The purchase, valued at $60-$70 million, is one of Tehran’s largest-known efforts to strengthen its short-range air defenses since the outbreak of its war with the U.S. and Israel, which exposed gaps in Iran’s ability to protect military sites and strategic infrastructure.

The contract covers the purchase of between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, including Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missiles, the sources said.

The deal was signed with Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, a Hong Kong-based company that the sources said was acting as an intermediary between the Iranian side and the Chinese supplier.

IRAN REARMING AFTER MONTHS OF WAR

The sources spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

“The relevant reports are completely groundless,” China’s Foreign Ministry said. “China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

Queried about the deal at a regular press conference in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin said he was “not familiar with the relevant situation”.

Beijing-based Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, the parent company of Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, did not immediately respond to an email request for comment on Tuesday.

Iran’s reported rearming efforts come after months of fighting in which the U.S. and Israel have struck facilities linked to its missile, drone and air defense programs, and Tehran responded with barrages of ballistic missiles and drones.

The conflict has highlighted the challenge of defending fixed military and strategic sites against advanced aircraft and precision-guided weapons.

Washington abruptly suspended two weeks of bombardment on Saturday, but President Donald Trump said strikes would resume if negotiations failed to end the five-month-old conflict, which has in theory been in a state of ceasefire since April.

Responding to this article, Trump said Iran receiving such equipment from China would be surprising given what he said were assurances from Chinese President Xi Jinping not to get involved in the war on Iran’s behalf.

“I mean, things like that happen, but that would be surprising. [Xi] told me very strongly he wouldn’t partake, but he knows I’d be quite disappointed,” Trump said on Wednesday in response to a question about this report.

The delivery of hundreds of MANPADS would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons and underscore how military ties with China are deepening.

The sources cautioned that, although the agreement had been signed, delivery schedules, quantities and other implementation details could still change.

Under a plan agreed by the parties, deliveries will initially be by air from Urumqi in western China, then transiting through Pakistan to Iran, according to the sources, who did not clarify whether the transfers would take place by air or by road.

“Speculations of Pakistan being involved in supply of Air Defense weapons to Iran from China are absolutely concocted and false,” Pakistan’s military public relations wing ISPR said.

A spokesperson for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

SOURCES: CHINA, IRAN EYE LAND ROUTES FOR DELIVERY

While Iran has invested heavily in the past two decades in missiles, drones and radar, military experts say portable air defense systems are important because they can be dispersed quickly, operated by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

A European security source said authorities in his country were aware of several contracts under discussion involving the possible sale of QW-series MANPADS to Iran, including QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 systems.

A second security source, in the Middle East, said Iran had been seeking to purchase QW-12 and QW-18 missiles, but they were unaware that a deal had already been concluded.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are shoulder-fired, infrared-guided surface-to-air missile systems designed to engage low-flying aircraft, helicopters and drones. Their mobility allows them to be deployed rapidly around military installations, energy infrastructure and other sensitive sites.

Defense analysts regard the QW-12 as less capable than newer QW variants, including the QW-18 and QW-19, but say the systems can still provide an effective layer of short-range protection against drones and low-flying targets.

Two Western intelligence sources and an Iranian official said Tehran had also explored the use of overland routes to move Chinese military supplies and dual-use components more discreetly and reduce the risk of disruption.

The procurement highlights the Islamic Republic’s continuing reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers despite years of sanctions and restrictions on defense related imports.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was close to securing a separate agreement with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, according to people familiar with those negotiations. Reuters could not determine whether the agreement went through.

Military conflicts, especially the war in Iran, have “tested” the Space Force substantially for the past five months, Senate Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Sen. Jack Reed, D-RI, said Thursday in a hearing to discuss the nomination of Schiess to be the third-ever chief of space operations for the Space Force.

“Space Force assets were among the first to be deployed in Operation Epic Fury and among the first to be targeted,” Reed said in the hearing. “Iran has specifically targeted Space Force command and control nodes and weapon systems throughout this conflict.”

In an Air Force statement announcing Schiess’ nomination, it said that operations such as Iran and Venezuela have “underscored guardians’ ability to deliver combat-ready, asymmetric advantages from space.”

Iran has claimed to have the ability to effectively use the space domain for satellite intelligence and reconnaissance and space launch vehicles with assistance from partners, such as Russia, which could interfere with U.S. or allied assets.

