At Camp Courtney and Kadena and Yokota Air Bases in Japan, investigators with the Defense Department Office of Inspector General found “visible corrosion, visible mold, visible fire damage, visible cracks on the building exterior and interior, visible concrete spalling and exposed rebar, water intrusion, lead‑based paint, asbestos‑containing material and inoperable communication connections.”

The findings came during an audit of Pacific Command infrastructure, during which IG investigators visited 11 PACOM bases in May 2025. They examined operations and communications infrastructure, as well as base housing.

Though the report is heavily redacted, the descriptions — and the photographs — show some structures on the verge of collapse, including two photos of homes at Kadena with crumbling ceilings and living room furniture strewn with debris.

“DoD officials told us that in some areas, falling debris — ranging from small fragments to large slabs — poses an ongoing risk to personnel safety,” the report states.

The audit was originally aimed at assessing the state of “mission-critical systems,” such as operations and communications infrastructure. Investigators determined that housing and water infrastructure are “critical to support the Service members in the USPACOM AOR as they complete their mission.” Their examination of those facilities revealed numerous problems.

Photos of a 50-year-old pier at Camp Courtney show corroded steel fenders and damaged concrete beams.

One Kadena building had eight inches of standing water on the roof, asbestos and cracked pillars and walls.

A Kadena aircraft hangar had holes in the walls.

A 50-year-old water pipe at Kadena had a 12-foot crack. Broken pipes at Kadena and Yokota have caused flooding and collapsed sidewalks.

At Kinser Tower base housing at Kadena, concrete damage has affected 544 homes, according to the IG.

Sebille Manor Housing at Kadena received 100 reports of mold, and dozens of Kadena residents were forced to move due to mold and concrete concerns.

DoD officials told IG investigators that “aging infrastructure, construction choices, or environmental conditions caused accelerated degradation.” In addition, facilities in Japan experience the effects of typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis.

DoD officials also blamed the problems on a lack of funds and the high cost of services in places like Japan.

They said that while the Japanese government provides host-nation funding, often it can’t be used to fix infrastructure. Instead, these funds tend to be allocated to new construction, or to “broader strategic objectives, such as reducing the impact of U.S. forces on the people of Okinawa.”

The IG recommended that various base commanders in mainland Japan and Okinawa submit a list of priority repairs. But this raises some interservice issues. For example, Army officials said that while Fort Buckner is used only by Army units, the Marine Corps is the real property owner.

The IG also recommended that the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force — as well as the commanders of PACOM and U.S. Forces Japan — conduct a root-cause analysis of infrastructure problems and find funding to fix them. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Infrastructure Modernization and Resilience concurred with the IG’s recommendations.

Dilapidated military facilities are not confined to the Pacific. A 2022 Government Accountability Office report estimated an infrastructure maintenance backlog of $137 million as of 2020. Housing on military bases in the United States has long been afflicted by issues like toxic mold.

But as America celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, it is easy to forget that independence was not guaranteed. As they shivered at Valley Forge in the winter of 1778, George Washington and his troops would have scoffed at the notion that victory would come on a silver platter.

For the American Revolution to succeed, the colonists had to create an army. Whether the Continental Army was defeated on the battlefield — as it frequently was — mattered less. As long as the United Colonies could keep an army in the field, Britain would be forced to continue what seemed like a forever war.

“American Revolutionary War” is a computer wargame that depicts the battles of the American Revolution, or what the British call the War of American Independence.

With 148 scenarios, from small engagements like Hubbardton and Kettle Creek, to larger battles such as Princeton, Brandywine and Saratoga, American Revolutionary War is part of publisher Wargame Design Studio’s Musket & Pike series. These games depict warfare from the 15th through the 18th Centuries, an era where polearms were gradually replaced by gunpowder weapons, such as muskets.

By the 1770s, the pike had been replaced by the bayonet, and the primitive arquebus by more reliable flintlock muskets including Britain’s “Brown Bess.”

With a 114-page user manual, American Revolutionary War is not exactly casual entertainment. It is a highly detailed simulation not just of 18th Century European-style warfare — but also how difficult it was to conduct armies’ European-style warfare in the 18th Century North American wilderness.

The game depicts battles at the grand tactical scale, with battalions and companies of infantry, as well as batteries of artillery and the occasional horse soldier (cavalry was much rarer than the later Napoleonic and American Civil Wars). The American have Continental regulars and local militia, while the Crown fields a polyglot force of British regulars, German mercenaries, Loyalist troops and Native American allies.

