Afghanistan. I went in May this year to the location of Omar’s house in Zabul, and indeed the U.S. Camp Wolverine is within walking distance.

The U.S. military even had one of these intel-gathering balloons hanging on top of the base, so they were able to see Mullah Omar sit in his garden. Except, they were not looking. They themselves had a strong bias towards Pakistan. That’s understandable. Most of the Taliban tried to live there. But understanding the underlying narratives of the Taliban would also have led the CIA to Mullah Omar.

What is an example of one of those underlying narratives?

The overall distrust of the Taliban leader, and his men, towards Pakistan, could have led to broader intel-gathering also in Afghanistan. While the U.S. government states that the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban is very good, I didn’t see that in the field. I saw nervousness, distrust.

What should the media, intelligence community and military have done differently, on a day-to-day level?

We too often have secondary sources, we cling to the elite, who mostly speak English — that works the fastest — and most media stayed in Kabul. Traveling into the countryside didn’t happen enough, even though the resistance started in the villages. Surely, we reported criticism — too many civilian casualties, human rights abuses, torture, corruption in elections. We reported on emotion, like the pain of attacks or the pain of war. That’s important. But the more independent questions were not asked enough: ‘Was this a war? Was this terrorism? Is the military necessary here?’

One of the more jarring parts of your book is the scene in which Mullah Omar gives his blessing for a Taliban surrender in December 2001. I didn’t realize this offer occurred or that the U.S. rejected it. Do you think that deal could have succeeded?

It’s unforgivable that we have overlooked such a massive peace offer from the Taliban in 2001. It requires systemic self-reflection. Would it have succeeded? Many of the U.S. officials I spoke to say, ‘Oh, of course not. Kabul would not have been able to hold this peace deal together.’ I find that arrogant.

What we know is that the U.S. singlehandedly blocked the deal. Yes, it’s difficult to say anything in hindsight, but, to me, there is no doubt there would have been a longer moment of calmness.

The soon-to-be president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, would have gone to Kabul, and would have had a solid base to start the new government. He was trying to be powerful and to be in contact with his natural enemies, Northern Afghans, who had already taken Kabul, but had agreed to share power (like many Taliban, Karzai is a Pashtun from Southern Afghanistan). To set up this very sensitive balance of shared power is not easy, and requires patience and time. Sharing power is difficult in any country, let alone in a country with the pain of 40 years of war.

One theme running through your book is how Afghanistan’s complicated tribal relations and business rivalries colored the conflict. How much do you think top Western leaders understood these dynamics?

I think we gave the space to these Afghan leaders to act like that because of our lack of knowledge. What we sometimes forget is that these Afghans have a history, as human beings have. One aspect is decennia-long rivalries, and especially in the first four years, 2001-2004, when there was not a strong Taliban, the U.S. goal ‘to kill Taliban,’ was misused by these leaders to solve rivalries and competition.

The U.S. should have cross-checked their allies much more. But the U.S. knew it all better. Figures like Asadullah Khalid were ‘the strong fighters’ and ideal ‘for killing terrorists’ and these Afghan leaders became supermen. (Khalid is a former Afghan defense minister who was accused of ordering the bombing of a U.N. convoy to protect his narcotics interests).

Mid-level State Department and Pentagon personnel knew something was wrong. But somehow knowledge was not always valued by the top. Ideology pushed it away, and instead, the binary idea of us-versus-Taliban prevailed.

If we had a more independent press, who would have systematically said that the Asadullah Khalid figures in Afghanistan, our allies, are killing rivals, that our U.S. soldiers die because of local rivalry fights and not Taliban, I think that it would have cracked the binary thinking. That would have taken away the urge for military use. The lack of this critical thinking among the American elites is extremely worrying to me, especially since we are now engaging in Ukraine with the same press, a country we also push in this binary, uninformative narrative.

What was an example you saw of the U.S. using force and it clearly not working?

Most leaders who were installed after Sept. 11, 2001, were given carte blanche to attack the enemy, while Taliban had surrendered. Tribal fights and competition between individuals were solved under the banner of terrorism. Police commander Abdul Raziq in Kandahar was proven by in-depth articles a spoiler and created more conflict than necessary. While those feature articles were strongly sourced, the U.S. government didn’t adapt.

It was truly painful for me to see how often the U.S. military let itself be misled in its selection of the enemy in Afghanistan. The intel-gathering was poor. The wrong people were killed, and their families ran immediately to the Taliban. This was systemic, from 2002-on. … The U.S. picks an ally, and puts its arm around it and says, ‘We are in this together.’

In late July, a U.S. drone strike killed al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. Your book describes how the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Taliban leaders was nuanced in the years before Sept. 11, 2001, and their ties weren’t strong. But some see the presence of Zawahiri in Taliban-controlled Kabul as both a violation of the Doha agreement and an indication that the Taliban and al-Qaida remain close.

We do know from more independent research that there has been a consistent, as I call it, ‘gray area policy’ of the Taliban towards the Arabs present in the country, some of whom are in al-Qaida and some of whom are not. The Taliban’s rule is hospitality until justice proves you are guilty, but you need to lay low and not cause trouble, as Bin Laden did in the late 1990s when he was convicted by the Taliban for giving press conferences against their wishes.

At the moment, a lot is unclear about what happened with Zawahiri. I am not in Kabul at the moment, so I, unfortunately, can’t figure it out. We see that the intel fluctuates.

(Dam pointed to a U.S. intelligence community assessment from mid-August indicating that al-Qaida has not reconstituted in Afghanistan and Zawahiri was the only key al-Qaida figure who tried to reestablish himself in the country since U.S. forces withdrew.)

In the U.S., the overall analysis is that al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul is proof that Taliban are close allies of al-Qaida and a threat for international security. Is that so? You could also include the complexity I describe in the book. … Learn from history and investigate if it was a way for the Taliban to keep al-Zawahiri silent.

International Crisis Group expert Jerome Drevon talked to sources within al-Qaida recently, who said that al-Qaida agreed with the Taliban to be silent, and not active.

