Defense News experienced a carrier landing firsthand on April 23, hitting the deck of the Abraham Lincoln aboard a U.S. Navy C-2A Greyhound aircraft with U.S. Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman and Adm. James Foggo, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe. The purpose of the visit was twofold — to kick off a dual-carrier exercise with sister ship John C. Stennis on April 24, and to deliver a sternly worded message to Russia: Stand down.

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” Huntsman said aboard the Lincoln, according to a Navy news release. “Diplomatic communication and dialogue, coupled with the strong defenses these ships provide, demonstrate to Russia that if it truly seeks better relations with the United states, it must cease its destabilizing activities around the world.”

Moscow received the message loud and clear, and though the response was predictable — at least publicly — it may not be the one Huntsman and Foggo were hoping for.

“I would like to believe that American megaphone diplomacy will not turn into megaton diplomacy,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, the ministry’s point man on arms control issues, “ because in that case there would be no winners, and American diplomats will regret how they failed to find opportunities for normal, constructive dialogue with partners around the world. We regret the U.S. ambassador in Russia made such a statement.”

In a briefing at the Foreign Ministry on April 25, spokeswoman Maria Zakharova advised Huntsman to study up on his history.

“Throughout its long history, Russia has repeatedly faced threats disguised as recommendations, and each time managed to demonstrate that it is futile,” she said, listing off examples such as France’s Napoleon Bonaparte and Sweden’s Charles XII, Russian news agency Tass reported.

Zakharova suggested the timing of Huntsman’s remarks and visit to the Lincoln was a slight toward Russia, as the country is gearing up to celebrate its victory in World War II on May 9. The U.S. Navy’s explanation for the timing of his visit was that it just happened to occur when the Lincoln and Stennis were crossing paths in the Mediterranean Sea, as they made their way to different regions.

In a video statement published on the U.S. Embassy’s Twitter page on April 25, Huntsman paid tribute to the 74th anniversary of Soviet and American soldiers meeting on the banks of the river Elbe in Germany, saying the event reminds Russians and Americans that, despite tensions between their nations, the world is safer when they commit to dialogue and discussion on areas of disagreement.

Meanwhile, in the Russian media, a political cartoon ran by state-owned RIA Novosti depicted Huntsman as Freddy Krueger, with aircraft carriers for fingers rather than razors. A talk show host on Vesti-FM, a state-owned radio station, said on Twitter that Huntsman “forgot to stomp his foot. Without this, it did not sound convincing enough.” Across the Russian media on April 24th, variations on this theme were abundant.

Much of this reaction is typical of the Russian government and the state-owned media machine that carries the government’s preferred narratives. But there are open questions about the utility of carrier-based messaging, according to Michael Kofman, an expert in the Russian Navy at the CNA think tank in Virginia.

“Military signaling is fraught with misperception,” Kofman said. “Most of the time it simply feeds an iterative cycle where both forces justify the other’s presence or behavior as the rationale for their demonstrative activity. Deterrence or competition are often cited as the catch-all bywords for much of the activity.”

“Moscow is generally indifferent to an American carrier in the Mediterranean, or even two or three” said Mikhail Barabanov, a naval analyst at the Centre the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow-based think tank. “I do not believe it is a ‘signal to Moscow,’ if only because no one in Russia seriously believes in the possibility of a conventional military conflict with the United States.”

Back in the game

“We are not here to do anything but deter and defend,” Foggo told Defense News in an exclusive interview aboard the Lincoln’s flag bridge, “and while we are at it and in the Med, we have seen an increased presence of Russian naval forces, particularly in the eastern Med. And the USS Abraham Lincoln will experience that while they are here. And I would expect nothing short of professional conduct from both navies.”

Russian naval activity in the Mediterranean goes beyond the presence of American carriers. Revival of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet — and, by extension, the old Mediterranean flotilla — was one of the key provisions of Russia’s updated naval doctrine in 2015. The annexation of Crimea the year before gave Moscow unhindered access to the key naval base at Sevastopol and opened the door to modernization of that fleet, once prohibited under an agreement with Ukraine.