These units maneuver across a 2-D hex-grid map of eastern North America in its pre-industrial glory. The terrain is studded with forests, fields, marshes and streams.

Units are rated for how many troops or guns they have, and their weaponry (musket, 3-pounder artillery, etc.). Most important is a quality rating from A to F, which affects combat proficiency and movement. The British regulars tend to be quality As and Bs, while the Continentals tend to be Cs and Ds, and the American militias Fs.

Players alternate taking their turns, with each turn representing about 15 minutes of real time. Each player conducts movement and fire combat, followed by a melee phase to resolve assaults. Combat inflicts casualties as well as “fatigue,” which saps morale and effectiveness until units break or rout.

Western battlefield tactics in the 18th and 19th Centuries centered on assuming the right formation in an era when troops fought shoulder to shoulder. Column formation was used to expedite movement, though at the cost of firepower and presenting a juicy target. When engaging in a firefight, infantry would assume line formation, standing in two or three ranks.

Units in line that move through rough terrain, or obstructions, such as walls, run the risk of becoming “disordered,” with movement and fire penalties. On the other hand, a densely packed column can take heavy casualties from enemy troops deployed in line. Dispersing troops into open order makes them less vulnerable to enemy fire, but penalizes them in melee.

One myth is that the conflict “was fought by the British in a strictly linear fashion, while the Americans were primarily in skirmish,” Mike Cox, designer of American Revolutionary War, told Military Times. Both sides were capable of assuming a variety of formations, though this presented challenges for under-trained Continentals.

“The Americans often tried to fight linearly, too,” added Cox. “It just didn’t often work out well.”

Particularly useful are the detachments of light infantry.

“Learning to master your light troops is extremely important,” Cox said. “When to deploy as skirmishers to delay or scout, or recall and use them to effectively melee to push back the enemy and take and hold ground.”

Command and control has always been the glue that binds armies, but especially so in the pre-radio era, when commanders personally led their troops.

American Revolutionary War features historical commanders, rated from A (George Washington) to F, that form chains of command in each army. Leaders can rally broken troops and provide morale bonuses, though they can also be felled by enemy fire.

“Keeping units in range of their leader and their leader in range of the next higher echelon makes an army work well,” Cox explained. American commanders will need to stay close to their militia: “Keeping them in command and preventing their disruption and breakdown is an art.”

One fascination of playing historical wargames is seeing how they model the little things. For example, the British Army’s Scottish Highlanders are given a bonus during melee combat “to reflect their impact on the minds of American troops, and their reputation for relishing close combat,” the game manual notes.

But ultimately, the question comes down to: How accurately does the game depict the battles that determined the fate of the American Revolution? And, how well does it capture the essences of a professional army versus a more amateur — but also more inspired — citizen army?

American Revolutionary War fares well on both questions.

The unit quality, morale and command systems model the capabilities of both sides, including how the Continental Army improved over time due to combat experience, as well as the tutelage of European instructors like Baron von Steuben.

“British forces are often outnumbered,” said Cox. “They need to learn to stretch their lines or get outflanked. They will usually have some high-quality troops and have the advantage of picking the point of attack.”

“The Americans usually have a high number of units. However, quality and strength can vary wildly. The Americans need to know when to give ground and when to hit hard.”

Perhaps what is most striking is the theater of war.

WDS has published almost 120 historical wargames that cover gigantic battles, such as Waterloo, Gettysburg, Kursk and the Battle of the Bulge. In these games, the maps are packed with masses of troops.

In American Revolutionary War, the maps are often big, while the armies are small. One can begin to appreciate how British soldiers and colonial settlers must have felt about fighting in a vast, untamed land.

As Americans mark the Declaration of Independence, this is a reminder of how far our nation has come.

The Defense Department has put out a solicitation for robot boats that are capable of launching small attack drones — with technology mature enough to be deployed to the field within 120 days.

The goal for the Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads, or SWAP-USV, project is to find “mature, market-ready [unmanned surface vessels] fully integrated with two or more mature, market-ready aerial drones to detect, identify, track, and defeat hostile threats,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation. The call out set a response deadline of Aug. 10.