A good portion of your book discusses the international isolation the Taliban faced in the 1990s, and you suggest that this was a mistake. Do you think the Biden administration is making the same mistake today by withholding billions of dollars in Afghanistan’s U.S.-held frozen assets?

I was with a Western journalist in Kabul recently: the journalist tried their best, but at the same time almost lectured the Taliban instead of interviewing. It was only Western narratives the journalist pasted on the country. That’s a small example of something bigger. The West finds listening to the other difficult. … True, we do have so much to offer. We have peace, money, power to change for the good.

But the Taliban have realities, too, that are as true as ours. … Taliban is fractured, Islamic, not as anti-western as Hamas or al-Qaida, arrogant, uneducated, extremely tribal, predominantly pro-girls’ education, willing to rebuild Afghanistan, but demanding autonomy.

Would you really say the Taliban are ‘predominantly’ pro-girls’ education? Currently, there is a ban in Afghanistan on girls attending secondary education. Although there is opposition to that ban — and even defiance from some Taliban — it’s still in force.

After my return from Kabul in May I would say the news headline on girls’ education could well be, ‘80% of the Taliban-leaders want girls’ education.’ Or, ‘Taliban-leaders openly revolt against their top leaders who are a minority in stopping girls’ education.’

There is a bigger part of the Taliban leadership who are more pro-girls’ education than anti-girls’ education. What should be investigated is the stubbornness of three or four Taliban leaders in Kandahar. Why are they against this? How big is their leverage? I don’t see calm reporting. I see emotion. Judgmental tweets of diplomats, where any knowledge or reflection lacks.

Final thoughts?

We, as Western media, embraced the War on Terror, and for that, the enemy of the U.S. government became the enemy of journalism. That is unethical if you look at it from a journalistic perspective. The War on Terror was a creation of the U.S. government and needed cross-check. Also, the media doesn’t have enemies; we have to try to talk to all sides. But because we embraced the War on Terror ideology, we only minimally interviewed the Taliban; mostly, we called their spokesman who had to deny or embrace an attack. That’s amplifying the propaganda channels. How many ‘jihad-watchers’ do not simply retweet Taliban and ISIS channels on Twitter? I find that irresponsible. PR from U.S., from the Taliban, from any organization, needs cross-checking if you take your audience serious. That did happen in feature articles or in some books. But these insights didn’t reach the mainstream narratives the big agencies — like Reuters, AP, etc. — were producing every day.

The Leahy Law was intended to prohibit U.S. security assistance from going to foreign units that have committed gross human rights violations, but two Defense Department programs — Section 127e and Section 1202 — are currently exempt from any vetting.

Legislation introduced this week by Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., and Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., would close that loophole, shutting off funds to specific units found to be committing atrocities, while also expanding the reporting requirements under which the two notoriously secretive programs are subject.

Section 127e funds partners who conduct counterterrorism missions, sometimes with U.S. special operations troops directing them as a surrogate force in combat, such as raids on militant compounds. It started with a small budget of $10 million in the mid-2000s, but grew to about $100 million per year more than a decade later.

Section 1202 was modeled after that program in recent years, but is intended for irregular warfare in the grey zone. This authority was “purpose built” for the shift to great power competition, the former U.S. assistant defense secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict said in 2019.

“Human rights vetting is an essential part of how we engage with other countries, but over the last several years Section 127e and Section 1202 have skirted these vetting requirements and, in some cases, been used with partners who have consistently violated human rights,” Jacobs said in a statement announcing the new legislation. “United States support for unvetted human rights abusers is not only deeply immoral and irresponsible, it is also counterproductive, leading to more unrest, instability and terrorist activity.”

Jacobs proposed an amendment to institute the same reform in last year’s annual defense bill. The amendment was adopted by the House but ultimately cut from the bill during negotiations with the Senate.

The Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act, which was introduced Tuesday, is a new attempt that comes with Senate Democrat support.

The legislation is co-led by Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., for whom the Leahy Law was named, and Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Ill. Congressmen Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., Joaquin Castro, D-Texas, and Jason Crow, D-Colo., in the House are also backing the bill. No Republicans are signed on, which could stymie the effort.

“This year, we are grateful to be partnering with human rights champions in the Senate, including Senators Van Hollen and Durbin — and especially Senator Leahy, who has championed these issues throughout his career,” an official from Jacobs’ office said in response to emailed questions about the bill’s chances. “We look forward to working with him to close this loophole before his retirement at the end of this term.”

In his own statement regarding the legislation, Leahy, who is not seeking re-election, said the Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act will ensure that the Leahy Law is applied uniformly.

“The purpose of the Leahy Law is to prevent U.S. assistance from supporting units of foreign security forces that violate human rights,” Leahy said. “Yet the Pentagon has not applied this standard to certain security cooperation programs with foreign forces. The Pentagon should have closed this loophole on its own initiative.”

Section 127e has been used to conduct operations in Somalia, Libya, Kenya, Tunisia, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania and Niger — all of which have had serious concerns raised in the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for years.

For instance, even after acknowledging human rights violations committed by an elite Cameroonian unit, the Pentagon continued to employ the force under Section 127e, the Intercept reported in March. The unit’s atrocities included torture and extrajudicial killings at a base where detainees testified to seeing and hearing uniformed Americans, according to Amnesty International.

Between 2017 and 2020, U.S. special operations forces conducted at least 23 separate 127e programs across the world, the Intercept reported in July.

In addition to forcing the Pentagon to conduct human rights vetting for Section 127e and Section 1202 recipients, the legislation would require biannual reports and assessments of how support to partner forces advances U.S. national security priorities.

“The deployments are one-for-one unit replacements, which will leave our overall force posture in the region — approximately 100,000 — unchanged,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters Friday afternoon. “The units being replaced will return to their home station following an appropriate turnover of responsibilities.”

The turnovers are expected to continue through the summer months. Of note, the 101st Airborne Division headquarters, out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, will replace the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has ignited debate over how many U.S. troops should be permanently stationed in Europe and even whether new bases should be established. But Kirby had no update Friday on whether any of the additional troops dispatched to countries like Poland, Romania and Germany in recent months foreshadowed a permanent presence.