Reed said that Space Force officials before Schiess spent the past seven years since its creation building the organization from scratch through focusing on issues like personnel, infrastructure and base operations.

“That was appropriate for a new service finding its footing, but the Space Force is quickly becoming a mature warfighting entity,” Reed said.

Schiess argued that American space capabilities are crucial to deterring adversaries, like China and Russia, as the countries continue to boost their own capabilities in an effort to exploit space for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes as well as fielding systems that can threaten the U.S. link to American forces.

“The United States no longer has the luxury of viewing space as a permissive environment,” Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., said in the hearing. “China and Russia have made clear that they see space as a critical warfighting domain.”

In particular, Schiess said that China’s anti-satellite tests and electronic jamming capabilities are “worrisome” as they use their efforts to target American forces farther than in the past.

“[China] built a kill chain to be able to see our carrier strike groups, our bombers, at much farther pace, speed and distances, and they’ve also developed missiles and weapon systems to go after that,” Schiess said. “So the Space Force needs to be able to bring capability to deny, degrade that kill web to be able to protect the joint force.”

When asked if the fight of the next major conflict would be in space, Schiess said it’s a possibility. He said that if not, space would be at the very forefront of a conflict, especially with China and Russia.

“I think about China every day,” Schiess said.

Schiess was first nominated by President Donald Trump to be the force’s highest-ranking officer in May. If confirmed, he would take over the role from Gen. Chance Saltzman, who is scheduled to retire this year after serving in the role for four years.

China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, sent Coast Guard ships earlier in June into the waters off the island’s east coast for what it called a “special maritime traffic law-enforcement operation,” angering Taipei.

China said the operation was in response to an announcement by Japan and the Philippines that they would begin formal talks on their maritime boundaries, which Beijing viewed as involving Chinese waters off Taiwan.

China has also been sending maritime survey ships into the same waters.

“China’s actions are deeply destabilizing,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson said regarding reports that Chinese Coast Guard vessels were harassing commercial ships.

“We reject any assertion by China of authority to interfere with freedoms of navigation or overflight, the freedom to lay cables, or other lawful uses of the sea,” the U.S. official said, adding that Beijing was undermining the peaceful resolution of issues that it claims to seek.

The de facto British, French and German embassies in Taipei said in a separate but rare joint statement that the Chinese activity was concerning.

“These actions threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping. We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” they said.

“It is fundamental that all navigational rights and freedoms and the safety of seafarers and vessels are guaranteed and respected.”

China’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The U.S., Britain, France and Germany, like most countries, have no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. But like many Western countries, they have repeatedly voiced concern at Chinese pressure against Taiwan, whose government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims.

Merchant ships ‘harassed’

Taiwan says the waters off its east coast are not China’s and that Beijing has no right to claim any sort of jurisdiction.

China said the Coast Guard patrol had inspected 198 passing vessels and “rectified violations” involving three ships, carried out a hydrographic survey and patrolled areas where undersea cables are located.

Taiwan has said that three passing merchant ships in the area were “harassed” by the Chinese Coast Guard, which asked them for information about their points of origin and destination and claimed jurisdiction.

Speaking to reporters in Beijing earlier on Wednesday, Zhang Han, a spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said the waters Japan and the Philippines were seeking to delineate were China’s exclusive economic zone.

She said the patrols were lawful, legitimate and necessary and that they constituted a just action to “safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

China’s nuclear missiles can already reach any city in the United States. Now, satellite images reviewed by Reuters show Beijing is building a sprawling web of launch pads, bunkers and communications nodes near the isolated nuclear silos that hold the Chinese military’s longest-range missiles.

The images reveal more than 80 pads for possible use by China’s expanding fleet of mobile missile launchers and air-defense batteries. They also show facilities that may serve electronic warfare, satellite communications and command operations, according to three security analysts, who assessed the imagery for Reuters.

The scale of the construction, which hasn’t been previously reported, points to a sweeping expansion of hardened infrastructure designed to protect and operate China’s land-based nuclear forces.

Taken together, the network signals a significant upgrade in Beijing’s efforts to ensure second-strike capability, underscoring intensifying nuclear competition with the United States as tensions rise over issues such as Taiwan’s sovereignty.

