{"id":136762,"date":"2018-07-19T14:28:21","date_gmt":"2018-07-19T14:28:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/militarytimes\/uncategorized\/2018\/07\/19\/full-speed-ahead-on-the-new-us-navy-frigate\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T00:22:09","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T00:22:09","slug":"full-speed-ahead-on-the-new-us-navy-frigate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/militarytimes\/commentary\/2018\/07\/19\/full-speed-ahead-on-the-new-us-navy-frigate\/","title":{"rendered":"Full speed ahead on the new US Navy frigate"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Correction: A previous version of this commentary misidentified what the acronym FFG(X) stands for.<\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. Navy is, by its own admission, in trouble. Over the last several decades, its shipbuilding account has been underfunded and the Navy has too often mismanaged the money it did have.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Navy has focused too much on high-end ships<\/a> and has neglected the importance of less expensive, smaller vessels that can perform important combat missions on their own for sustained periods on the high seas, even in contested environments. No one has more respect for the carrier task force than I do, but the Navy needs additional numbers, presence and distributed strike force, and it needs all that as quickly as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To its credit, the Navy is moving fast to rectify this problem by fast-tracking the new FFG(X) program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Frigates are smaller than their more technically advanced counterparts, cruisers and destroyers. The frigate has historically been used for escort duties, low-end \u201cshow the flag\u201d naval-presence missions, and limited offensive operations. The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates were a big part of the Reagan naval buildup, but the last one of those was retired in 2015<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today the Navy doesn\u2019t have any frigates, aside from the original 220-year-old sailing frigate, the Constitution \u2014 and that isn\u2019t going on the high seas anytime soon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the Navy does have are littoral combat ships, which, as their name suggests, were designed for missions near shore. LCS can operate in blue water in combination with other ships, but not independently, and it can\u2019t perform anti-submarine or anti-surface missions persistently or with credibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hence the new frigate program. If it succeeds, and succeeds quickly, there\u2019s a chance for significant progress toward President Donald Trump\u2019s 355-ship Navy<\/a> within the next few years. If it fails, or if it is delayed by long arguments over design or shifting requirements, it will be decades before the Navy has the vessels it needs. So the Navy is fast-tracking the program, chiefly by competing the new ship among contractors who will use existing, or \u201cmature,\u201d designs in order to shorten the development process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s the reason for my concern about a new paper<\/a> on the frigate by Ron O\u2019Rourke of the Congressional Research Service. O\u2019Rourke is a seasoned hand, and some of what he suggests in the paper is certainly worthwhile. I like the idea of building a bigger \u201cgrowth margin\u201d into the new frigate, which means pushing the shipbuilders to adjust their existing designs to allow for upgrading the frigate over time with new capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\t