“The security environment has now changed based on what Mr. Putin has done,” Kirby said. “So, we expect that we’re going to have to take a look at the permanent footprint in Europe and make an assessment about that in the future, but there’s nothing in the offing right now.”

Prior to the Ukraine war, about 80,000 U.S. troops were in Europe, either on permanent bases or rotating through to train with NATO allies. Some countries, like Lithuania, have sought a more concrete U.S. military presence to beef up security after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“My advice would be to create permanent bases, but don’t permanently station,” Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee in early April. “So, you get the effect of permanence by rotational forces cycling through permanent bases.”

“And I believe that a lot of our European allies … they are very, very willing to establish permanent bases,” Milley added. “They’ll build them, they’ll pay for them, etc.”

Although no decisions have been made on that front, the Pentagon appears prepared to continue maintaining the elevated troop presence that began when Fort Bragg-based paratroopers were flexed to Poland in February.

But, for now, those paratroopers will get to go home.

Kirby said the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade will replace the 3rd Infantry Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division. That turnover alone will involve about 4,200 soldiers.

Another 4,200 soldiers from 3rd Armored Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, out of Fort Hood, Texas, will replace the 1st Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which is returning home to Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Finally, the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade, which is stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, will replace the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade to support the U.S. force commitment to Atlantic Resolve, a rotational presence that has been ongoing since fighting began in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014.

During the call, Austin discussed the potential for a ceasefire and emphasized his desire to keep talking with his Russian counterpart, according to the Pentagon. It was the first time Austin and Shoigu had spoken since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24.

Austin requested the call, which lasted about an hour, a senior defense official told reporters Friday.

“Both leaders had a chance to talk back and forth with one another, but I’m not going to get anymore into the content of it,” the senior defense official said. “I won’t speak for the Russians, but I think generally our takeaway was that our message was received with respect to keeping the lines [of communication] open.”

Austin believed it was important to make the call, but “the call itself didn’t specifically solve any acute issues or lead to a direct change in what the Russians are doing and what they’re saying,” the senior defense official added.

The hour-long discussion between Austin and Shoigu comes after months passed in which Russian leaders avoided phone calls.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said in late March that Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov had “so far declined to engage” with their U.S. counterparts, despite attempts made by Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley.

However, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan did speak with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Gen. Nikolay Patrushev in mid-March.

Details of that call were not provided, other than a brief statement noting the U.S. commitment to continue imposing costs on Russia and reinforcing NATO’s eastern borders.

The commando, Wahedullah Khan, was detained after he opened fire on Czech special operators, killing one and injuring two others. Wahedullah was captured, handed over to NATO forces and interrogated in a cramped room on Shindand Air Base, according to the redacted case file obtained by Military Times through a Freedom of Information Act request and reported here for the first time.

“I want to break his jaw,” the translator recalled one U.S. soldier saying. “No, not yet,” another responded, according to the translator. “I need him to finish answering my questions.”

Hours later, Wahedullah was dead from blunt force trauma. The translator said Americans approached him that same night and told him to keep quiet about the incident.

“Forget that this happened,” the translator recalled several soldiers warning him. “You didn’t see anything.”

Soon, the Green Berets came under scrutiny from the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter and murder. They denied harming Wahedullah and blamed the death on other Afghan commandos.

Blood found in the Green Berets’ interrogation room during a crime scene examination suggested another course of events.

“The room appeared to have been cleaned; however, blood spatter was identified on the walls and ceiling,” Army CID’s final report stated. “A laboratory analysis of the blood spatter revealed the blood matched the DNA profile of Mr. Wahedullah.”

The case closed in May 2021. All evidence was turned over to 1st Special Forces Command, where leadership decided against prosecution.

General officer memorandums of reprimand were instead issued to eight Green Berets from 7th Special Forces Group, including a captain, a chief warrant officer, a master sergeant, three sergeants first class and two staff sergeants. All names were redacted in the case file, but six letters were permanently filed, meaning they will follow those soldiers throughout their careers.

“In this case, the investigation’s results did not present sufficient evidence of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the offenses, which is the standard required to obtain a conviction at court-martial,” Maj. Dan Lessard, spokesman for 1st Special Forces Command, said in a statement. “Furthermore, there was not probable cause to believe that the most serious alleged offenses, including murder, had occurred.”

Officials at 1st Special Forces Command declined to provide copies of the reprimands to Military Times.

Even with the translator’s testimony, CID did not determine in its final report who delivered Wahedullah’s death blow. Wahedullah was passed between troops from three different countries over 10 hours and his blood was found in a room where both Americans and Czechs took turns questioning him.

‘He just lost his mind’

Wahedullah attacked at about 2 p.m. earlier that day.

Czech special operators were escorting a civilian truck onto Shindand Air Base when their rear vehicle suddenly took gunfire from a nearby compound owned by Afghanistan’s 4th Special Operations Kandak, according to the case file.

After Wahedullah opened fire, the Czechs raced three casualties to a medical clinic on Camp Conde, which was part of Shindand.

Afghan commandos later called the U.S. base to say they had the shooter in custody. The Afghans arrived with Wahedullah at roughly 5 p.m. He was dressed in a track suit with sandals, according to an American who escorted the Afghans to two Green Beret intelligence sergeants waiting near the interrogation room.

The American who escorted the truck later told investigators the building was chosen because it was far away from the medical evacuation area and from unnecessary personnel watching everything unfold.

U.S. forces needed to know whether another attack was coming, according to the investigation. The base heightened its security posture following the shooting. And Jaguar 50, call sign for the Green Beret team’s JTAC, a close air support specialist, spotted an individual crawling towards the camp with a satchel when helicopters came for the Czech casualties.

The Americans watched the crawling man but didn’t shoot.

With the help of the translator, the Green Berets sifted through Wahedullah’s phone and other personal items for shreds of useful information. Meanwhile, the Czechs interrogated Wahedullah. The translator told investigators he heard screams coming from inside the room.

The Green Berets and the translator entered next. They wanted to know if “there were more people or threats waiting,” one Green Beret later told investigators.

