A Chinese H-6K bomber patrols the islands and reefs in the South China Sea in this undated photo. (Liu Rui\/Xinhua via AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nChinese anti-access, area-denial weapons would try to hold any U.S. ships at bay, meaning an air assault might be the preferred way of getting U.S. ground troops on the island, but it is not likely they would play a major combat role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Once the paratroopers stuff their chutes, what do they do? Mostly deal with getting noncombatants off the island. Cheng estimates that effort would comprise much of the duties of units with the 25th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division\u2019s Globtal Response Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But those grunts would serve another purpose \u2014 political.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Once American boots are on the soil of Taiwan, lobbing missiles that way becomes riskier, Cheng said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIf you continue this war, you\u2019re going to kill Americans \u2015 do you really want to do that?\u201d he asked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If a company of soldiers dies in a barrage or a planeload of paratroopers gets hit, that might mean an escalation of the war onto targets in mainland China, something neither side wants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cMost U.S. military experts think that China wouldn\u2019t be ready to take Taiwan by force until 2028, but I\u2019ve heard from the Chinese military that they think they\u2019re going to be ready in a year or two,\u201d Oriana Skylar Mastro, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, told Military Times. \u201cI don\u2019t know who\u2019s right.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unsurprisingly, INDOPACOM assets would take on a big chunk of responsibility, should a conflict emerge with Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cAll the equipment is going to be INDOPACOM, with CENTCOM as a supporting theater,\u201d Mastro said. \u201cIn the beginning, it would be everything we have in theater \u2015 Korea, Japan, and then, of course, the naval assets that are out on a deployment type of thing.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What would defeating China look like? Mastro said the ideal scenario for both parties would be a \u201climited, short-duration conflict\u201d that would preserve the status quo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That could mean no reunification between China and Taiwan, and no independence for Taiwan, she said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe\u2019re going back to the status quo, the situation isn\u2019t worse,\u201d Mastro said. \u201cI think that\u2019s the kind of defeat you would want.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Take to the sky<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
But maybe it wouldn\u2019t be the sudden World War III scenario in Taiwan. Perhaps it would come more subtly, then overwhelm, much like the Russians\u2019 work in Crimea, Georgia and Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Former Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said to watch for hybrid warfare akin to the Russian \u201clittle green men\u201d who slipped into Crimea to launch the annexation of Ukrainian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt would be fishermen, who suddenly had to be on the Senkaku Islands because their boat was sinking, and this would be the equivalent of the little green men,\u201d James said. \u201cAnd then somehow, the cyber would go down, and there would be massive confusion.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By the time U.S. and allied political authorities cut through the confusion, figured out what had happened and decided to act, those \u201cfishermen\u201d would already be dug in, she said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Former Air Combat Command head and retired Gen. Herbert \u201cHawk\u201d Carlisle, current president of the National Defense Industrial Association, agreed that like Russia, China would likely operate in a \u201cgray zone,\u201d in which it slightly pushes and prods the U.S. and its allies until they respond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then things get ugly \u2014 fast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIf we push back, and it gets to the point that it starts a conflict, it\u2019s going to be rapid, it\u2019s going to be intense, it\u2019s going to be a high potential for casualties,\u201d Carlisle said.<\/p>\n\n\n\nAircraft from the Nimitz Carrier Strike Force and a B-52 Bomber from Barksdale Air Force base conduct integrated joint air operations in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Carrier Strike Groups are conducting dual-carrier operations in the South China Sea as the Nimitz Carrier Strike Force. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Cmdr. Joseph Stephens)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nOne of the Air Force\u2019s first missions in the initial hours, James said, could be to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities \u2014 such as the RQ-4 Global Hawks that this summer rotated into Yokota, or cyber or space assets \u2014 to sus out \u201cwhat the heck is going on here?