Related<\/span>\n\t\t\t\tTop Marine called to testify on 9 deaths in amphibious assault vehicle accident<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
The Corps\u2019 safety issues go well beyond this one accident, one congressman said.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/aside>\n\t\n\n\n
But the SOP does not account for \u201ca circumstance in which the AAV is in a rough sea state, no safety boats are in the water and the AAV is slowly sinking,\u201d Rudder said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The vehicle commander told investigators, \u201cI just kept telling him (the rear crewman) to stay calm and that we had to get to the ship.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the survivors later said that it was around this time that the crew of the AAV started to get nervous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI began to notice that the crew was getting concerned. I could tell the (rear crewman) was freaking out still.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After roughly 20 minutes of waving the November flag, two nearby AAVs finally noticed and started to slowly move toward the sinking AAV.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the water inside the vehicle reached calf height the rear crewman told the vehicle commander they would need to evacuate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At this point the vehicle commander told \u00adinvestigators that he ordered the crew to \u201cdrop their stuff\u201d and open up the cargo hatches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All the Marines who died were found wearing their small arms protective insert carriers. Seven still had their Kevlar helmets on and two still had their rifles on their body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Due to the failure of the emergency egress lighting system the Marines started to prepare for evacuation in near complete darkness, trying to use their \u00adcellphones as flashlights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A broken handle on the starboard hatch slowed down the process. But eventually it was opened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The AAV crew started to help the infantry Marines and Navy corpsman evacuate from the vehicle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But a collision with one of the other AAVs \u00adattempting to help pushed the sinking AAV broadside in the waves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Soon, a large wave hit the AAV, knocking the few Marines who already had escaped into the water.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cEverything starts to run together in my mind,\u201d the vehicle commander said. \u201cI remember the Marines who are still in the back of the vehicle just looking at me. I remember that I got knocked off by a wave, and I remember swimming over to one of the other tracks.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Once the wave hit the AAV, the vehicle started to rapidly fill with water. It went nose high and sank into the ocean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI saw Track 5 sinking,\u201d a Marine on an assisting AAV told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cAt the time I didn\u2019t realize how many people were still in Track 5 because they were not trying to get out of the hatch. I assume that the people inside the \u00advehicle were either already drowned or drowning because they were not trying to get out.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018A small bubble of air\u2019<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Two of the AAV crewman and three of the \u00adembarked Marines made it outside of the vehicle. Eleven went down with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The AAV driver was the only member of the crew to go down with the vehicle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the vehicle started to rapidly sink, he tried to escape through his hatch, but could not get it open, he told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI had a small bubble of air, so I took one breath and then climbed out of the back of the vehicle,\u201d the driver told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As he was escaping through the passenger area the Marine said he felt the uniform of one of the grunts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Pulling the Marine out of the cargo hatch the driver inflated the other Marine\u2019s life preserver, which sent him to the water\u2019s surface.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Feeling another Marine bump into him, the AAV driver inflated a second Marine\u2019s life preserver, also sending him to the surface.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After roughly 45 seconds under the water the Marine said he finally inflated his own life preserver, which sent him to the water\u2019s surface.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI got to within 20 feet of the top and I felt that I wouldn\u2019t make it, and then I blacked out,\u201d he told investigators. \u201cThe next thing I remember when I woke up on the ship.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The three Marines who floated to the surface were pulled on top of the nearby vehicles where Marines started to conduct CPR on them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the Marines who made it out, Lance Cpl. Guillermo S. Perez, was pronounced dead on the scene after one hour of continuous CPR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWhile I\u2019m doing CPR on (one of the rescued Marines) I saw some water come out and then I saw some foam and blood come out,\u201d the vehicle \u00adcommander said. The name of the Marine referred to here was redacted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe felt a light pulse, so I kept doing CPR until I started puking at which point I told (redacted name) to do CPR. We checked his pulse again but couldn\u2019t find anything.