The Green Berets denied harming Wahedullah during questioning. They said the turn-coat commando failed to answer most questions. Wahedullah told them he had been feeling ill and went “crazy” while on guard shift.

“He did not know the names of any of the soldiers he lived with, ate with, or prayed with because he was new to the unit and had only been there for five months,” one Green Beret stated. “Again we asked him who hired him to do this or why he did it and he insisted he just lost his mind. We could not get him to explain if it was in retaliation or if he had ever been in contact with the Taliban.”

Wahedullah at one point recalled Americans mortaring his village years ago, killing three women.

“He claimed that Americans make mistakes all the time when they kill innocent civilians and it was the same as his mistake,” another Green Beret stated. “When asked to further elaborate on that comment he just kept referring to that he went crazy.”

‘You never saw anything’

The Americans questioned Wahedullah for about 30 minutes before turning him back over to Czech special operators, according to the investigation. Wahedullah wasn’t harmed while in either group’s custody, the Americans said.

In a statement made days after the shooting while still on Camp Conde, the translator largely agreed with the Green Berets’ version of events. But on Nov. 7, 2018, now on Bagram Air Base and away from the remote camp, the translator provided a statement with a far different narrative.

During the interrogation, a zip-tied Wahedullah was repeatedly assaulted by multiple Americans from 7th Special Forces Group, the translator told investigators at Bagram.

The Americans choked Wahedullah, hit him in his crotch, slammed his head off objects and beat him, the translator alleged. One of the interrogators brandished a knife, the translator added.

“Now you are going to tell me the truth or I am going to slit your throat,” the U.S. soldier warned, according to the translator. But another man, who the translator referred to as “chief,” told him to put the knife away.

At one point, a Czech soldier entered the room.

“He had big eyes, and was bald, and started choking the shooter and spitting on him, grabbing his hair, he yelled at the shooter and pounded on the desk,” the translator stated.

Questions were asked during the interrogation. But Wahedullah had a “hard time talking” and “struggled to answer,” the translator said.

Eventually, the Americans decided they wouldn’t get any information and ended the interrogation. The translator claimed that the last time he saw Wahedullah outside the room, the man was bleeding from his nose and mouth, and his face was swollen around his eyes and forehead.

The translator said he was then approached by an American and told, “Listen, this never happened, you never saw anything, forget this.”

Later that night, more Americans knocked on his room door.

“They told me, if you are ever asked what happened to tell them we only asked a few tactical questions and collected biometric information and then left,” the translator stated. “They asked me to repeat it several times, which I did.”

Wahedullah was turned back over to his unit at roughly 7 p.m. Other Afghan commandos put him in the bed of their Ford Ranger truck. An Afghan commander ask why Wahedullah was in the back, according to the translator, who was present.

“He was bleeding so badly, we put him in the back instead of the back seat,” the other Afghan commandos answered.

‘They beat him’

Hours later, an individual from the U.S. Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan called the operations center on Camp Conde to say they received reports that Wahedullah was about to die after he was abused by Czech forces. It wasn’t clear from the redacted investigation how the task force learned of the situation.

Regardless, Wahedullah was once again brought back to the Americans, this time in an attempt to save his life. He arrived on a stretcher. A dressing was over his head, an IV was in his arm and a plastic tube was inserted into his nasal airway to help him breathe, according to an American doctor who saw Wahedullah at Camp Conde’s clinic.

Wahedullah had no pulse when he arrived. A surgical team tried to resuscitate him, but to no avail. After he was pronounced dead, one doctor turned to the Afghan sergeant major who brought the beaten body and asked questions.

“l asked what happened and [the sergeant major] answered me, ‘They beat him.’ I asked when and he repeated it,” the surgeon said in his witness statement.

While in the clinic, the Afghan sergeant major said openly that every commando at the 4th Special Operations Kandak “had a go” at Wahedullah, implying they were the ones who beat him, several Green Berets stated.

When investigators questioned one of the Green Berets further about this exchange, and who heard it, the soldier explained that the surgical team was too far away and distracted to listen in.

The translator, who was also in the clinic, disputed that the Afghan sergeant major made those comments. “No, l never heard that,” the translator stated, adding that those individuals never spoke in the clinic.

Czech officials conducted their own investigation into Wahedullah’s death, according to the case file, but those details were withheld in the copy provided to Military Times because it was considered third-party information.

Czech Ministry of Defense spokesman Jakub Fajnor told Military Times that their investigation remains open, but declined to comment further.

“The Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic is not allowed to comment on an ongoing investigation,” Fajnor said in an email. “The supervising public prosecutor’s office in Brno has reserved the right to provide information about the case. According to our sources, the public prosecutor’s office is planning to contact the American authorities with a cooperation request.”

The Czech prosecutor’s office in Brno did not return a request for further information.

‘I know I can’t do that’

The case file indicates that Czech special operators were highly regarded by Americans. One Green Beret, who the redacted investigation suggests was in a leadership position, said in his statement that Czech troops took great pride in being one of the few allied forces to conduct missions outside the wire.

The Czechs wouldn’t have done anything to jeopardize that, according to the Green Beret leader, who was interviewed as part of the investigation but who was not present during the interrogation or Wahedullah’s handoff.

He also told investigators about an encounter he had hours after the attack. An individual, who contextual clues in the case file suggest was a Czech commander, walked into the American’s office and shut the door.

“He was visibly upset [over Wahedullah’s attack] and frustrated yet composed,” the Green Beret leader said. “He had tears welling up as he told me, ‘I want to kill him, that shooter needs to be dead, but I know I can’t do that.’ It seemed he needed to vent in private where his guys couldn’t see.”

The translator’s second statement, which implicated both Green Berets and Czech troops, was made two weeks after the incident.

Some disturbing accusations remained the same in both statements, including that the translator heard screaming while Czech troops were questioning Wahedullah without Americans and that Wahedullah was bleeding badly when turned over to the other Afghan commandos. But the translator’s detailed account of Green Berets beating Wahedullah was new.

