{"id":67327,"date":"2021-10-01T15:18:50","date_gmt":"2021-10-01T15:18:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/marinecorpstimes\/uncategorized\/2021\/10\/01\/threat-posed-by-iran-is-unlikely-to-extend-beyond-centcom-region-report\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T14:19:42","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T14:19:42","slug":"threat-posed-by-iran-is-unlikely-to-extend-beyond-centcom-region-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/marinecorpstimes\/flashpoints\/2021\/10\/01\/threat-posed-by-iran-is-unlikely-to-extend-beyond-centcom-region-report\/","title":{"rendered":"Threat posed by Iran is \u2018unlikely\u2019 to extend beyond CENTCOM region, report"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A \u201clarge-scale\u201d attack by Iran<\/a> on U.S partners or allies \u201cappears remote\u201d as Iran has shown a \u201cclear reluctance\u201d to commit \u201cconventional\u201d forces in direct combat, a new report<\/a> from the Rand corporation states. As a result, any threat posed is \u201cunlikely\u201d to extend outside of the Central Command region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report, funded by the U.S. Army, is designed to inform Army planners under what conditions Tehran might intervene in another country and to what degree Iranian leadership might commit its armed forces. Researches conducted analysis on what has driven Iranian military actions and interventions going back to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, the researchers found that Iran is historically reluctant to directly engage in foreign interventions, having done so eight times since 1979. If Iran chooses to intervene conventionally outside its borders, Tehran prefers to use naval or air assets in \u201csmall-scale and targeted\u201d strikes that support its interests. Experts said in the report that these small-scale attacks, facilitated by Tehran\u2019s drone and missile programs, are likely to continue, and partner nations would benefit from U.S. training preparing them for such an attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead, Tehran has \u201cmostly relied on indirect involvement,\u201d working by, with, and through proxies<\/a>. In every foreign intervention identified by researchers, an Iranian \u201cco-identity group\u201d within that country has been present. Examples from the report include the large Shiia population inside of Iraq, which provided natural inroads for Iran following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and with the rise of ISIS in 2014.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the report, these groups allow Iran to build influence through \u201cadvise-and-assist\u201d missions while also \u201climiting the costs associated with foreign involvement,\u201d both in terms of human and financial capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analysis within the report identified three key factors which drive Iran to be involved militarily in another country.<\/p>\n\n\n\t