To make this happen, DIU created a year-long contest backed by $100 million in prize money. DIU wants to “partner with established maritime manufacturers, autonomy developers, sensor manufacturers, and UAS developers to execute a multi-phase Prize Challenge.”

The SWAP-USV project is billed as a solution to a problem that has also plagued missile and drone defense on land: the economics favor the offense.

“The cost-exchange ratio for detecting and neutralizing asymmetric maritime threats in contested environments is heavily skewed in favor of the adversary,” the DIU solicitation states. Nor can the U.S. military continue to rely “on exquisite, multi-million-dollar naval and aviation assets to intercept these inexpensive targets.”

The solicitation paints the picture of a drone boat that can carry, launch and control at least two small UAVs. The UAVs together should be capable of conducting kinetic strikes with a combined payload of at least 2 kilograms, or just over 4 pounds.

DIU wants a mix of recoverable and one-way attack drones that can patrol ocean, coastal and riverine waters, and loiter on station. The drones, according to the solicitation, should “support one or more operational effects, including ISR, comms relay, electronic warfare, payload delivery, or precision engagement of moving or stationary, as applicable, under operator command.”

The Pentagon also wants the system to be mobile enough to fit into a standard cargo container, on road trailers or on C-17 and C-130 transports.

“Solutions that can launch from unimproved locations or provide additional launch flexibility, i.e. remotely from a container, will be looked upon favorably,” DIU noted, adding that the UAVs should be “technically mature and have an established production line.”

Interestingly, among the maritime threats the DIU solicitation cites are “‘go-fast’ smuggling boats, and semi-submersibles.” Drug cartels have used semi-submersibles to transport contraband from South America to the U.S., and such pseudo-submarines are hard to detect.

The SWAP-USV project calls for robot craft capable of “autonomous surveillance and interdiction of defined maritime operating areas, maximizing operational coverage, probability of detection, interdiction effectiveness, and time on station while minimizing daily operating cost, logistics burden, and required personnel.”

The surveillance elements of the solicitation state that the drone boat must be able to “autonomously follow or shadow a vessel of interest, and autonomously intercept a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel. Autonomous execution of these functions is desired but not required.”

The SWAP-USV Challenge, meanwhile, comprises three “sprints,” or phases, each with separate prize money. To sweeten the pot further, companies that pass the test in each phase will be eligible for procurement contracts backed by a $200 million budget.

Sprint 1 calls for in-water testing in fall 2026, with a goal of deploying a system in the field within 120 days.

“Solutions must include a complete mission ready USV with integrated drone capability system available for testing and evaluation within 29 days of down-selection for Sprint 1,” the solicitation specified. There will be $40 million in prize money.

Sprint 2 will have a fall 2026 deadline and in-water testing in early 2027, with the focus on “expanded payloads, upgraded autonomy, and multi-vendor integrations.” The prize money for that timeframe will also be $40 million.

Sprint 3 will take submissions in early 2027, with in-water testing in summer 2027. The goals of this phase will be announced later, but there will be $20 million in prizes.

Companies must specify which phase they want to join. “The government reserves the right to assign applicants to [Sprint] cohorts based on technical and manufacturing maturity,” the solicitation noted.

But this time, the Pentagon is in a hurry. The Iran war has exposed the problem of relying on costly long-range missiles such as the Tomahawk. To remedy that, DoD is putting out a call for long-range, autonomously guided Ground-Based Affordable Mass, or GBAM, weapons that cost less than $250,000 apiece.

The Pentagon also wants the GBAM munitions to be ready for demonstration within three months, and full-scale production within 18 months.

The goal of the GBAM initiative is to supplement expensive smart munitions with “affordable, scalable long-range effects, and “enable commanders to service a broader target set, preserve exquisite munitions for their intended purpose, and sustain operational tempo throughout a prolonged conflict.”

To facilitate that, the Defense Innovation Unit has created the GBAM Challenge. Contestants will pitch ideas in the form of a pitch deck or white paper, with a deadline of Aug. 5.

Winning teams will be invited to a Phase II flight demonstration at a government test site in early November, where they will give a 30-minute presentation — and get a $250,000 cash prize.

The top Phase II contenders may receive up to $5 million “to immediately deliver operational test quantities to units.” They may also be eligible for other funds, including Prototype Other Transaction agreements, follow-on production contracts and Small Business Innovation Research awards.

“In total, the government has budgeted up to $250 million to support prize execution and follow-on transition activities associated with this effort,” DIU pointed out.