Defense lawyers could’ve pounced on that change, said retired Army Lt. Col. Franklin Rosenblatt, who served as the lead military defense counsel for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, an American held captive by the Taliban for five years after deserting his post.

However, the translator could’ve also explained in court why he initially withheld details.

“There could be reasons why [the translator] did this. If he was under some sort of coercion or threat or intimidation before and once he was free of those things, he was liberated to speak and said what he had to say,” Rosenblatt explained.

When Wahedullah’s death first became public, it was reported that the Green Beret team had been withdrawn early from Afghanistan.

Taking troops out of a war zone where alleged crimes occurred can make cases more difficult to prosecute because of difficulties obtaining the necessary evidence and witnesses, according to Rosenblatt, who has argued that the court-martial system should be able to follow U.S. forces on deployment.

“These are crucial Afghan witnesses,” Rosenblatt said. “Good luck being able to identify them and work out the visa issues to get them here. The Czech soldiers, they’re also essential witnesses for this. The prospects for prosecution, even if the prosecution did have merit, really changed once everyone flew back to the States.”

The general officer memorandums of reprimand, or GOMORs, may have been the most aggressive action available given the problems with investigating this crime. When permanently filed, as they were for six of the Green Berets, GOMORs can end a soldiers’ career.

“Credit goes to [1st Special Forces Command] for seemingly doing all that could be done in this situation,” Rosenblatt added. “The result of permanently filed GOMORs is significant and will likely have career consequences for each of those implicated.”

“We are still in the process of recruitment,” Mamuka Mamulashvili told Military Times in a Skype interview. “There are a lot of guys joining us. On the list, there are now about 750 men, mostly from Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We have a lot of Americans.”

Mamulashvili leads the Georgian National Legion, one of several paramilitaries integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces after the War in the Donbas, part of the larger conflict between Russia and Ukraine, began in 2014.

Now, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, some U.S. military veterans eager for a war with what they see as a righteous cause have pledged to come to Ukraine’s defense.

The Georgian National Legion hopes to relieve the Ukrainian military of some of the logistical burden that comes with organizing overseas recruits. But absorbing the 16,000 foreigners ― the number that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims have volunteered ― will be a challenge.

Flooding conflicts with foreign fighters can animate extremist movements or offer experience to the already radicalized. And though the vast majority of fighters who travel to Ukraine will be well-intentioned, it’s not clear how many will be particularly helpful on the battlefield given language and training barriers.

Foreigners may be more useful in a propaganda role to signal global unity rather than as a front-line fighting force.

Three veterans spoke with Military Times and offered a mix of plans for how they would fight in Ukraine.

Only one intended to join the fledgling International Legion that Ukrainian officials have been promoting. But all three echoed similar concerns about Ukrainian embassies that are slow to process applications and worries about contractual obligations.

“The contract with the Ukrainians sounds a little bit more ambiguous — a little more long-term,” said a Marine veteran who is traveling now and who hopes to join a unit other than the International Legion.

He had connected with a group of like-minded U.S. veterans on Reddit.

“They vetted me and put me into a Signal group chat with about 15 people and we’ve been organizing,” said the U.S. veteran, who asked that his name be withheld for this article.

Paperwork hurdles

Setting up an international legion is a bold undertaking for a government that, while punching above its weight class in its war with Russia, is nevertheless facing overwhelming odds.

Ukraine is trying to screen applicants as fast as possible, Ukrainian Maj. Gen. Borys Kremenestkiy, a military attaché in Washington, D.C., told Military Times. But vetters have to parse out those with criminal records and those who are too old or otherwise unfit for service.

So far, the embassy has received about 6,000 applications, Kremenestkiy said, adding that about half immediately were turned down for various reasons. Of those 3,000, the embassy has approved about 100 people to join Ukraine’s International Legion.

“It’s not surprising that there have been administrative challenges given the scale of foreigners who have responded to this call,” said Austin C. Doctor, director of counterterrorism research initiatives at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s NCITE Center. “But from a broader security standpoint, I think it’s especially important that the Ukrainian government does its best to create the administrative infrastructure to incorporate these hires into formal units for purposes of monitoring and accountability.”

The processing delays have caused some volunteers to grow frustrated.

It took one 82nd Airborne Division Army veteran days even to get in touch with the Ukrainian embassy and submit his application, he told Military Times. He received a notification indicating that his application was being reviewed, but was not given a timeline on when it may be approved or denied.

“Every hour feels like a day, he said. “Every day feels like a week. At the end of the day, as a combat soldier, what is the rush?”

Others are not so patient.

Kremenstkiy said he was aware that some volunteers have been traveling to Ukraine without going through any formal process to join the International Legion. But his goal is to properly vet as many as possible, even if that takes longer than desirable.

“I don’t have a big staff to work with and we have other areas, like working with the Pentagon on security assistance,” he said. “That is more important.”

“We have to see everyone or talk to everyone,” he said. “So they can try and go on their own, but I have a task to talk to everyone.”

While U.S. citizens can go abroad to enlist in a foreign military, they could be in legal trouble if they’re “recruited or hired” in the U.S., which may be why Ukraine is having volunteers sign contracts when they arrive. The Defense Department still has discouraged U.S. citizens from volunteering.

“We still do not believe that Ukraine is a safe place for Americans to go,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters March 7. “We urge them not to go. And if any are still there, we urge them to leave.”

Skipping red tape

Beyond organizational delays, some U.S. volunteers are uncomfortable committing to fight in Ukraine for the duration of the war, especially without knowing exactly how the end is defined.

Corey Wetherholt said he has joined an independent militia over concerns about the ambiguous commitment.

The veteran is no stranger to volunteering in foreign war zones.

After being administratively separated from the Marine Corps following two years in the infantry, Wetherholt headed to Syria as a volunteer for the People’s Protection Unit, or YPG. After seven months in Syria, he returned to the United States, but before long he was in Iraq with the Sinjar Resistance Units, or YBS.

On his way home from 13 months in Iraq, Wetherholt heard about Russia’s invasion and changed his plans.