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Two Marines were hospitalized due to the accident, the Marine Corps said at the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Marines who were on the nearby AAVs, along with those who conducted rescue missions later in the day, said besides the three bodies all they had seen float to the surface were MRE boxes, rucks and inflated floatation devices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The investigation found that all but one of the service members who went down with the vehicle eventually were able to escape. But the weight of their equipment, added to the depth of the AAV at that point, meant they would never reach the surface alive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The flotation devices they were using were designed to allow a Marine carrying a full combat load to float on the surface. But the buoyancy provided by the device shrinks the deeper in the ocean a Marine gets \u2014 reducing by more than 50 percent by the time a Marine is 33 feet below the ocean\u2019s surface.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From when the rear crewman first noticed the excess water to the vehicle going under took a total of roughly 45 minutes, according to the investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fresh off the deadline lot<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 15th MEU originally was slated to receive 13 allegedly well-maintained AAVs that were fresh off a previous deployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But an unplanned reorganization saw the MEU receive vehicles from the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion\u2019s administrative deadline lot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The seven vehicles sent to the MEU from the lot had not been operated for almost a year, outside of quarterly startups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And six of the vehicles required a tow to even make it to the repair shop, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The platoon\u2019s maintenance chief had informed the 3rd AA Battalion that the vehicles were inoperable and the platoon did not have the personnel to fix them in time for the deployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But instead of replacing the vehicles with \u00adworking AAVs the platoon was sent three additional mechanics, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As of April 20, 2020, only one of the 13 vehicles slated to be handed over from the 3rd AA Battalion to the 15th MEU was operable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe way I felt about this was that our platoon had always kind of gotten fucked over,\u201d the rear crewman who had been the platoon\u2019s assistant maintenance chief prior to the training accident told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI feel like 3rd Tracks just said, \u2018Fuck you, here\u2019s a bunch of really horrible tracks and old vehicles.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Only 11 days earlier the commander of 3rd AA Battalion\u2019s Headquarters and Service company said the platoon had a readiness of 92 percent, according to the investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
After finding out so many of the vehicles meant for the MEU were inoperable BLT 1\/4 Commander Lt. Col. Michael Regner met with the then commander of 3rd AA Battalion, Lt. Col. Keith C. Brenize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
During the meeting Brenize told Regner that the vehicles would be fixed in time for a March exercise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe literally spent two to three weeks going to work at 0500 and getting off at midnight every single day working on those vehicles,\u201d the AAV\u2019s driver told investigators. \u201cI think that some of the battalion maintenance guys were coming in some days to help out, but I\u2019m not sure.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the Marines working to repair the\u00ad \u00advehicles saw a series of delays.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The vehicles still belonged to the 3rd AA Battalion, preventing them from getting priority on replacement parts or financial support from the MEU they were destined for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They were able to repair the vehicles enough for land use by May 3, 2020, the investigation found. By May 26, 2020, the vehicles were supposedly suitable for waterborne operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Though the vehicles eventually were declared \u00adoperable, an inspection of the fated vehicle after the accident found numerous mechanical problems that should have deadlined it and kept it from ever deploying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issues were not unique to the 3rd AA Battalion, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After the accident, an inspection of all the AAVs in the Marine Corps was conducted with updated watertight integrity requirements and bilge pump functionality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cA majority of the AAVs failed to meet the new inspection criteria,\u201d Rudder found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most common failures were, \u201cbilge pump \u00addiscrepancies, inoperable emergency egress lighting systems and plenum leakage,\u201d exactly what had doomed the AAV on July 30, 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The infantry Marines from BLT 1\/4 lacked the \u00adtraining required to be on the water with AAVs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Only 11 of the 13 service members embarked on the AAV had up-to-date swim qualifications, while the corpsman aboard, Hospitalman Christopher Gnem, may have never passed a swim qualification, his \u00adstepfather, Peter Vienna, told Marine Corps Times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Only two of the Marines from BLT 1\/4 had genuinely completed the required underwater egress training, but, through a twisted shell game around ambiguous standards, the company commander was able to make it look like they were qualified on paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The training would have them use a submerged vehicle egress trainer, or SVET, which simulates what it is like inside a sinking AAV in a safe environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But, between COVID-19 restrictions and mechanical issues with the trainer, the Marines never had the opportunity to take part in the training.