However, grabbing that pot of gold will require much work. For starters, the timeline is tight. The Pentagon wants “mature, affordable, long-range precision strike systems that can be demonstrated within 60 to 90 days, certified, and scaled into production within 12 to 18 months.”

DIU doesn’t specify whether GBAM will be a missile or a drone, though it does say GBAM will be “aligned with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) mandate to field low-cost autonomous capabilities at scale.”

Either way, the U.S. military wants a “favorable cost-per-effect at operationally relevant ranges while minimizing the logistical, training, and sustainment burden on employing units.” This means a ground-launched weapon with a range of at least 600 nautical miles, and a minimum payload of 35 pounds while ideally allowing for 100 pounds.

It should have automatic target recognition and autonomous terminal guidance, and be “ideally mission-proven” to function in jamming and GPS-denied environments. This includes “Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) or redundant navigation capabilities suitable for GPS/GNSS-denied operations in maritime and other ‘feature-poor’ environments.”

DIU is also looking for a weapon that doesn’t require any proprietary launch equipment, with “remote and low-signature launch methods strongly preferred.”

Companies should have an “existing production capacity or credible path to producing 100+ systems monthly.” And with a price tag of “cost-per-effect below $500,000 based on system reliability and mission success rate, with a sub-$250,000 all-up flyaway cost at scale.”

In addition to GBAM, the U.S. military is pursuing other strike weapons that don’t cost as much as traditional missiles, and can be mass produced as needed. They include the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles, or FAMM-BAR, program to launch cruise missiles from cargo planes, as well as the Low-Cost Containerized Missiles hypersonic weapons program.

The “Readiness Simulation” project comes as the U.S. government is about to change its draft registration system.

Since 1940, men within a designated age range have been required to register with the Selective Service. But under a proposed rule, men aged 18 to 26 will be automatically registered starting Dec. 19, 2026. The Selective Service System will work off data contained in other federal databases.

Questions remain about how prepared the Selective Service System is to handle the change.

“SSS currently relies on manual analysis, legacy modeling approaches, outdated assumptions, and historical datasets that do not fully reflect modern demographics, communications channels, throughput constraints, or operational readiness conditions,” warned the agency in a Request for Quote for the Readiness Simulation tool.

The deadline for vendors to propose their simulation models is Aug. 14.

The computer simulation will explore multiple areas. These include evaluating staffing and resource requirements, comparing mobilization and police scenarios and assessing the operational impact of surge conditions. In addition, the system will “identify throughput risks, delays, and bottlenecks” and support executive planning and reporting obligations.

The goal is a simulation system that “models the full end-to-end SSS mobilization pipeline, supports configurable scenarios, and provides decision-support analytics necessary for leadership, planners, and operators.”

Scenarios will encompass draft registration, selection, notification, delivery and classification. They will also cover the Alternative Service Program, which includes various forms of community service as well as conscientious objectors.

Computer models will “represent MEPS [Military Entrance Processing Stations] throughput, no-shows, medical disqualification rates, claims processing, and ASP diversion,” according to the Request for Quote.

Contractors must be prepared to run the Readiness Simulation while “recognizing that legacy SSS draft data may be outdated or unreliable,” the agency said.

A draft registration system based on data compiled by — and accessed from — other federal agencies is likely to raise privacy concerns.

The computer simulation “shall operate within an SSS-designated cloud environment, use anonymized aggregate data, and support complete Government ownership and sustainment,” the agency said.

The simulation must also comply with multiple privacy regulations.

“The trends are moving in the right direction,” Jerry McGinn, who co-authored the study for the Center for Strategic and International Analysis think tank, told Defense News.

However, the study — described as a progress report on reforms to the defense manufacturing and acquisition system — still found numerous problems with ramping up and sustaining wartime production.

For example, “according to several measures — manufacturing lead times, critical munitions and materials stockpiles, and supply chain security — the U.S. industrial base has a long way to go to achieve resilience,” warned the analysis by CSIS’s Center for the Industrial Base.

CSIS did find measurable improvements since November 2025, when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth vowed to “transform the entire acquisition system to operate on a wartime footing.”

Hegseth also promised to “inspire American industry to become a wartime industrial base that focuses on speed and volume.”

Most striking is the number of new companies in the defense field.