Once in Ukraine, Wetherholt linked up with other foreigners who served in Iraq and Syria. The group, which he declined to name, plans to go to Kyiv, Ukraine, for paperwork that would show they were operating in the country with the permission of the Ukrainian government and are not Russian forces.

“No ideology or politics, just guys who wouldn’t wanna miss out on a just war,” Wetherholt said. “The big one.”

Integrating foreign volunteers will be a challenge if the 16,000 number claimed by Ukraine is accurate, according to Ilmari Käihkö, a Finnish military veteran and an associate professor at the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm, who has researched the volunteer phenomenon in Ukraine.

“While some of the volunteers will no doubt contribute to the military effort on the Ukrainian side, many probably won’t have much of an effect,” Käihkö told Military Times. “However, there is a political benefit for Ukraine in receiving volunteers from abroad, as this makes the Ukrainian cause more relevant in other countries. The propaganda value may be considerable.”

There’s also good reason to be skeptical about any volunteer’s plans that involve fighting for independent groups outside official Ukrainian channels.

Käihkö said his Ukrainian contacts doubt such units “can constitute any considerable forces.”

And any independent fighters could be forced to join the International Legion or cease activities.

The Ukrainian military has greatly increased its command and control in recent years, and any units independent of its efforts present practical problems, Käihkö said ― like friendly fire.

“This said, one possible explanation for the existence of volunteer units could be red tape,” he explained. “Many foreign volunteers no doubt want to get to the fight fast, and the Ukrainian army might not offer the quickest way to do this.”

“Then again, I have already seen photos of Swedish volunteers in Ukrainian gear, so the process seems to be quick.”

A history of militias

Ukraine has a history of volunteer battalions that sprouted up in the early days of the War in the Donbas.

In 2019, about 17,000 people from more than 50 countries traveled to participate in the conflict, the Soufan Center nonprofit estimated, most fighting for pro-Russian separatists.

Mamulashvili’s Georgian National Legion was organized in 2014 and has served as a clearinghouse for some of those foreigners who fought on the Ukrainian side. The Georgian’s unit officially was integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces in 2016.

“We are under control of Ukrainian armed forces,” Mamulashvili said. “We work with several different structures. And we work under their command.”

Mamulashvili’s forces have unique insight into integrating foreign fighters that the burgeoning International Legion lacks.

“They have no experience in doing such a job. And they’re using our skills,” Mamulashvili said.

A complicating factor in the Ukraine conflict has been the presence of far-right paramilitaries on both sides of the conflict, such as Azov, which started as a volunteer militia and attracted foreign members, including U.S. neo-Nazis. It eventually was absorbed into Ukraine’s National Guard.

But despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that his invasion is intended to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, extremists, like those of the Russian Imperial Movement, also fought for separatists in the Donbas.

The history of ideological units is one reason why Doctor, the counterterrorism researcher, stresses the need for a formal enlistment process with direct supervision, monitoring and accountability.

“There are likely going to be some [volunteers] who are doing this for more malevolent purposes, especially if the conflict that we’ve seen in the Donbas region is any indicator, particularly as it relates to receiving training or connecting with persons affiliated with Nazi or white supremacist organizations on the ground,” Doctor said. “Looking at that risk with eyes wide open will be important.”

Monitoring foreign volunteers probably will be more important for their home countries. For Ukraine, the risk is likely limited, according to Käihkö, the Swedish Defense University professor.

“I have difficulties seeing how foreign volunteers can become the kind of domestic political force in Ukraine the volunteer battalions constituted in 2014–2015,” Käihkö said. “It is good to keep in mind that many of these foreign volunteers come with their own motivations and without military background. Few probably speak Ukrainian or Russian. Even in the best case scenario they might get gear they’ve never used before. For Ukraine the risk is probably limited, and consists mainly of Russian accusations of a NATO army in Ukraine.”

Käihkö echoed the warnings by some analysts that individuals with radical views might travel to Ukraine to get combat experience that could be used back home, and domestic intelligence agencies should take note. But intelligence agents may find other uses for returning volunteers, as well.

“This said, military intelligence might also be interested to learn as much about the situation in Ukraine and Russian tactics as possible,” Käihkö said.

The images, shared Friday by Maxar Technologies, show nearly 150 ground attack and transport helicopters in total.

One large helicopter grouping was spotted near the Belarussian town of Chojniki and contains more than 90 helicopters parked on a road with the deployment extending for more than five miles, according to Maxar’s images.

“Northeast of the town, a large deployment of ground forces with several hundred vehicles is seen in convoy position in several fields,” Maxar senior director Stephen A. Wood said in an email accompanying the images.

Another group of more than 50 helicopters, alongside support troops and equipment, was spotted roughly 40 miles away at the V.D. Bokov airfield near Mazyr, Belarus, Wood added.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is trending into its third night. His forces drew closer to Kyiv Friday morning, and intense gunfire broke out on a bridge across the Dneiper River dividing the eastern and western parts of the city.

Other prongs of the Russian offensive have been striking out against Ukraine’s far eastern Donbas region and from the Russian-held Crimean peninsula.

However, the Russian push on Kyiv has lost some of its momentum, according to the U.S. and U.K. governments, though the Kremlin has only used about a third of the combat power arrayed around Ukraine’s borders.

“Based on all the things that we’ve talked about, and what we’ve seen over the last 24 hours, we do assess that there is greater resistance by the Ukrainians than the Russians expected,” a senior U.S. defense official told reporters Friday morning, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “I’m not able to quantify that resistance for you. I’m just telling you what we’re seeing.”

Britain’s defense ministry said Friday morning that the bulk of Russian forces advancing on Kyiv were still more than 30 miles from the city center, with sporadic clashes in the capital’s northern suburbs.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made several video statements since Thursday evening. In the latest, he said he was remaining in Kyiv and “defending our independence,” despite being a supposed mark for Russian forces.

“The enemy identified me as the number one target, and my family as the number two target,” Zelensky said in one video address. “They want to destroy Ukraine politically by destroying the head of state.”

Zelenskyy and his cabinet have urged the West to sanction the Russian economy more aggressively and to send more arms to Ukraine, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry.