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead, the Marines used a shallow water egress training, or SWET, chair. In the SWET chair a \u00adMarine straps themselves in and is surrounded by bars. The Marine is flipped into the water and works on getting out of their harness in a shallow pool.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The SWET chair is considered a valid replacement for the Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer, or MAET, commonly known as the helo dunker, which simulates escape from a helicopter crashed into water. It is considered a valid replacement for the SVET.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Bravo Company commander said that because SWET can substitute for MAET, and MAET can substitute for SVET, that he was within regulation to substitute SVET for SWET, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWhile it is clearly not the intent of the policy to dispose of both SVET and MAET and pronounce personnel fully (underwater egress) trained through SWET training alone, the ambiguity in the policy makes that a possible interpretation,\u201d Rudder said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He recommended that the ambiguity be fixed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The infantry Marines were not the only ones missing the required training when the vehicle went down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The entire AAV platoon assigned to the 15th MEU was missing required training before the deployment. Several of the crews had been hastily thrown together and none had spent much time in the water in the months leading up to the sinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the platoon was assigned to the MEU in \u00adJanuary 2020 Marines only had four months to prepare before coming under the MEU\u2019s command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI did not feel that my platoon was ready to become part of the 15th MEU, at least no right off the bat in January,\u201d the AAV platoon sergeant told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite the approaching deployment, the priority from the 3rd AA Battalion seemed to be on Native Fury, a joint exercise that took place in the United Arab Emirates in March 2020, the platoon commander said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The focus on Native Fury prevented the platoon from scheduling much of the training needed before the \u00adplatoon deployed on the MEU, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe platoon would be conducting the same training requirements throughout the exercise as they would here in CONUS,\u201d Brenize told investigators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately only half the platoon deployed to Native Fury, as COVID-19 restrictions led to canceled flights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Those who did deploy to Native Fury were forced to conduct two weeks of quarantine before they resumed training.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While on the exercise the Marines never took their AAVs into the water, the investigation said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Final evaluation<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The AAV crew on the sinking AAV had only been put together on July 27 \u2014 three days before the sinking \u2014 because the normal rear crewman in the vehicle tested positive for COVID-19.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prior to any deployment Marines are expected to go through a Marine Corps combat readiness evaluation, which ensures the Marines are fully capable of doing their jobs in combat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The evaluation is especially important for MEUs, as they are the Marine Corps\u2019 expeditionary response force, supposedly prepared for any situation, from war to humanitarian aid, that the Corps could be called to respond to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In September 2001, elements of the 15th MEU were in East Timor rendering humanitarian aid, while others were in Darwin, Australia. Two months later they were part of the initial invasion into Afghanistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The responsibility to hold the \u00adevaluation fell on the commander of the 1st Marine Division, then Maj. Gen. Robert Castellvi and commander of the 3rd AA Battalion, Brenize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Brenize told investigators that he \u00adbelieved the platoon met all training and readiness standards and that a MCCRE was not required because it was only a platoon and not a company or larger size force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The AAV platoon commander told investigators that he was not aware that a MCCRE was necessary before his \u00adMarines joined the MEU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In fact, he told investigators that no one from the 3rd AA Battalion ever asked him for a training plan or even a brief on his platoon\u2019s readiness and capabilities prior to the deployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The platoon commander had told the Bravo BLT 1\/4 commander about his concerns and the two talked about potential extra training that could be conducted, but between COVID-19 restrictions and \u201c\u00adother reasons,\u201d the training never \u00admaterialized, the investigation found.<\/p>\n\n\n\t