“Roughly 10,000 new firms have entered the market in the past two years and nontraditional companies received over $120 billion in contract obligations in FY 2025, adding competition and innovation to the sector,” CSIS noted. “Munitions contract obligations have risen 330 percent since FY 2010. Spurred by this increased demand and depleted inventories, the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale.”

The military is also responding to depleted stockpiles of expensive guided weapons that have been rapidly consumed by the Iran and Ukraine wars.

The Pentagon’s 2027 budget request for munitions allocated 49% to low-cost munitions — defined as costing less than $600,000 apiece — rising to 70% by 2031.

The U.S. is also strengthening its defense supply chain, such as “multiyear procurement agreements, direct-to-supplier investments, and leaner acquisition pathways,” as well as investing in defense companies such as L3Harris Missile Solutions, according to CSIS.

However, while this signals government commitment to defense production, it “also complicates competitive dynamics within the industry as new entrants and established suppliers alike seek to meet rapidly growing demand for munitions at scale.”

Also notable is federal investment in rare earths, which has seen production soar from 95 tons in 2022, to 8,900 tons in 2025. Nonetheless, “the erosion of domestic rare earth manufacturing capacity and the rise of Chinese control took decades to unfold, however, and it will take several years of enduring effort for the United States and its allies to build, scale, and sustain the production capacity of these key defense inputs.”

Exports of U.S. arms, or cooperative multinational projects such as the F-35 fighter, have also become a pillar of America’s defense industry. Foreign Military Sales, or FMS, have more than tripled, from less than $20 billion in 2015 to more than $80 billion in 2025.

The Trump administration wants to take this further with the “America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” launched in February 2026.

“The United States will use foreign purchases and capital to support domestic reindustrialization, expand production capacity, and improve the resilience of the United States defense industrial base,” the White House executive order declared.

Ultimately, the federal government can control defense production through the products it demands, the prices it is willing to pay, and the incentives it offers.

“It’s a monopsony,” McGinn said. “Government sets the market. Government can regulate the market. So, if the government wants different outcomes, it changes how it buys.”

The search comes after dozens of MQ-9s were swatted out of the sky during the Iran war, according to a May 13 Congressional Research Service report.

With the Air Force currently possessing about 135 Reapers — which cost approximately $30 million apiece — such a loss rate is not sustainable, especially against a force like Iran, whose air defenses are less sophisticated than those of China or Russia.

“The Joint Force’s reliance on low-density, high-value ‘exquisite’ (>$30 million) manned and unmanned aircraft is unsustainable against adversaries utilizing layered defenses enabled by increasingly low-cost antiaircraft capabilities,” warned the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation for a new drone, which the Pentagon wants to “execute missions that the MQ-9A performs today.”

Rather than build a better Reaper, DIU is opting for an expendable replacement. The Massed Modular Aircraft, or MMA, project aims to develop a UAV designed to operate in such large numbers that it can absorb heavy losses and still overwhelm enemy defenses.

Particularly of interest is the size of the MMA. Drone swarms may be the next big thing in unmanned warfare, but generally those hordes are made up of small, inexpensive UAVs with limited range and payload.

But the DIU solicitation envisions a drone that has long range and a heavy payload — and is still inexpensive enough for mass production. The solicitation calls for a payload of at least 2,800 pounds, a bit less than the MQ-9’s 3,800-pound capacity.

The MMA should also have an unrefueled combat range of at least 2,300 nautical miles, according to the solicitation, and a one-way transfer range of at least 8,000 nautical miles. Additionally, the drone should reach speeds of at least 200 miles per hour and have the ability to operate from a 6,000-foot runway or improvised airstrips.

The DIU solicitation states that the drone should have “sufficient available size, weight, power (25kW), and cooling (5kW) to host a variety of internal and/or external payloads,” with a level of autonomous operations that would allow one operator to control several drones.

The solicitation does not specify the MMA’s dimensions, though the specifications suggest a drone comparable in size to the MQ-9. It also did not list a desired price point, though presumably it would be less than the $30 million price tag of an MQ-9.

The timeline for the MMA project, meanwhile, is ambitious. DIU is calling for “full-scale prototype flight testing within 21 months of award, with a targeted Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY2031. IOC for MMA is envisioned as 20 mission-ready aircraft delivered to an operational unit, able to be deployed.”

Pentagon solicitations continue to reflect a mindfulness of lessons from the Ukraine War, as well as the experiences during the Iran War. In both conflicts, the defender exhausted interceptors before the attacker ran out of drones.

