{"id":82495,"date":"2018-03-01T16:13:41","date_gmt":"2018-03-01T16:13:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/militarytimes\/uncategorized\/2018\/03\/01\/countering-wmds-cannot-be-on-socom-alone-experts-contend\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T07:30:53","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T07:30:53","slug":"countering-wmds-cannot-be-on-socom-alone-experts-contend","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/militarytimes\/flashpoints\/2018\/03\/01\/countering-wmds-cannot-be-on-socom-alone-experts-contend\/","title":{"rendered":"Countering WMDs cannot be on SOCOM alone, experts contend"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Coordinating the counter proliferation<\/a> of weapons of mass destruction is now in the hands of U.S. Special Operations Command<\/a>, but it shouldn\u2019t be on them alone, members of a panel at a National Defense Industrial Association<\/a> symposium argued Wednesday. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Culturally, SOCOM<\/a>, they are the solution people. They solve problems. They fill gaps,” said Michael Lumpkin, a retired Navy SEAL and the Pentagon’s former assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cBut they may fill gaps that aren’t theirs to fill,\u201d he added. \u201cThe other agencies have to do their part. … If those departments don’t have skin in the game, they’re less likely to support it.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2005<\/a>, the counter proliferation mission was owned by U.S. Strategic Command, but the mission began moving over to SOCOM\u2019s purview in 2016, hoping to capitalize on the counterterrorism model the command had become so adept at conducting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision to give SOCOM yet another leading role is said to be in response to long-standing complaints that STRATCOM had not devoted enough personnel and emphasis to counter WMDs, according to a Congressional Research Service report<\/a> from January 2017.
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Still, there remain concerns about how to properly fund, execute and coordinate the far-reaching mission on the SOCOM side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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U.S. Soldiers with the 51st Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Company prepare to treat victims at a decontamination field site during Guardian Response 17 at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Ind., April 27, 2017. Guardian Response, as part of Vibrant Response, was a multi-component training exercise run by the U.S. Army Reserve designed to validate nearly 4,000 service members in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the event of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) catastrophe. (U.S. Army photo by Master Sgt. Michel Sauret)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Michael Waltz, another panel member, former Green Beret and current CEO of Metis Solutions, LLC, cited a recent United Nations report that highlighted the transfer of chemical weapons manufacturing equipment from North Korea to Syria, to include acid-resistant tiles, valves and pipes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“If you take [the report] at face value, it\u2019s looking at 40 to 50 previously unknown, unreported shipments of essentially chemical weapons components, from North Korea to Syria,\u201d Waltz said. \u201cLast I checked, Syria’s chemical industry isn’t thriving, so I think it’s safe to assume what those components are for.”
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Given that, Waltz expressed concern that a whole-of-government approach wasn\u2019t being fully implemented in preventing WMD proliferation from North Korea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“I think they’re really suffering in many respects, if I can be candid, with the lack of appointments and what’s going on within the State Department,\u201d he said.
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