I can only tell you what I told Tony: All names are redacted, so I don’t know who gave the mission briefs and thus created the order that was disobeyed. Nobody higher up in the chain called the mission off. The weather was bad, but the entire night was not a total blackout — it’s clear from the report (and the story, I hope) that things started iffy and got progressively worse, which would explain why the whole mess wasn’t canceled before dinner. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Details about who gave the mission brief instructing the troops not to fly under those conditions were redacted. The Louisiana National Guard declined to discuss the report. But in the wake of the accident, investigators recommended new training procedures and safeguards meant to prevent similar tragedies from happening in the future, according to the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chief Warrant Officer 4 George Wayne Griffin Jr. Chief Warrant Officer 4 George Wayne Griffin Jr.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Photo Credit: Courtesy Photo<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n At least one witness interviewed for the investigation, which was obtained recently by Military Times via a request under the <\/span>Freedom of Information Act request, said Griffin was informed of ceilings at less than 200 feet about less than <\/span>an hour before his Black Hawk took off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Multiple witnesses said weather conditions deteriorated dramatically throughout the evening, during which two helicopters, each loaded with MARSOC Raiders, were to participate in “Helo Cast” water insertion training, per the report. Training the previous night on similar maneuvers had been successful, the report states, as had a series of operations the month before that had marked the first joint training operations between LAANG crews from 1st Assault Helicopter Battalion, 244th Aviation Regiment, and MARSOC Marines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But this night, about 15 seconds after the helicopter, call sign called <\/span>MOJO 69, was over the water, there were already signs of trouble. Griffin said he was “pulling back to the east,” according to transcriptions of cockpit communications, when the helicopter actually was turning north.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chief Warrant Officer 4 David Strother<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Photo Credit: Courtesy Photo<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The pilot, with nearly 1,100 hours of night-vision flight on his lengthy aviation record, began making erratic maneuvers, the report states. The helicopter climbed and fell rapidly. It went backward. It spun. He ceded control to co-pilot Chief Warrant Officer 4 George David Strother I believe this was phrased as such by investigators to make it clear that there was not a mechanical\/software\/systemic failure of the autopilot system — it was simply employed under conditions where it was not designed to work (i.e., 17 seconds before impact). Unsure how you want to tweak.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Strother’s last communication \u2013 “climb, climb” \u2013 came three seconds before impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Staff Sgt. Thomas Florich, left, and Staff Sgt. Lance Bergeron<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Photo Credit: Courtesy Photos<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Two other LAANG soldiers died in the crash:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seven Marines with 2nd Marine Raider Special Operations <\/span>Battalion [[They recently renamed from 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion. GH]] <\/span>perished, including some who had served with distinction during combat:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Top, left to right: Capt. Stanford Henry Shaw III, Master Sgt. Thomas Saunders and Staff Sgt. Marcus Bawol; bottom, left to right: Staff Sgt. Andrew Seif, Staff Sgt. Kerry Kemp, Staff Sgt. Liam A. Flynn, Staff Sgt. Trevor P. Blaylock<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Photo Credit: Marine Corps<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n ‘Aggressive at getting things done’<\/p>\n\n\n\n Less than three minutes before the first aircraft hit the water, the second Black Hawk flying with MOJO 69 aborted its mission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both helicopter crews “disobeyed a direct order of [redacted] by choosing to fly in lower then [sic] briefed weather minimums,” according to the report. It wa<\/span>is unclear whether crew members in the second Black Hawk, which aborted its mission less than three minutes before the first aircraft hit the water,<\/span> were disciplined for this breach. Col. Pete Schneider Requests for comment from family members of the helicopter crew via phone messages and emails either were not returned or denied. Attempts to reach family members of the MARSOC team members via a command spokesman were not successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Griffin likely wasn’t pushed on his decision, the report says, because of the high esteem in which he was held by members of his crew and others in the unit. He was selected for the training operation, at least in part, because the soldier in charge of putting the Guard team together “wanted someone who was aggressive at getting things done,” according to the investigation. That soldier’s name is redacted from the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Griffin, 37, had 1,017 combat hours and 6,112.2 combined military\/civilian flight hours, and had flown with night vision goggles for 1,082.9 hours as of the day before the incident, according to the report. Most of that time was in other types of aircraft, including as <\/span>a C-12 Huron twin-engine turboprop plane pilot<\/span>. He’d flown 81.8 hours with NVGs in a UH-60M and 357.7 hours overall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some of those hours came over Iraq, where he’d been deployed twice, most recently in 2008. Some came over Louisiana in support of three post-hurricane assistance missions, including Katrina. Strother had deployed in support of missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, returning from the latter in November 2014. He’d also flown over his home state during the aftermath of three hurricanes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A UH-60 instructor pilot, Strother, 44, had 2,486 total flight hours, including nearly 735 in combat. He’d logged 13 hours with NVGs aboard a UH-60M.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/DesktopModules\/UDMW\/TextEditor\/images\/cq.png\"\/)
, one of the Louisiana Guard’s top pilots, made the decision to fly in weather conditions worse than the 1,000-foot ceiling and three-mile visibility outlined in all mission briefs, the report found. He was selected for the MARSOC mission in part because he was known as an “aggressive” pilot, according to the investigation found<\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635817313918267474-arm-griffin-jrjpg.jpg\")
![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635817316639080915-arm-strotherjpg.jpg\")
, who also exhibited signs of disorientation and would suggest engaging the autopilot, which didn’t work because the aircraft was “outside the required flight parameters.” [[can we explain what that means a bit? GH]]<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635817457746509444-arm-florich-bergeronjpg.jpg\")
, 30, who served as an active-duty Marine from 1994 to 1998, transitioned into the Marine Corps Reserve until 2001, then joined the Guard and would make two Iraq deployments.<\/li>, 26, a sergeant at the time of the crash who was would be <\/span>posthumously promoted to staff sergeant<\/span>. He joined the LAANG in 2007, the year after his brother-in-law, Sgt. Jay R. <\/span>Gauthreaux, was killed by an improvised explosive device <\/a>in Iraq while deployed with 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635817454907603246-mar-black-hawk-crashjpg.jpg\")
, had received the Silver Star Medal four days before the crash for braving enemy fire in an attempt to save a mortally wounded fellow Marine. Seife<\/span> served as the special operations team leader during the exercise.<\/li>, 29, who deployed to Iraq in 2008, two years before his selection to attend the MARSOC Individual Training Course.<\/li>, 33, the team’s operations chief, who served in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.<\/li>, 33, who served as a squad leader in Afghanistan in 2009 and returned there in 2012 with Marine Special Operations Team 8231, the same team he was with in the sky over Florida. Flynn was raised in County Kildare, Ireland, according to the Irish Times, which first wrote about the investigation<\/a>. An Irish flag and a Raiders patch were placed atop his casket during a March 31 ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery, the newspaper reported<\/a>.<\/li>, 31, who deployed to Iraq in late 2007 and again in 2009. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 2006 and began MARSOC training courses <\/span>in 2012.<\/li>, was a critical skills operator with the team. His wedding had been set for October, Bawol’s sister told Marine Corps Times shortly after the crash<\/span>.<\/li>\u200b, deployed to Iraq as a machine gunner attached to a motor transport company before beginning MARSOC training in 2010.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n\n\n, chief spokesman for the Louisiana National Guard, said via email that the Guard will offer no further comments on the incident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n