Crimea also enabled much of what Russia has done in Syria since its surprise intervention in that Middle Eastern conflict in late 2015. Equipment is regularly ferried from Sevastopol, on down through the Bosphorus, into the eastern Mediterranean and then delivered to the Russian naval station at Tartus on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, Russian warships set up shop in the eastern Mediterranean and have been a regular fixture ever since.

But renewed activity by Russia’s Navy extends beyond the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The service as a whole has been a key beneficiary of President Vladimir Putin’s military modernization efforts. New submarines — nuclear and conventionally powered — are coming online across all of Russia’s major fleets, as are smaller surface platforms. Russia is again active in the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the Arctic.

“The Russian Navy has definitely modernized. They have put some of their capital into faster, leaner, more agile and smaller warships,” Foggo said, referring to Russia’s Admiral Grigorovich- and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates as well as the Steregushchy-class corvettes. “And they have never stopped putting money into the undersea domain and their submarine force, which is very capable. So, to tell you the truth, I respect the Russian Navy for the capability that they have.”

However, Foggo noted, nothing the Russian Navy can muster compares to the show of force assembled in the Mediterranean. “Nothing comes close to this,” Foggo said, gesturing around the flag bridge of the Lincoln, “a [U.S.] carrier strike group, two at a time in the Med.”

Kuznetsov blues

To be sure, Russia has itself tried to pull off an American-style carrier-strike-group operation. In 2016, the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov departed its base at Severomorsk, on Russia’s northern frontier, with a group of escorts that included the powerful battlecruiser Peter the Great. Together they sailed around Scandinavia, down through the English Channel and into the Mediterranean on their way to Syria.

In many ways, it was Putin’s Great White Fleet moment. The strike group was paraded across Russian television, boasting that Moscow was again a great naval power and the Kuznetsov could do anything a ship like the Lincoln can. The reality, however, was a bit underwhelming compared to the story sold to Russian audiences.

The Kuznetsov was even used as a diplomatic tool when returning to Russia from Syria in 2017, stopping off the coast of Libya to pick up the local military leader Khalifa Haftar. There, he was given a tour of the ship by Kuznetsov’s officers and ended the visit with a video conference with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

“The Russians want what we have right here on the deck of this ship, they want a powerful carrier strike group. But she does not have the incredible capability of the steam catapult like this ship,” Foggo said, referring to the mechanism installed on American carriers like the Lincoln that accelerate heavily loaded aircraft to takeoff speed in the course of about 300 feet.

“So when you do an apples-to-apples comparison, there is no comparison,” the U.S. Navy officer added.

The cruise was not without its utility, he noted. Russia did prove Kuznetsov could deploy for a prolonged period of time. But the ship’s shortcomings were also put on display. “As they came around, they were blowing some pretty nasty black smoke, so I think the engineering system on that ship is in dire need of upgrade,” Foggo said.

Then there is the case of Kuznetsov’s air wing. Because the ship lacks catapults, its fighters can only take off with a reduced fuel and weapons load. And even then, the jets have to charge the end of the deck at full speed, with the ship sailing into the wind. At the end of the deck there is a large ski ramp to give the planes a little kick into the air. It gets the job done, but it severely limits what the Kuznetsov can put up, and relegates the wing to defensive rather than offensive duties.

To be fair, this is by design. Kuznetsov was never envisioned as a strike carrier, but rather as an “aircraft-carrying heavy guided missile cruiser,” as it is technically designated in Russia. The ship was built with guided-missile tubes and hangar space for a modest air wing. The idea was Kuznetsov would largely act as a guided-missile cruiser, throwing planes up to defend the battle group. This was the greatest obstacle for Moscow’s desire to use it as an American-style strike carrier.