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Carlisle also said the newly created Space Force\u2019s assets, such as orbiting satellites, would help support the other services in a China conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When it comes time to strike back, the Air Force is well-positioned in the Pacific region. There are fighter jets, ISR aircraft and other assets at Japan\u2019s Yokota and Misawa, and South Korea\u2019s Osan and Kunsan, air bases, as well as bomber task forces rotating through Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. The naval base at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, has also periodically hosted bombers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Carlisle said fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35, as well as the B-2, B-52 and \u2014 in the future \u2014 B-21 bombers would likely take a lead role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Air Force aircraft in Japan \u2014 such as the F-16s of the 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa \u2014 would be most likely to respond to an invasion of the Senkaku Islands, James said, flying alongside fighters from the Koku-Jieitai, or Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. Air Force aircraft regularly train alongside the Koku-Jieitai to prepare for such joint operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Reinforcements would soon be needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Air Force bases like Whiteman and Minot would start getting their bombers ready to fly. Those bombers are typically on quick alert, to get in the air in a matter of hours. It\u2019s a long flight to the Pacific, but James said more bombers could start arriving within a day or two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Air Force could also fly long-range strike missions from the continental United States, Carlisle said, and has done so in the past. In January 2017, for example, B-2s flew 34 hours from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to strike Islamic State targets in Libya.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Vast amounts of airlift capability, such as C-130s and C-17s, would also be needed to bring in all the troops, weapons, equipment and supplies such a conflict would necessitate, James said. But the Air Force only has so much refueling and mobility capability, she said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Air Force\u2019s fleets of bombers and advanced fighters are also limited, Carlisle said, with about 120 combat-coded F-22s, 20 B-2s, and the B-21 still years away from the battlefield. And such a fight would stretch the U.S.\u2018s munitions production capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the high seas<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indications that the Chinese were readying to invade Taiwan would be observable, and allow Guam-based forces to start moving forward while United States-based support ramped up, Herzinger said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cOne of the big questions of Taiwan is if China decides to undertake such an invasion, would they open with a massive strike against U.S. forces in the region,\u201d Herzinger, the civilian Indo-Pacific defense policy specialist, said. \u201cI think it\u2019s a fair assumption that they would. So, regarding 7th Fleet, who knows what\u2019s available on day 0.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nAircraft from Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 5 and 17 fly in formation over the Nimitz Carrier Strike Force on July 6, 2020, in the South China Sea. The aircraft carriers USS Nimitz (CVN 68), right, and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and their carrier strike groups are conducting dual carrier operations in the Indo-Pacific as the Nimitz Carrier Strike Force. (MC3Keenan Daniels\/Navy)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n\u201cGuam-based submarines would definitely be required,\u201d he added. \u201cIf a no-kidding war broke out, 7th Fleet would absolutely require the full support of (San Diego-based) 3rd Fleet.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How such a conflict would unfold in the initial hours, days and weeks would depend on how it starts, Herzinger said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIf it\u2019s a surprise, in-theater forces may be dealing with the aftermath of a large pre-emptive strike,\u201d he said. \u201cThe Navy\u2019s priorities would also be defined by the contingency. Large-scale war, the Navy needs to secure primary (maritime routes) and address the PLAN submarine force. You\u2019d be looking at reserves getting called up and mobilized (which takes a long time, weeks and months), 3rd Fleet getting ready to surge forward, (prepositioning) ships moving. Once it\u2019s safe to move forces into the theater, you\u2019re looking at massive airlifts into safe bases.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nSOUTH CHINA SEA (July 6, 2020) The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and USS Nimitz (CVN 68) Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) steam in formation. The Nimitz and Ronald Reagan CSGs are conducting dual-carrier operations as the Nimitz Carrier Strike Force. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jason Tarleton)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nAnti-submarine warfare assets such as the sub-hunter P-8 Poseidon aircraft and American boats, as well as surface shooters and fighter jets, would be critical to any kinetic response, as would torpedoes, missiles, sonobuoys and fuel, Herzinger said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cA number of leaders have briefed the fact that we don\u2019t have enough [missiles], and we don\u2019t have enough tubes to shoot them from,\u201d he said. \u201cAs attrition bites into that force, we have even less and we don\u2019t have land-based missiles to use (which is why you see the push for basing these in the region \u2014 despite the lack of interest from U.S. partners).\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe generally accepted wisdom in modern naval warfare is that the first shooter has a considerable advantage because you\u2019re reducing the number of tubes the opposition has to shoot back with,\u201d Herzinger said. \u201cSo acquiring and fielding a lot of distributed, concealable shooters is key.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tell it to the Marines<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Marine Corps has spent years wargaming different scenarios, zeroing in on what it could do best in a war against China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI know they have done hundreds of iterations,\u201d said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel and now a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger envisions a force spread out on the small islands and atolls that litter the Pacific Ocean, acting as a skirmish line within China\u2019s weapons engagement zone, jabbing the Chinese forces, while the rest of the military prepares for the knockout blow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSkirmishers when deployed effectively can have a significant impact,\u201d said Chris Dougherty, a former senior advisor to the deputy assistant defense secretary for strategy and force development, and now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.