“Keeping a constant airborne MMA presence to launch weapons, gather intelligence, perform electronic warfare missions, or relay communications will force an adversary to stay on the defensive,” DIU said. “This relentless pressure will exhaust the adversary, forcing them to burn through expensive anti-aircraft missiles and resources faster than they can be replaced.”

“DOD plans to invest over $2.4 trillion to develop and acquire its costliest weapon programs,” according to the Government Accountability Office’s 2026 annual report on major defense acquisition programs, or MDAP.

“Schedule delays persisted across MDAPs, signaling overly optimistic time frames,” according to the GAO report, which examined 104 of the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons programs. “The overall average time frame to deliver a capability increased this year to over 12 years. Further, several MDAPs have not set new delivery dates or are delaying critical interim milestones.

“By keeping delivery dates static, these programs raise questions about how realistic their estimates are. This means the 12-year average will likely increase in the future.”

If that sounds familiar, the 2025 annual report found that the DOD “continues to struggle with delivering innovative technologies quickly and within budget.”

However, the 2025 study seemed particularly concerned by rising costs of weapons due to inflation in the U.S. economy. In that regard, the 2026 analysis revealed a mixed price picture, with 46 of 72 programs reporting increases totaling $122 billion, and 16 reporting decreases totaling $47 billion.

GAO’s 2026 report seems more focused on program delays, especially in middle tier of acquisition, or MTA, projects that are intended to quickly jumpstart fielding of weapons within five years. The Pentagon is investing more than $49 billion across 23 of the most expensive MTA projects.

But GAO found that many systems are being slotted into the MTA despite the technology being too immature to be fast-tracked.

“For example, between 2018 and 2025, 18 out of 40 programs have entered the MTA pathway with immature technologies,” the report stated.

Many were lower than Technology Readiness Level 6 (prototype stage), and some were less than TRL 3 (proof of concept stage). Of eight current MTA projects, GAO deemed seven to be technologically immature, including the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile and the Next Generation Persistent Overhead Infrared sensor.

Thus, “programs are increasingly using the MTA pathway to mature technologies, when the intention of the pathway is to prototype and or field a residual capability within two to five years,” Shelby Oakley, GAO’s director for contracting and national security acquisitions, told Defense News.

“This is why we are not seeing capabilities fielded any faster,” Oakley said.

Among specific program issues, the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based unmanned aircraft has a 2.5-year delay to “initial operational capability and a 26-month delay to the end of initial operational testing,” GAO found. Changes to the design based on testing could push deployment out even longer.

For the DDG(X) destroyer, the Navy has yet to offer an acquisition strategy that details the assumptions behind the project.

“As such, the Navy’s business case for the DDG(X) program is not apparent,” GAO said. The DDG(X) is also likely to be affected by shipyard delays in building the Arleigh Burke-class Flight III series, which are up to 55 months behind schedule.

The Air Force’s B-52 radar modernization program, meanwhile, is beset by “cost increases and schedule delays.” The Air Force is opting to enter production with “very little development flight testing completed.”

The Army’s Mid-Range Capability program, which uses mounts Navy missiles and vertical launch tubes in Army vehicles, has “identified three additional critical technologies, all of which are immature.”

There are questions on “whether the return on investment is worthwhile for the four batteries planned for production by the Army,” the GAO stated.

The goal is to develop an air-launched loitering munition “with an extended range and capabilities beyond the current SOPGM [Stand-Off Precision Guided Munition portfolio],” according to a June 26 SOCOM Request For Information. The response deadline is July 27.

Launched at an altitude of 5,000 to 30,000 feet, the desired Air Loitering Munition must have a range of at least 75 nautical miles. Once over the target zone, it must have a loiter time of at least 40 minutes while orbiting at an altitude of 500 to 3,000 feet, according to the RFI. The munition should also be able to maintain a speed of 50 to 100 knots, with a weight that does not exceed 95 pounds.

By comparison, AeroVironment’s Switchblade 600 — which SOCOM ordered in 2021 to test as a boat-launched weapon — has a range of more than 55 miles and weighs 33 pounds. The ALM’s guidance would be passive, homing in on radio emissions or using automatic target recognition.

The ALM will be able to be launched by SOCOM fixed-wing aircraft, according to the request. Ideally, the weapon should be capable of being fired from a Common Launch Tube, a launcher that enables most military or civilian aircraft to become missile platforms.