“Today you saw cycling air operations, launching and recovering aircraft,” Foggo said. “We do that 24/7, including at night. … The Russians didn’t do that. They basically drove the air wing down to Syria and offloaded it, so it was more like a fly-on/fly-off type of ship. So there is no comparison, and I am very happy the United States Navy has got two of these fantastic carriers in the Med right now to send a very strong message to all of our adversaries, and also to all of our friends.”

It’s unlikely Russian leadership would seriously argue the U.S. is not a formidable, much stronger naval power. But Russia’s entire defensive posture on the water is arrayed to keep U.S. carrier strike groups away; beyond surface ships and submarines, Russia has coastal defense cruise missiles, and the country’s Air Force plays a significant role with its bombers such as the Tu-22 and Tu-142, which can be fitted with standoff cruise missiles to hit U.S. ships at range.

“Waving about carriers is a standard attempt at bolstering coercive credibility, but it is of limited utility when dealing with a continental land power,” said CNA’s Kofman. “The Russians are perfectly aware that we can put together two carrier strike groups, but they are able to effectively contest maritime approaches and project power into adjacent seas nonetheless. I wouldn’t expect them to be terribly impressed.”

Coordinated messaging

Huntsman’s arrival on the Lincoln was an unusual move for a U.S. ambassador to Russia. But it is part of a growing relationship between Huntsman and Foggo. “We have been consulting with each other and comparing notes on a pretty regular basis,” Huntsman said. “There is nothing quite like being on the ground and working across the negotiating table on a day to day basis.”

“We are able to pick up on perceptions that are impossible to get anywhere else, how the system works internally, and what the trends are likely to be going forward — because they are going to impact obviously the strategic dynamic in a broader context,” Huntsman added. “So this is a pretty good example of the integration you seek between diplomats and our men and women in uniform. And it is a good thing that we are doing that more and more.”

Huntsman also said Foggo’s insights are useful for his work in Moscow, since they bolster his understanding of the strategic situation and Russia’s priorities. It also helps him better comprehend how the Kremlin responds to American deployments, such as the dual-carrier op with Lincoln and Stennis.

“This is all very helpful for us, for me as chief of mission,” Huntsman said, “particularly when you are from Russia because a lot of what we are doing here is being watched and analyzed, and we are watching and analyzing [Russia], and it is best if we do it together with our colleagues in uniform.”

The Kerch Strait became a flashpoint when Russian coast guard vessels first rammed a Ukrainian tugboat, then later fired on two accompanying gunboats, attempting to transit the strait. The clash set off a furious round of diplomacy, featuring Western nations and the Russian Federation trading barbs at the UN and in the media while Ukraine began preparing for a wider conflict.

In the wake of Sunday’s clash in the strip of water running between the Russian-controlled Crimean Peninsula and the Russian mainland, some wondered if the U.S. or other Western countries should consider a South China Sea-like strategy of “freedom of navigation operations” where warships drive through a disputed feature or choke point to assert international rules and challenge excessive claims.

And while Russia is surely claiming territorial dominion over Crimea, the highly contested root of the conflict here, Moscow knows that the Sea of Azov likely won’t turn into the kind of international debacle China created with ludicrously expansive claims in the South China Sea, and that gives Russia enormous leverage.

Russia already has internationally recognized rights in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov that China could only dream of in the South China Sea, a situation presciently described by the head of U.S. Navy forces in Europe, Adm. James Foggo, during an October talk at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

Whereas China’s claims of maritime rights over most of the South China Sea have been rejected by an international tribunal, Russia’s rights in the Kerch Strait are well defined. The body of water is an inland, semi-enclosed sea and governed by Article 123 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Foggo said Oct. 5, meaning the two nations that border it – Russia and Ukraine – are required to cooperate on all maritime matters, including access to the strait.

That’s very different from the South China Sea where the U.S. and many of its allies claim China is asserting dominion over what are essentially international waters.