“We can see this infrastructure is being built on a grand scale, covering thousands of square kilometers of desert beyond the silo fields,” said Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow at Hawaii’s Pacific Forum think tank. Depending on the precise capabilities, he said, “we’re looking at a very considerable enhancement and diversification of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent.”

The ability to protect its desert silos is key to China’s stated goal of forging a minimal but credible nuclear deterrent — a policy grounded in the capacity to retaliate if it is struck first.

While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can fire nuclear weapons from submarines and aircraft, the silo fields in the northwestern Xinjiang region and Gansu province are the core of its nuclear forces.

China’s nuclear build-up is among the most scrutinized facets of President Xi Jinping’s military modernization because of what some foreign diplomats describe as Beijing’s lack of transparency and failed efforts by the United States to engage the Chinese leadership on its evolving nuclear capabilities and intentions.

A cornerstone of China’s doctrine is its “no first use” policy, meaning its forces wouldn’t initiate a nuclear exchange. But some senior Western diplomats and analysts say China would possibly resort to nuclear coercion to limit outside involvement in a conflict over Taiwan.

Xi this month warned U.S. President Donald Trump that mishandling of their countries’ disagreements over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory, could lead them to a “dangerous place.” Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claim.

China’s defense ministry didn’t respond to questions about its nuclear program and the developments revealed in the satellite imagery. The Pentagon said it wouldn’t comment on intelligence-related matters.

OCTAGONS IN THE DESERT

The new desert infrastructure is centered on two octagon-shaped installations built over the past six years in eastern Xinjiang. Both are southwest of the Hami nuclear silo fields — one is about 140 kilometers away, the other some 230 kilometers.

Satellite images show the octagon structures contain housing for personnel and large military vehicles. They are flanked by armored bunkers and fortified weapons-storage areas, as well as airfields and railheads that link the octagons to the Hami silos.

Exercises involving large military vehicles occurred around the northern octagon this month and during April, the images show.

Also evident in recent images are large tents and what two analysts said appear to be camouflaged launch sites cut into the desert, some with air-defense missile batteries.

The existence of the octagons has been documented previously. But Reuters is the first to report the extent of the launch-pad network linked to the octagons; recent military activity around one of the facilities; and analysts’ assessments that the pads could field mobile missile launchers and electronic-warfare operations.

Five security scholars interviewed by Reuters agreed the infrastructure broadly could support China’s nuclear program, as well as other military purposes. But they cautioned that key details remain unknown — including the weapons China might deploy at the launch pads and whether the octagon structures house truck-mounted ballistic missiles or facilities for fitting nuclear warheads.

The PLA displayed nuclear-capable weapons during a parade in Beijing last September to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. These included silo-based and truck-mounted intercontinental ballistic missiles.

U.S. officials and arms-control analysts say China is expanding and improving its nuclear weapons capabilities faster than any other nation. The latest Pentagon report on China’s military modernization says the country’s warhead production has slowed but it is on track to field 1,000 warheads by 2030. The December report estimated China is likely to have loaded 100 ICBMs across its three main silo fields.

China has also been strengthening its early-warning system, underpinned by its Huoyan-1 satellites, according to U.S. officials. The system can detect an incoming ICBM within 90 seconds of launch and alert a command center within three to four minutes, according to the Pentagon — sufficient time for China to fire its own silo-based weapons before they are hit.

‘AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT’

Significantly, each octagon sits at the core of a network of dirt roads and conduits that stretch far into the desert. These routes connect to the concrete pads, which are nestled among rocky outcrops and dry creekbeds.

The pads could be used to deploy mobile air-defense missiles, electronic warfare nodes or, from some of the larger ones, road-mobile ICBM launchers, three security scholars said.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project, said while it was difficult to conclude how the various installations would be used, “it is hard to rule anything out” given the scale of the infrastructure in such a hostile environment.

The conduits that link the pads to the octagon structures may contain fiber-optic cables for communications, Kristensen and Neill said.

At the northernmost octagon, a possible space or microwave communications facility is also under construction, three analysts said, pointing to satellite dishes and two large towers.

“Taken together, I think there is a real possibility that the octagonal structures and the strange towers are linked to C3 – command, control, and communications – as well as maintenance and storage activities related to China’s nuclear operations at the Hami ICBM silo site,” said Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in nuclear policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

A third octagon-shaped installation south of the Lop Nur nuclear test facilities is less developed. It appears to be used as a target range: Images show pock-marked earth, damaged buildings and what analysts at Vantor, a commercial provider of satellite imagery, said are mock-ups of Western jet fighters.