<\/p>\n\n\n\nMarines with Charlie Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, run toward security positions during a live-fire range as part of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s simulated Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan, March 13, 2019. (Gunnery Sgt. T. T. Parish\/Marine Corps)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nSmall units of Marines on expeditionary advanced bases with a variety of tools \u2014 including unmanned aerial vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-ship missiles and possibly even equipment to launch cyberattacks against China \u2014 could have a major impact on China\u2019s ability to get their soldiers to the battle, Dougherty added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, to avoid counterattacks from the Chinese forces, Marines would have to move from island to island every few days or even every few hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSignature management really does matter, you have to make it as hard as possible for the enemy to figure out where you\u2019re at and what you\u2019re doing,\u201d Wood said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If Marines were able to create and defend forward refueling and rearming bases, it could massively extend the time a Navy ship could stay in the fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the commandant\u2019s plan isn\u2019t scheduled to be completed until 2030 and the Corps still lacks the equipment and possibly even the personnel to fully implement it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt would be very ugly right now, if we had this kind of war,\u201d Wood said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Beyond the equipment concerns, the biggest issue preventing Marines from fully committing to a dispersed fight against China is the lack of basing agreements between the U.S. and nations that would play a key role in the fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt\u2019s really hard to win a Taiwan fight without access to the Philippines,\u201d Dougherty said. \u201cI don\u2019t see that reflected in the priorities of our national security community.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Chinese military would be able to quickly level the Marine Corps\u2019 air bases in Japan, while Australia and Guam \u2014 places where the Marine Corps is currently operating \u2014 are too far away to be particularly helpful when it comes to launching strikes against China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition to the Philippines, Dougherty cited Vietnam as a potential key partner in the fight against China \u201cbecause Vietnam has some wonderful geography. You can have good exterior lines versus the Chinese.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIf you\u2019re in Vietnam and the Philippines, suddenly you\u2019ve got the Chinese in the South China Sea pretty badly surrounded,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Where are the special operators?<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The role of special operators in a fight against a highly advanced adversary like China would be limited at best, according to experts who spoke to Military Times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tier-one units are not designed to take on peer competitors, while Green Berets, as an example, are trained to work with indigenous forces to build up their capabilities and conduct unconventional warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI am not sure they would have an immediate role in one of these situations,\u201d said retired Army Gen. Joseph Votel, describing a conflict in Taiwan or on the South China Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Votel, who commanded Joint Special Operations Command, which directly oversees the special missions units, as well as U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command, told Military Times that \u201ccertainly some SOF could be used for reconnaissance, select targeting, limited direct action and partnership.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is possible, he said, for U.S. SOF to assist on the ground in Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\nA member of the Philippine Naval Special Operations Group poses for photographers beside the Philippine Navy Agusta Westland 109 helicopter on board the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar (PF15) warship at Manila’s pier, Philippines Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2014. The refurbished former U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class weather high endurance cutter is now the country’s biggest and most modern warship and is part of a drive by the Philippines to modernize its navy amid tensions with China over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. (AP Photo\/Aaron Favila)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n\u201cIf the Chinese attack was more subtle \u2014 meaning a less-militarily focused approach \u2014 then perhaps USSF could work with partners on the ground to create a resistance network,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In need of a lift<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The sorry state of U.S. Military Sealift Command vessels worries Herzinger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prepositioned ships full of warfighting supplies, and the surge ships on call to ferry troops and materiel to a future fight, have been long neglected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt\u2019s old, the mariners are old, and we don\u2019t exercise them enough for high-end warfare,\u201d Herzinger said. \u201cThey\u2019re strapped just trying to resupply the fleet under current conditions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There\u2019s also the question of access. Should a one-on-one fight break out between China and the United States, there is no guarantee that America would be allowed access to the ports and other infrastructure of nominal regional allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cA lot of places we\u2019d really need are tied tightly to China economically and would be pretty reticent to allow us to use their ports\/airfields\/etc.,\u201d Herzinger said. \u201cOur anti-allies stance from the top has not helped this.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The virtual space gets real<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