In practice that means the world won’t see the kind of FONOPs that send U.S. ships barging through the strait, with no means short of escalatory aggressive action to stop them, because for all intents and purposes, that strait and the body of water it leads to are property of Ukraine and Russia.

“The Sea of Azov,” Foggo said, “that is controlled by Ukraine and Russia. I would not expect us to go in there.”

The standing international law makes it clear that any solution would have to come via a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine, experts told Defense News. And while the two parties have an agreement on the books to cooperate in all matters relating to the strait, the facts on the ground have cast doubt over how viable it is.

But either way, neither the U.S. nor anyone else other than Ukraine could conduct freedom of navigation operations against Russian claims with any degree of legitimacy because Ukraine and Russia are the only parties with clearly delineated rights under international law in matters relating to the Sea of Azov.

Under the original agreement between Ukraine and Russia over the strait, Ukraine would be allowed to invite U.S. or NATO warships to visit its ports there, a suggestion advanced by an Op-Ed on the Atlantic Council website, but such actions would be seen as highly provocative and could prompt some kind of response from Russia.

Who owns Crimea?

The overall dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Strait of Kerch can easily get bogged down in legal questions but is really quite simple: It comes down to who you think owns Crimea.

Russia claims Ukrainian ships attempted to violate a Russian closure of the strait without warning, encroached on its territorial waters, performed dangerous maneuvers inside those waters, ultimately resulting in the attack on, and seizure of, the three-vessel flotilla.

Ukraine disputes every part of that claim: They say they attempted to radio Russian security at the strait; they deny the ships entered Russian-claimed waters; they deny any dangerous maneuvers; and they dispute the underlying assumption that Russia has the right to close the strait or that they have a right to claim the waters off Crimea as theirs in the first place.

The 2014 annexation of Crimea precipitated by a revolution in Ukraine is not recognized by Ukraine, the U.S. or the vast majority of nations. However, some nations including China, North Korea and Iran have recognized it.

Russia and Ukraine agreed to cooperate in the strait and in the Sea of Azov as dictated by international law in a 2003 agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, which Ukraine cited in its protest of Russia actions Sunday.

But, to paraphrase Darth Vader, Russia has altered the deal.

The Crimea annexation gave Russia de facto control of both sides of the strait, leaving the 2003 agreement in legal limbo and, if you accept Russian control of Crimea, created some ambiguity around what Ukraine can and can’t do in and around the strait under international law, said Mikhail Barabanov, a Russian naval analyst at the Moscow-based Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

“The status of the Kerch Strait is very much a matter of interpretation,” Barabanov said. “After the annexation of Crimea, the interpretation of the 2003 treaty regarding passage through the strait has inevitably changed since Moscow now views the Kerch Strait as purely Russian territorial waters.”

However, experts say, even if Russia owned Crimea, Russia could not legally stop Ukraine from transiting the strait.

“At a minimum there is a non-suspendable right of innocent passage” through the Kerch Strait given that Ukraine has an irrevocable right to access its ports on the Sea of Azov, said Günther Handl, a professor of international law at Tulane.

Tensions flare

The situation at the Kerch Strait had been relatively stable compared to flashpoints along Ukraine’s front with Donetsk and Luhansk – Eastern Ukraine’s breakaway regions controlled by Russia-backed separatists.

But two recent developments have caused the situation to boil over: the build-up of Ukrainian naval bases and forces in the Sea of Azov in general, and Russia’s construction of a $3.7 billion bridge over the strait linking mainland Russia to the Crimean Peninsula. Developments on one side are naturally viewed as ominous by the other.

The bridge was completed in May to much fanfare in Russia, but Moscow has made an ever-greater fuss about unspecified security threats to this massive, high-profile infrastructure project. This has been used to justify steadily increasing Russian security presence around the strait.