The senior U.S. defense official said Ukrainian air defenses have been degraded but are still operating.

The Ukrainian government reported roughly 140 deaths on their side, while claiming to have killed hundreds of Russian troops and destroying dozens of Russian aircraft and tanks.

The Kremlin has not disclosed casualty figures, and it has not yet been possible to verify the tolls on either side.

As Russia presses its attack against Ukraine, the U.S. military is pushing forces closer to that embattled nation.

Six Air Force F-35 fighter jets are due in Estonia, Lithuania and Romania on Thursday as Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to clash outside of Ukraine’s major cities, a senior defense official told reporters.

Another 32 AH-64 Army Apache helicopters are also set to arrive in Poland and the Baltic states on Thursday, the official said, as part of a build up of thousands of U.S. troops to reassure NATO allies as Russia makes moves toward a full takeover of Ukraine.

On the ground, the official said, thousands of soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division are prepared to assist any American refugees who come across Ukraine’s border into Poland.

“They’re poised to support, but I don’t have an update for you in terms of whether they’re actually anybody at their facilities at this time,” the official said, later adding that there has been an increase in people heading across the border in general.

Roughly 4,700 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division were sent to Poland in recent weeks. Another 3,800 soldiers from a 1st Infantry Division armored brigade have also been in the country since August as part of a regular rotation of forces. Paratroopers in Poland have set up at a military airport near Mielec, about 90 miles from the Ukrainian border by road. Another 1,000 soldiers from the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment were dispatched to Romania. And a battalion of paratroopers from the Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade are heading to Latvia, as well.

Since the fighting began early Thursday morning in Ukraine, the Defense Department has been able to confirm that attacks have targeted military barracks, ammunitions storage and airfields.

“We do not have a good sense of of total damage,” the defense official said. “As you might expect, we do not have a good sense of casualties, civilian and or military.”

Russian ground forces began to move later in the morning, he said, adding that there has been no confirmation that troops undertook an amphibious assault from the Black Sea. Indications are that troops air assaulted, fast-roping down from helicopters, into Kharkiv.

“We haven’t been surprised by what we’ve seen thus far,” the official said.

The official also could not confirm reports that Ukraine had shot down multiple Russian jets.

Air Force Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel, an intelligence officer and military strategist currently working as an Atlantic Council fellow, said in an online briefing late Wednesday he believed Russian air and naval forces would work to control Ukrainian airspace and the sea as daylight broke there Thursday.

“I think what we’re seeing right now are the initial standoff strikes,” he said.

Those would take out the surface-to-air missiles that protect Ukraine from overhead attack, allowing Russian jets to patrol the skies so their ground and naval forces can move around the country more freely, Wetzel said.

The opening moves of the Russian air campaign likely aim to sever military units’ ties to their commanders — “cut the head off of the snake, if you will,” Wetzel said. Interrupting Ukrainian troops’ access to command, their leaders’ control, and communications more broadly can hurt their ability to slow Russia’s advance.

Experts said ahead of the invasion that the air defense systems were perhaps the most vulnerable aspect of Ukraine’s military protection.

“The United States set the tone for this type of attack in 1991 in the opening hours of [Operation] Desert Storm,” Wetzel said. “It is a methodology that still works today.”

For now, the U.S. is not flying any reconnaissance missions over the country, nor able to use aircraft to bring aide to Ukraine.

The F-35s will police NATO airspace over the Baltic and Black Sea regions from Estonia’s Amari Air Base, Lithuania’s Siauliai Air Base and Romania’s Fetesti Air Base, the service said in a release.

“Why are they in the Baltics? It’s assurance, deterrence and, quite frankly, I think they’ll do training as well, depending on how the situation evolves,” a senior F-35 official told Air Force Times on Wednesday.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin nor Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were at the White House on Thursday morning, the senior defense official told reporters.

“I would not rule out or take off the table … the possibility that there’ll be additional repositioning inside Europe or even flow from outside Europe,” he said.

Multiple U.S. Air Force tankers were airborne Thursday to refuel jets patrolling the skies as part of NATO’s air policing mission and other movement around the region. Alongside the F-35s, the United States has currently dispatched F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15 Eagle fighter jets to Romania, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania.

Cargo aircraft, including several C-17 Globemaster III and C-130 Hercules planes, and intelligence-collection assets are “actively executing their mission throughout Eastern Europe,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe spokesperson Capt. Daniel de La Fé said.

Flight trackers showed three NATO E-3 airborne target tracking planes in the nearby skies Thursday morning, as well as an American E-8C ground target tracking jet and RC-135 signals intelligence plane. Open-source flight radar also showed an RQ-4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drone circling over the Black Sea, where Russia has amassed naval forces.

Farther north, two B-52 Stratofortress bombers linked up with the Swedish and Polish militaries for previously planned joint aviation training. The Cold War-era bombers, which can carry conventional and nuclear weapons, worked with Swedish troops who called in airstrikes in practice runs in the Arctic, and partnered with Polish MiG-29 fighters for a show of force in the Baltics, the Air Force said.

”USAFE is postured and ready to adjust forces as necessary to support a range of options for NATO and Department of Defense leaders, and we are working closely with NATO allies and partners to coordinate aircraft maneuvers throughout the theater,” de La Fé told Military Times.

The revisions are not needed to curb any currently known activities, but they would prevent future administrations from finding the kind of legal loopholes that allowed torture during the George W. Bush years, according to Scott Roehm, Washington director for the Center for Victims of Torture.

“What happens when the U.S. faces the next crisis? Will somebody take a look at this [Army field] manual and try to lawyer around it in the same way we saw what was done with the ‘torture memos’ in the aftermath of 9/11?” Roehm said by telephone Monday.

“And there are ways in which the field manual could be more protective against that kind of ‘acrobatic’ effort to allow for torture or cruel treatments,” Roehm added.

The May 20 letter was cosigned by Roehm’s organization, the American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, among others. It was sent to Austin, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Attorney General Merrick Garland and FBI Director Christopher Wray.

Revising interrogation guidelines, the letter to senior officials said, would help fulfill President Joe Biden’s campaign promise to “reaffirm the ban on torture.”