The extent of the defensive network near its silos potentially sets China apart from the other major nuclear powers. The U.S. and Russia — whose warhead stockpiles and deployed weapons far exceed Beijing’s — rely on a combination of sheer numbers of silos, their relative isolation and hardened construction to deter a first strike, rather than extensive missile defense, Kristensen said.

The scale of what is emerging in China’s northwestern desert has left even seasoned analysts startled.

“I’ve never seen anything quite like it,” Kristensen said. “It’s an extraordinary effort.”

Speaking at the 2026 Land Forces of the Pacific Symposium and Exposition in Hawaii, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. William Parker, commander of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, joked that he remembers, as a young officer, standing outside at a headquarters building adorned with a sign that read, “Will work for food,” a stark contrast in how the AAMDC is perceived today as tensions surge across the Indo-Pacific.

“But now, I’m a cool guy,” Parker added. “We are a very, very much demanded resource globally because of the challenges within the operating environment that we face.”

The 94th AAMDC’s mission includes protecting critical assets and formations within the expansive Indo-Pacific theater from enemy missile, air and drone attacks. The command was reactivated in 2005, roughly seven years after it shuttered.

The command’s mission, Parker discussed, is now especially focused on delivering layered defense at scale across a region that has seen its strategic importance skyrocket as the U.S. military and partner nations continue to contend with emerging security threats from China and North Korea.

Parker said there has been a consistent sense of urgency over the last 10 to 15 years as the People’s Republic of China speedily develops both its capabilities and capacity.

These contributions to a challenging environment come as the U.S. air and missile defense community is undergoing its largest period of modernization in history, Parker said.

Among those new critical developments is the incorporation of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, or IBCS, a network of command-and-control systems, sensors and interceptors that offers commanders — from any branch or partner nation — a tailored approach to thwart threats ranging from cruise missiles to drones.

“The IBC’s capability really brings us to the concept of any sensor,” Parker said. “They are the most effective shooter … that allows us to break the paradigm of having to rely solely on Patriot Radar Systems.”

Beyond tech developments, Parker hammered home the importance of continued allied collaboration while staring down and deterring threats out of Beijing.

“We can’t do any of what we do today without allies and partners,” Parker said. “We don’t fight alone, and we haven’t fought alone for a long time. Our partners help us protect our critical assets and critical formations that we have within this theater.”

Days before the launch of LANPAC 2026, the U.S. military wrapped up the 41st iteration of Exercise Balikatan, the largest annual bilateral exercise between U.S. and Philippine militaries.

This year’s 19-day exercise was also joined by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, France and Canada, the latter four of which put troops on the ground for the first time as part of the exercise.

“Balikatan 2026 marked a strategic evolution from a bilateral exercise to a full-scale, multinational mission rehearsal for the defense of the Philippines,” U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said of the event. “That growth reflects the security environment. It reflects the sovereign choices of free nations.”

The surge in partner participation, Parker noted at LANPAC, is a direct reflection of the region’s security importance. And the role of the air defender, he added, is at the heart of it all.

“It’s both an interesting and challenging time,” Parker said. “It’s a great time to be an air defender. If you don’t believe it, just watch the news every night.”

The 2026 National Defense Strategy — a quadrennial report — described the change as a sharp alteration “in approach, focus, and tone.” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in a pointed critique of past policy, wrote the U.S. government had previously “neglected – even rejected – putting Americans and their concrete interests first.”

“No longer will the Department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building,” he added.

The 34-page blueprint asserts the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” encompasses a commitment to restoring American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere. It also prioritizes access to strategic locations such as Greenland, the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico. President Donald Trump has framed this approach as the “Donroe Doctrine,” a modern iteration of Monroe’s principle that European powers should not intervene in the Western Hemisphere.

“America’s military stands ready to enforce it,” the Pentagon report said.

China ranks as the Trump administration’s second priority — a contrast from both the president’s first term and from his predecessor, Joe Biden, who regarded Beijing as Washington’s principal adversary.

The Pentagon said it aims to be “clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality” of China’s historic military buildup, but the goal is neither to “dominate,” nor to “strangle or humiliate them.”