“There has been some irresponsible activity in the Sea of Azov in the last couple of months and the Ukrainians are not happy about it,” said Foggo, head of Naval Forces Europe. “Russians have delayed shipping, held them at sea unable to enter port or leave port. This is costing the Ukraine millions of dollars and it’s an unfair practice.”

From Russia’s perspective, tensions began flaring in March, when Ukrainian coast guard vessels in the Sea of Azov seized the Nord, a Russian-flagged fishing boat operating out of the Crimean city of Kerch. Russia soon responded with arresting a Ukrainian fishing boat in the Black Sea. Civilian traffic from both sides has been subject to regular inspections and seizures.

In a direct challenge to Russia’s apparent restriction of passage, Ukraine dispatched vessels on a surprise run through the strait on Sept 23. The ships drew some heat, but Russia was apparently unprepared or unwilling to check Kiev’s move. Foggo in October praised the Ukrainians for what he called a freedom of navigation operation.

It is not clear why, then, Russia reacted the way it did when Ukraine attempted a similar journey on Sunday. Russian officials from the Kremlin on down have accused Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko of provoking a clash to drum up international outrage against Russia and popular support at home ahead of presidential elections in March, in which he may very well face defeat.

What is clear, however, is that in the dispute over access to the strait, Russia believes Ukraine is playing a weak hand, said Barabanov, the Moscow-based analyst.

“Ukraine holds very bad cards in this crisis,” Barabanov said. “And on Sunday they showed clearly that they don’t really hold any real cards at all. Ukraine’s actions have been inevitably hysterical and provocative because they have no other options.”

Casus belli?

As tensions continue to run high over Sunday’s confrontation, it’s unclear if this will lead to open warfare between Russia and Ukraine, something Russia has been at pains to avoid for fear of international blowback. Russia has instead opted for what the U.S. calls “gray zone” conflict, seeking policy victories by aggressive actions that fall just below the level of war.

The Sea of Azov is not seen as a strategically important body of water in Moscow, and that the Kremlin isn’t seeking a war over access to it via the Kerch Strait, Barabanov said.

“In general, this is peripheral problem for Russia,” he said, not worth a war.

“The situation around the Sea of Azov will remain shakey for the time being but Russia does not seek conflict there, rather Moscow’s only desire is to return to the status quo observed before the seizure of Nord – when no one interfered with anyone, and Ukraine was forced to accept the new reality of everyday business around Crimea and the Kerch Strait.”

Not everyone in Russia shares this view, however. Writing in the Novaya Gazeta newspaper on Tuesday, prominent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer suggested Moscow instigated Sunday’s crisis out of concern that Ukraine’s naval bases in the Sea of Azov may eventually host visiting NATO patrols, and therefore hopes to assert control over Kerch and Azov.

During Sunday’s standoff with the Ukrainian navy, the Russian coast guard closed the Kerch Strait to all traffic – even moving a tanker in to position under the Kerch bridge to physically impede passage. Dozens of civilian ships were stranded on either side, and two additional Ukrainian naval vessels approaching the strait from the Sea of Azov were denied access.

Wrestling full control of the Sea of Azov would fall well in line with Russia’s revanchist arguments underpinning its 2014 annexation of Crimea. Viewed from Moscow, the Sea of Azov – like Crimea – has been part of Russia’s inland waters since Catherine the Great. They were also part of the Soviet Union before its dissolution and Ukraine became an independent state.

“[The Sea of Azov] was always considered internal waters of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before that,” said Handl, the Tulane professor. “Everything changed in 1991.”

Despite Russia’s historic dominion over the Kerch Strait, it would be hard to see this situation as anything but the latest small move by Russia that adds up to a massive intrusion on Ukraine’s sovereignty, said Bryan Clark, a former top aide to former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert and analyst with the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“With the Russians it’s always, ‘We want this next little thing,’” Clark said.