For the Common Launch Tube, the ALM would be no longer than 42 inches, with a 5.9-inch diameter. Fitted to a BRU-71 or BRU-78 weapons rack, the ALM could be up to 90 inches long and 9 inches wide.

The project will involve “a single demonstration for evaluation on the AC-130J Ghostrider or another SOF platform,” according to the RFI.

The RFI also calls for rough cost estimates for orders of 500, 1000 and 3000 munitions. SOCOM is “looking for true innovative, out-of-the-box thinking, conceptual approaches and ideas on how industry can expediently design, manufacture and deliver stated capabilities.”

While short-range backpack kamikaze drones have become a fixture on the battlefield, long-range loitering munitions have become increasingly prominent.

In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan used the Israeli-made Harpy to devastate Armenian forces. Ukraine and Russia have also made extensive use of long-range loitering drones. Earlier this month, Russia bombarded Kyiv with the Banderol, which reportedly has a range of 500 miles and packs a 150-pound warhead.

Armed with loitering munitions with a range of around 100 miles, SOCOM MC-130J gunships and other aircraft would be able to hunt targets deep inside enemy lines — and do so while remaining out of range of enemy air defenses.

One reason is that research funds are being diverted to operations.

The Pentagon’s “research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure is deteriorating and weakening the Department’s ability to maintain a technically advanced warfighting capability,” warned the report by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. “Authorized major military construction (MILCON) projects for modernization of critical joint-mission RDT&E infrastructure continually slip due to the services’ reprioritizing of scarce MILCON funds toward other operationally relevant priorities.”

The study examined government laboratories as well as federally funded think tanks and university research centers. Investigators visited 30 of these sites — or about one-third of total facilities — in what the report termed “unprecedented data collection.”

The report presented a mixed picture of the Pentagon’s research backbone. It found the defense research enterprise, or DRE, “is fundamentally sound.” However, it also “needs to rapidly adapt to a new environment moving at the accelerating pace of commercial technology and driven by a broader set of global security threats.”

Research has been hampered by backlogged security clearances, limited funds to build or refurbish labs and a slow and difficult hiring process that discourages younger skilled personnel.

Nor does DoD have a clear handle on its research infrastructure, including a comprehensive list of specialized facilities, such as the Triaxial Earthquake and Shock Simulator in Illinois.

Pentagon research facilities don’t even speak a common language, the report states.

“For example, a single technical domain may be variously labeled as ‘Human-Machine Teaming,’ ‘Autonomy and Teaming,’ or ‘AI Agent Development’ depending on the reporting entity,” the report noted. “This semantic variability ensures that high- level titles alone are insufficient for determining the true depth or specificity of the work being performed.”

Further, the Pentagon is not taking full advantage of its own discoveries.

DoD’s “vast intellectual property remains underutilized due to passive marketing and the lack of a centralized discovery mechanism,” said the report. “Current administrative burdens for transition agreements often exceed the funding timelines of startups, hindering innovation and collaboration.”

This results in delays in new technologies reaching the field.

“The Department’s ability to rapidly transition technologies from knowledge producers to capability fielders is severely degraded by structural and cultural barriers, specifically bureaucratic stovepipes, fragmented funding streams, and misaligned mechanisms, authorities, and incentives,” the report said.

The report took care to state that it is not calling for Pentagon research centers to be closed.

“The evidence in this report does not support consolidating or eliminating institutions: Most overlap is driven by mission need,” the report says. “The findings suggest that the way to reform the DRE is to fix the system around its institutions — how authority, money, and decisions flow, and how the institutions are funded, measured, and governed.”

The study points to China as an example for DoD’s research infrastructure, including partnering with the commercial sector.

“China has solidified its civil-military fusion model and is investing on a scale and at a pace that requires the United States to develop a new Government-industry paradigm — one that advances and protects critical defense research while extending the technical reach of the DRE through industrial and academic partnerships the DRE itself does not own.”

The report made numerous recommendations, including easing budgetary limits on lab refurbishment, using AI to speed up security clearances and creating a searchable database for DoD intellectual property.

“Without a robust, agile, and properly resourced DRE, the department cannot rapidly onramp innovative capabilities or deliver the advanced capabilities the warfighter requires to deter and, if necessary, defeat emerging threats in an era of intense strategic competition,” the report concluded.