Thanks to an amendment to the 2016 defense budget bill, there’s one key document to revise. All national security interrogations, excluding law enforcement, adhere to the methods described in Army Field Manual 2–22.3, “Human Intelligence Collector Operations.”

The manual currently has a list of prohibited actions, including waterboarding, mock executions and electric shocks. But advocates want that expanded to include all of the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” and any other “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” identified in Senate reports from 2008 and 2014.

“This should include, for example, specifically banning ‘rectal rehydration’ and ‘rectal feeding,’” the letter reads. “Some, but not all, of these prohibitions existed in the 1992 version of the [Army field manual] but were deleted from the 2006 version.”

The letter also seeks the removal of interrogation methods like the “Emotional Fear-Up Approach,” which creates or preys upon a detainee’s existing fears, and the “Emotional-Futility Approach,” which “engenders a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness on the part of the source,” according to the Army field manual.

Intelligence collectors are instructed by the manual to “be extremely careful” not to “threaten or coerce” sources. However, they can use phrases like, “You know what can happen to you here?” and “We have heard many allegations of atrocities committed in your area and anyone that was involved will be severely punished.”

Human rights advocates worry that some of these techniques could be interpreted in ways that allow inhumane treatment of detainees. Similar loopholes were exploited during the Bush administration, Roehm noted, pointing to a 2006 legal memo arguing that the conditions of confinement that detainees are placed in should be considered separate from interrogation methods.

Clarifying that the places and conditions detainees are confined must also be humane is another aim of the May 20 letter.

“It has to be clear that conditions of confinement aren’t an end run around not being able to use specific interrogation methods that constitute torture or cruel treatments,” Roehm said. “They have to explicitly prohibit both the former and the latter.”

The 2014 Senate report found that the CIA used abusive conditions of confinement to facilitate interrogations, including placing detainees in complete darkness, shackling them in isolated cells and blaring loud noise or music.

Lack of heat at the Cobalt black site north of Kabul, Afghanistan, likely contributed to the death of a detainee, the Senate report added, and a senior CIA officer stated that Cobalt was itself an enhanced interrogation technique.

“Nothing in there says keeping somebody in a ‘dungeon’ is an interrogation method, much less a permissible one, but that’s what one of the black sites was referred to by an actual CIA official,” Roehm said. “That has to be prohibited in the same way that an interrogation method is prohibited.”

The Office of the Secretary of Defense did not respond to a request for comment made Monday afternoon.

They lost four Rangers and one Korean in the assault, but another battle was still to come.

During the night that followed, Puckett’s Rangers faced hundreds of Chinese forces counterattacking the hill. He would be wounded three times before ordering his men to leave him behind and retreat — a command they disobeyed.

Puckett previously received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the battle for Hill 205 on Nov. 25, 1950. Seventy years later, that award is being upgraded to the Medal of Honor.

President Joe Biden spoke by phone with Puckett and his wife Friday to congratulate them, said John Lock, a retired Army officer who has been lobbying for the upgrade.

The phone call was first reported by the Washington Post.

The president also told Puckett that the administration would be coordinating with him this week to set a date for the ceremony, which is expected to be held at the White House, Lock told Army Times.

The 2021 defense policy bill urged the president to award the Medal of Honor to Puckett and three other service members. Decisions by the president have not been announced for the other three: Dwight W. Birdwell, Alwyn C. Cashe and Earl D. Plumlee.

The battle for Hill 205 was part of a counteroffensive that marked the Chinese entrance into the Korean War, destroyed the Eighth Army’s right flank and triggered a massive U.S. retreat.

The sheer number of Chinese forces surprised the Americans, including those sitting on Hill 205. A day before the battle, Puckett was briefed that there were 25,000 Chinese troops in his division’s sector.

“Well, I knew that violated our doctrine,” Puckett recalled for an oral history project. “When the United States Army made an assault or made an attack, the doctrine was to outnumber the enemy 2:1 or preferably 3:1. Well, they [the Chinese] outnumbered us 3:2, so I knew something was wrong.”

After initially taking Hill 205, which was laid with bunkers, the Rangers set up a perimeter and prepared their rocket launchers and machine guns for nightfall. The closest U.S. Army ground unit was more than a mile away.

“We were always alone, and tonight was to be no different,” Puckett said.

Waves of Chinese attacks came throughout the night. The assaults started with whistles from the Chinese lines, followed by mortar barrages, automatic weapons fire and hand grenades. Four Chinese attacks were repelled, thanks to close artillery strikes called in by Puckett.

“At about 0200-0230 in the morning, we heard the Chinese blowing their whistles, bugles, always the same thing,” Puckett said. He once again got on the radio to call artillery, but the cannons were busy supporting another unit and could not help.

“We are under great pressure, we’re crumbling, we’re being overrun, I just gave my unit the word to withdraw,” Puckett recalled telling the artillery crews by radio.

Throughout the assault, Puckett had repeatedly left the safety of his foxhole to observe the Chinese troop movements and to direct artillery fire, exposing himself to small-arms and mortar fire, according to his award citation.

By the time Chinese troops massed for their final assault, Puckett was wounded so seriously that he was unable to move, the citation stated.

“I had been wounded three times by then, and I was lying there in the foxhole unable to do anything,” Puckett said. “I could see three Chinese about 15 yards away from me, and they were bayonetting or shooting some of my wounded Rangers.”

Two privates first class, Billy G. Walls and David L. Pollock, charged back up the hill, shot the three Chinese troops and carried Puckett down the steep mountain face, through brush and back to the American lines.

Puckett, a 1949 West Point graduate, retired from the Army in 1971 after also serving in the Vietnam War. During his time there, Puckett, then a lieutenant colonel, was warded a second Distinguished Service Cross, two Silvers Stars, and three Legion of Merit decorations.

He was inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame in 1992.

Puckett was born in Tifton, Georgia, and now lives near Fort Benning, where he maintains close ties to the 75th Ranger Regiment. In April, he visited and offered words of encouragement to Rangers participating in the annual Best Ranger Competition at the Army post.