“Before the annexation of the Crimea it was, ‘We want unfettered access to Sevastopol,’” he continued, referencing the home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. “Well that turned into, ‘Now we are going to annex Crimea.’ So, it’s ‘the next little thing’ that doesn’t seem too escalatory, but then when you look back on it all the sudden you’ve lost territory or sovereignty to the Russians.”

That was the 70th anniversary parade, a major event in contemporary Russian patriotic lore. And it was the year the Victory Day parade became something more than what may have been an earnest, albeit very Russian, event to mark a solemn and hard fought victory. As talk of a new Cold War proliferated, the parade was used to unveil scores of new vehicles and weapons for the world to see, and fear.

For those, like me, hoping to get a peak of what President Vladimir Putin’s massive military modernization program was producing, the parade was a goldmine. Tanks roared onto the brick pavement of Red Square, followed by every armored vehicle in Russia’s arsenal. Massive bombers flew in tight formation trailed by the red, white and blue stripes of their flag.

It is easy enough as an American to witness such a spectacle and wonder why the U.S. military does not parade like the Russians do. In four years of witnessing these parades, I have concluded that it is only something that a government that feels politically or militarily insecure would do.

My dissolution with the idea began shortly after the parade ended. I wandered off Red Square and bumped into Steven Seagal (I have a selfie to prove it), and began to witness the public spectacle taking place outside the closed off square.

Families with young children flooded the closed off streets of central Moscow. Some of the kids dressed in costumes resembling WWII-era Red Army uniforms. The whole city seemed to be adorned in the orange and black St. George’s ribbons, a symbol that saw a massive boost in popularity after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Everything about it was unapologetically militaristic.

The Victory Day parade serves as an important case study for Americans sympathetic to President Donald Trump’s call for their own massive military parade. While it may seem as simple as calling up Defense Secretary James Mattis and ordering him to arrange a parade, my experience in Moscow over the past four years has shown me it is significantly more complicated. First, preparations begin weeks before the parade actually begins. This takes men and material out of regular and training duty. But, more important for the common man, it is a major, prolonged disturbance to city life. Moscow’s main roads, like the central Tverskaya artery in and out of the city, are closed frequently. This exacerbates an already dramatic traffic problem.

While the processions of tank columns and nuclear missiles make their way through the city streets mostly at night, it is the bomber flights that have really come to bother me over the past four years. They practice their Red Square runs early in the morning, and their flight path has always somehow gone directly over whatever apartment I am living in. If you have never heard the propellers of a 60-year-old Tupolev Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber before, I can promise you that they are loud. Very, unreasonably loud. The massive jet engines hanging below the body of the Tu-160 supersonic bombers are a much more pleasant sound in comparison. They’re all unwelcome, recurring wakeups in the lead up to the big day on May 9.

Back to the topic of the children. What kind of message does a parade like this send to them? Inevitably, they will be the most attentive audience. I can’t speak for Russia’s children, but I can’t help but feel saddened when I see legions of them swarming Moscow’s lovely bulevards in play uniforms, fawning over Topol-M nuclear missiles designed to incinerate millions of people.

When the parade ends, the aftermath begins. Transiting across the city center can be a nightmare, especially on foot. Streets remain blocked off for hours. Fireworks are detonated in a steady barrage. One year, I stood on the river bank and found myself dodging large, hot chunks of firework shrapnel falling down on the crowd.

This leaves a lot for the city to clean up the next morning. And needless to say, almost everyone wakes up with a bad hangover. The city streets are no match for the treads of a 46 tonne T-90 main battle tank. And, every year, Moscow’s city government dishes out tens of thousands of dollars in street repair tenders after the military has retreated to their bases outside the city.

In 2015, the cost of repairs to Manezh Square, a lead-in to Red Square stormed several times by over 100 armored vehicles, cost the city $80,000 alone. In previous parades, repair contracts across the city have sometimes totalled millions of dollars.

The parades are messy, expensive, and morally questionable affairs. The White House and Pentagon should keep this in mind.