{"id":19860,"date":"2018-11-29T01:02:08","date_gmt":"2018-11-29T01:02:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/marinecorpstimes\/uncategorized\/2018\/11\/29\/china-aims-to-defeat-the-us-air-force-without-firing-a-shot-heres-how\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T20:34:58","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T20:34:58","slug":"china-aims-to-defeat-the-us-air-force-without-firing-a-shot-heres-how","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/marinecorpstimes\/flashpoints\/2018\/11\/29\/china-aims-to-defeat-the-us-air-force-without-firing-a-shot-heres-how\/","title":{"rendered":"China aims to defeat the US Air Force without firing a shot. Here\u2019s how."},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A new study highlights China\u2019s growing air power<\/a>, and warns that China is looking to build out its Air Force to the point that the U.S. would not be willing to take it on in direct conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Project Air Force team at Rand Corp. describes an emerging Chinese air force that aims to rival the United States’ own, both technologically and strategically, often by mirroring U.S. military capabilities and doctrine<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt is important to recognize that many of the PLA [People\u2019s Liberation Army<\/a>] efforts in the military aerospace sector focus on fielding of specific capabilities in sufficient quantities to deter the United States from entering a conflict; the PLA would vastly prefer deterrence over actual combat operations,\u201d the report reads. \u201cIn this sense, the capabilities competition can be regarded as aimed at defeating the United States without actually fighting.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Copying or innovating their own capabilities are both valid pathways to this goal. However, \u201cthe lower cost and higher speed of the copying and adapting approach appears to have made it a preferred approach whenever available,” the report reads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Different services prefer different styles, however. The People\u2019s Liberation Army Air Force<\/a>, or PLAAF, tends to copy, while China\u2019s missile and space programs are more frequent innovators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
FILE – In this Sunday, Feb. 25, 2018, file photo, a model of the Wing Loong II weaponized drone hangs above the stand for the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corp. at a military drone conference in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Across the Middle East, countries locked out of purchasing U.S.-made drones due to rules over excessive civilian casualties are being wooed by Chinese arms dealers, who are world’s main distributor of armed drones. The sales are helping expand Chinese influence across a region crucial to American security interests and bolstering Beijing’s ambitions of being a world leader in high-tech arms sales. (AP Photo\/Jon Gambrell, File)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Unlike the U.S. military, China\u2019s strategic missile forces<\/a> act as their own service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Rand Corp. report<\/a> was originally shared with Air Force leaders in September 2017, but was made publicly available this month.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In it, researchers documented the restructuring of the PLAAF and the technological innovations the country is looking to develop as it cruises towards a possible confrontation with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The PLAAF is one of five branches within the larger People\u2019s Liberation Army, the name given to China\u2019s armed services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s power projection strategy appears to be built around the development of precision-strike ballistic and cruise missiles, supplemented by a dense web of surface-to-air missiles and advanced fighter jets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe main driver for Chinese military aerospace power development is the PLA\u2019s view that it needs to be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat the United States in a high-end clash,\u201d the Rand report reads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report added that the PLA tends to copy foreign military technology, organizational designs and operational concepts where it suits them, but is not incapable of innovating its own solutions when needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
A model of a Chinese J-31 stealth fighter of AVIC is pictured at the Airshow China 2014 in Zhuhai, south China’s Guangdong province on November 12, 2014. The 10th Airshow China 2014 takes place from November 11 to 16. \rAirmen from the 33rd Maintenance Group perform checks on an F-35A Lightning II prior to a hot pit refueling session at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. All of the F-35 variants use the refueling areas in conjunction with the 96th Logistics Readiness Squadron\u00d5s fuels flight. <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

PLAAF writings often cite the U.S. Air Force as a model for their transformation into a \u201cstrategic air force,\u201d which they define as one not bound to defending China\u2019s air sovereignty but capable of supporting China\u2019s national policy objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2014, then-Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh argued that achieving his own service\u2019s core missions required \u201cintegrating air power capabilities within and across air, space, and cyberspace.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Chinese military appears to be mirroring that with their own developments in the arenas of strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; tactical and strategic airlift; and strike assets, according to Rand Corp.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report recommended that the U.S. Air Force strive to understand the advances China is making in those domains, as well as in space and within space-based satellite architectures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the Air Force should monitor a range of other PLA investments and changes, including in the realms of doctrine, organization, training, manpower, logistics, procurement and facilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cMany U.S. observers have also seen similarities in PLA hardware and operating practices that, at least superficially, appear to be derived from the observation or theft of the United States\u2019 or other countries\u2019 technologies and practices,” the report reads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A chart within the Rand report highlights areas in which the Chinese tend to copy the U.S. Air Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The top of the chart notes large degrees of similarities between the PLAAF\u2019s J-20 and J-31 stealth fighter jets and the U.S. Air Force\u2019s F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters. In areas like bombers and precision strike, though, China exhibits much less similarity with U.S. counterparts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The PLAAF\u2019s close-air support capabilities are also much more limited, the chart notes, hinting at China\u2019s expectation for a conflict with the U.S. to be relegated to naval and air combat around the South China Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That could portend a weakness in China\u2019s doctrinal approach, as they may not anticipate the need to engage in air-to-ground combat on the Chinese mainland or elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a similar vein, the U.S. military\u2019s reliance on satellite-based targeting could be a weakness China seeks to exploit. China has not put significant money into space-based satellites for ballistic missile early warning like the U.S. has.<\/p>\n\n\n\t