Instead, the strategy underscores ongoing U.S. diplomacy with China in tandem with “erecting a strong denial defense” in the Pacific. The U.S., according to the strategy, will “urge and enable key regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense.”

Taiwan is notably absent from the national security focus, even as Chinese leader Xi Jinping has ordered his armed forces to be ready to seize the island by 2027.

The strategy also identifies Russia as a key security concern, characterizing it as a “persistent but manageable threat” for the foreseeable future.

“Fortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia — it is not even close,” the report notes. “Germany’s economy alone dwarfs that of Russia.”

While the U.S. says it will continue to play a vital role in NATO, the strategy contends that Washington’s allies are well positioned to take “primary responsibility” for Europe’s conventional defense with “critical but more limited U.S. support.” This includes taking the lead in support Ukraine’s defense, as Moscow’s invasion of its neighbor approaches its fifth year.

Headquartered on Fort Shafter, Hawaii, the 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment, or 1st TIAD, was officially launched Nov. 7, the unit’s public affairs officer said in a statement Tuesday, adding that the unit is “a direct reporting unit” to the U.S. Army Pacific commander.

The unit’s purpose is to “gain and maintain a strategic advantage through information dominance in the Indo-Pacific region by disrupting malign influence, increasing cooperation with key partners, and promoting regional stability through a shared commitment for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” according to an Army fact sheet. It will be responsible for a region spanning 36 countries across northeast, southeast, south Asia and Oceania.

The unusual 65-soldier formation combines military intelligence, psychological operations, electronic warfare, public affairs, civil affairs, information operations and cyber operations into a set of dedicated teams.

“There is talk, and I’m not going to speculate on the size of that talk, but there is talk for growth,” Command Sgt. Maj. Avery Bennett, the unit’s senior enlisted adviser said in a statement when asked about the size of the detachment.

The Hawaii unit is the first of three Theater Information Advantage Detachments to activate, Capt. Avery Smith II, a member of the 1st detachment’s engagement team, said in a statement. Second TIAD is projected to activate at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in the spring of 2026 and 3rd TIAD will follow at Wiesbaden, Germany, in the fall.

The creation of this new unit may mark a fundamental change in how the military understands the battlespace, one national security analyst said.

“It’s a signal that we’re now treating information operations as part of the conventional fight and that means doing it at a much larger scale,” said Anthony Vinci, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who added that “conventional forces are orders of magnitude larger and are more worried about issues that can affect large numbers of people.”

Though the real-life operations of this unit remain unclear, this type of formation could be used to oppose information campaigns waged by America’s adversaries, said Vinci, who is also the author of “The Fourth Intelligence Revolution: The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America.”

For example, in the Indo-Pacific theater, he said, campaigns by those who oppose the U.S. could be intended to reduce local support of American involvement or shift that community’s allegiances “over to China.”

“How they utilize those aircraft carriers globally is, of course, a concern of mine,” Adm. Daryl Caudle said in Japan, part of his 10-day tour of the Asia-Pacific.

China on Nov. 7 commissioned its latest aircraft carrier, Fujian, and began sea trials of its most advanced amphibious assault ship last week. China’s navy already has more ships than the U.S. Navy, but it has fewer aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships and other key vessels.

“We watch that very closely and see what they’re going to do there,” Caudle said of the amphibious assault ship. “That’s a large ship, very capable.”

But he added: “When you’ve got a lot of friends and allies, we have a pretty large, combined force ourselves,” noting the capability of Japan, South Korea, Australia and other partners in the region.

His visit to Tokyo comes as Japan’s conservative new prime minister has stirred tensions with China by suggesting a Chinese move against Taiwan could prompt a Japanese military response.

Earlier Monday, Caudle visited the U.S. Navy base of Yokosuka and a local shipbuilding facility. “What we are willing to do with Japan and South Korea is to bolster U.S. shipbuilding,” he said.

He also called a plan for South Korea under a recent agreement with the U.S. to have a nuclear-powered submarine “very nascent.”

Japan has also expressed interest in developing a nuclear-powered submarine, though that may face public resistance in a country that suffered atomic bombings and has non-nuclear principles.

But what if China embraces the more flexible Western concept of mission command?

“A Chinese military that fully embraces mission command would likely lead to improved operational performance, with quicker decision-making, better adaptability, and greater resilience in the face of degraded C4ISR,” according to a new report by Rand Corporation.

There is evidence that Chinese military reformers are beginning to push for the People’s Liberation Army to adopt mission command, researchers warn in the U.S. think tank’s Oct. 22 report. A more flexible, decentralized Chinese system would be more resistant to U.S. tactics such as attacking command and control centers. In turn, the report suggests, this would force the U.S. to revise its strategy.

The concept of mission command essentially means commanders expressing the general intent of the mission, leaving subordinates to use their own judgment on how to implement those goals. It is an approach that worked well for the Germans in World War II and works well for the Israel Defense Forces today, enabling initiative and rapid decisions while their opponents waited for orders from higher command. Today’s U.S. military — in theory at least — embraces mission command, despite frequent concerns that commanders micromanage their subordinates.

China’s political leaders have long worried that the effectiveness of their armed forces are being undermined by rigid and over-centralized command, unrealistic training and widespread corruption. A 2023 Pentagon report pointed to “genuine anxieties among PRC [People’s Republic of China] leaders about the PLA’s readiness and ability to conduct joint operations if tested under real combat conditions.” China’s president Xi Jinping has conducted repeated purges of senior officers, with nine generals and officials recently expelled as part of an anticorruption drive.

For now, reformers are gingerly testing the waters, with mission command appearing in select units such as special operations forces and warships operating in distant waters, according to the Rand report’s authors.

“There is ample evidence that Chinese military strategists are advocating for institutional PLA adoption of mission command,” Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, who co-authored the Rand study, told Defense News. “And that some PLA units are experimenting with mission command in some PLA exercises, but it is unclear so far how widely mission command is being adopted throughout the PLA.”

Controlling the military is a dilemma for any authoritarian government. The military is usually the force that props up the regime — and is the one force that can overthrow it. In Nazi Germany, for example, the armed forces, or Wehrmacht, were made to swear an oath to Adolf Hitler rather than Germany itself.

Similarly, the PLA is not the armed forces of the Chinese nation, but rather the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Commissars sharing command with regular officers at every level — from army headquarters to submarines on patrol — enable the CCP to keep an eye on the military. For the PLA, the “first and primary responsibility is to ensure the continued survival of the CCP regime, and generally to faithfully follow the orders of the CCP leadership,” Rand researchers noted.

The report’s authors see three options for China. For the U.S. and its allies, the most dangerous would be for the Chinese military to fully adopt mission command, the report suggests.

“The U.S. way of war has historically focused on degrading adversary C2 [command and control],” the report notes. “A PLA that embraces mission command is likely to be much more resilient against such U.S. strategies, requiring adapting or developing new U.S. approaches.”

One way for the U.S. to impede Chinese adoption of mission command is to avoid joint exercises.

“Potential PLA exposure to successful foreign command practices should be a factor when U.S. allies and partners consider undertaking a bilateral or multilateral exercise with the PLA,” the authors suggest.

Another option is partial adoption of mission command, perhaps out of skepticism that Chinese commanders are capable of fully implementing the concept. Some units, such as special operations and warships, would enjoy some degree of operational freedom (though nuclear, space and cyber forces would likely remain tightly controlled). However, this could be problematic if “inadequate implementation and organizational dynamics lead to a faulty hybrid of centralized and mission command that result in inconsistent PLA operational performance,” the study states.

It could also increase the chance of war.

“A PLA command structure that empowers lower-level command while not improving command capability and discipline could result in more aggressive and self-interested behavior, without central PLA leadership direction,” the report warns.

On the other hand, China’s leaders may simply decide that it’s safer to keep the existing system of tight command. This may involve more frequent use of “skip echelon,” where military and political leaders bypass the chain of command and issue orders directly to lower-level formations. This option would show “CCP desires for political control outweigh any acknowledged benefits for operational performance, leading to slow, more brittle PLA command,” according to the report.

Still, voices within the Chinese military may still carefully call for reform.

“The CCP will almost certainly continue to prioritize Party control, as evident in recent purges of PLA senior leadership,” Beauchamp-Mustafaga said. “But PLA advocates of mission command would argue that Beijing can have its cake and eat it too. Decentralized execution while retaining high levels of Party control when it matters.”

While the exercise only involved two subs, the warning was clear: America should contemplate the prospect of confronting a China-Russia alliance.

“I’d say this is simply an effort at deterrence,” Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington, told Defense News. “While it is hard to conceive of a scenario where they would embark on a war with the West simultaneously, they may benefit from some impression that could be the case.”

Beijing and Moscow are portraying this as a milestone in military cooperation. A Chinese military expert told China’s Global Times newspaper that “the first joint submarine patrol indicated a high level of strategic mutual trust between China and Russia. Having submarines keeping in contact requires not only higher technical expertise but also more in-depth exchanges.”

The patrol comprised the Russian submarine Volkhov and a Chinese sub, accompanied by two Russian surface ships: the corvette Gromkiy and a submarine rescue vessel. They sailed in August through the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, following a joint China-Russia anti-submarine exercise earlier that month, which included surface ships and aircraft. The Volkhov traveled 2,000 miles before terminating its voyage at Vladivostok, according to Russian newspaper Izvestia.

The Russian and Chinese boats were both Kilo-class, a 1970s Soviet diesel electric design known for being acoustically quiet.

“It’s a logical choice, since China imported this type of submarine from Russia, so they have very similar capabilities and could make easy exercise partners,” said Goldstein, whose new book on the China-Russia naval alliance will be published in January.

What was more significant was what China and Russia chose not to do for the exercise: commit their nuclear-powered submarines, perhaps out of reluctance to reveal the capabilities of advanced warships to an ally that could be a future rival.

“So far, China and Russia are not cooperating — at least openly — in wielding nuclear-powered submarines,” Goldstein said.

Indeed, the current bromance between China and Russia is practical rather than affectionate. Though the two nations were allies in the 1950s, Chinese and Russian troops battled each other in border clashes in 1969, Soviet leaders once pondered a nuclear strike against China and the Kremlin knows that China considers parts of the Russian Far East to be stolen Chinese territory.

Whatever the reason, the ostensible allies only paired up aging and more or less identical warships.

“Neither side gave up anything the other participant didn’t already know by using Kilos,” Richard Moss, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College’s Russian Maritime Studies Institute, told Defense News.

While the Chinese and Russian armed forces share a common lineage in Soviet military thought and equipment, that doesn’t guarantee integration during joint exercises.

“The level of interaction does not remotely approximate what the U.S. and its allies, such as NATO countries, do on a regular basis,” noted Moss, who said he was speaking in a personal capacity.

Nonetheless, the sub patrol is only the latest in a series of highly public displays of Sino-Russian military cooperation. In 2019, the two nations began sporadic bomber patrols, including a 2024 flight by four Chinese and Russian bombers that flew near Alaska. 2021 saw the onset of annual joint patrols by surface ships. There have also been joint land exercises such as the Zapad/Interaction wargame in 2021.

“I think this [the sub patrol] is quite consistent with the overall pattern,” said Goldstein. “It is repetitive, consistent, quite small in scale, and often features a new dimension, whether technological or geographical.”

Goldstein floats an intriguing possibility: The sub patrol was a warning shot against AUKUS, the Australia-U.K.-U.S. agreement that calls for Australia to acquire nuclear submarines with the help of America and Britain, and U.S. subs operating out of Australian bases.

“I have seen substantial evidence that Chinese naval strategists are tracking AUKUS developments extremely closely and, moreover, that their threat anxiety about this program is acute,” Goldstein said. “I have also seen Chinese strategists discussing how enhanced China-Russia cooperation in undersea warfare is a logical counter to AUKUS.”

A key indicator of the China-Russia relationship will be that their nuclear submarines operate together.

“If they do take that major step in the future, it could indicate a tighter and more worrisome development, as that could herald more high-tech sharing on the most cutting-edge warfighting platforms,” said Goldstein.

He argues against overreacting to these joint patrols.

“Ever greater deployments of U.S. forces, and ever more intense exercising with allies, often goes beyond our intention and provokes a counter-reaction — and this can be seen in the budding China-Russia quasi-alliance.”

How deep that alliance is remains to be seen.

“Both sides are somewhat chastened by the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute,” Goldstein said. “They seem to realize that there are dangers in being too close, and also in being too dependent on one another. Now, there is a certain maturity in the relationship, wherein it is fully realized that their interests will not always be identical.”