China is building carriers now, aiming for an offensive fleet, but they are not yet expeditionary. The Chinese lack the ability to transport assets to a foreign shore and sustain the fight, except perhaps closer to home, as with Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That means where the Chinese military can really have an effect is in space and cyber. Cheng sees a host of attacks in the United States, both cyber and possibly kinetic, on communications sites and key linkage points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI see jamming, dazzling, attacks on ground facilities, including in [the contiguous United States], cyber up and down the chain,\u201d Cheng said. \u201cI expect, quite frankly, to see GPS go offline.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That\u2019s because, he added, the Chinese military sees how the American way of war is tied to space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And China sees space holistically \u2014 not for shiny satellites, but for the data they bring back down to Earth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All of the valuable command, control, communications and computers, as well as ISR, assets that the United States brings to the fight and enables them to fight with their allies is tied to space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If that goes down, much of the allied force is operating in the blind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s one thing for a platoon or company to have to whip out a map and compass, he said, but a brigade, a division, masses of ships attempting coordinated air and sea attacks?<\/p>\n\n\n\nStaff Sgt. Jacob Rascon, right, and Sgt. David Hendrixson, both assigned to 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), analyze prototyped cyber field equipment during Cyber Quest 2019. While the event traditionally has built up to a single annual exercise, future iterations will include smaller events year-round. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. TaMaya Eberhart, 55th Combat Camera) (Photo Credit: Spc. TaMaya Eberhart, 55th Combat Camera)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nChina also has some low-tech tricks to use that will help their already outsized force look bigger and better. And it starts with some rubberized items that fit in a rucksack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Chinese soldiers can carry a 35 kg inflatable tank on their persons and have it up in five minutes or less. It can fool observers even at close distance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But that\u2019s plastic, you might say. Surely our sensors can defeat those decoys.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Well, there are versions of decoy units made of metal or other materials. The Chinese military has filled some with hot water to mimic engine heat for thermal sensors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even missile launchers are disguised to look like fuel or cargo trucks. Their military trains are built to appear just as civilian trains, making bombing train lines difficult except in a total war scenario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Allies<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
This year, Japan canceled a new air defense system, Aegis Ashore, which had been in the works and was aimed to tie in with both ship- and land-based assets to protect them from either a North Korean attack or Chinese land grabs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The South China Morning Post reported in August that Taiwan had been excluded from the massive Rim of the Pacific international maritime exercise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University in eastern China, told the newspaper that excluding Taiwan from RIMPAC reflected a \u201csensitivity\u201d from the Pentagon to avoid potential military conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cChina-U.S. relations are already in a difficult situation, and neither side wants the tension to get out of control in the Western Pacific,\u201d Zhu said. \u201cMajor powers can compete strategically, but they still want to manage risks to prevent the possibility of military conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie said the issue of Taiwan joining RIMPAC was one of Washington\u2019s bargaining chips in dealing with Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe U.S. may still invite Taiwan [next time] if they want to play the Taiwan card,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Earlier this year, INDOPACOM Commander Adm. Phil Davidson put out a release re-emphasizing U.S. agreements with Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and the island states of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, should China come a-knocking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cheng notes that while much of the Pacific will be an air and sea war, for partnerships the United States must also focus on its Army. That\u2019s because most of the Pacific nations\u2019 armies are their military center of power and hold political sway within each state\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lamb, the retired Army Special Forces command sergeant major, thinks any potential steel-on-steel conflict is not likely for at least another decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBut in 2030, when they are ready, that\u2019s when things get really dicey unless we have a bunch of friends,\u201d Lamb said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That means partners \u2014 not just in the region, but also in Europe and Latin America \u2014 sharing intelligence, training and equipment in a coalition, he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the bottom line, according to Lamb, is the U.S. must send China the message that there\u2019s a limit to Beijing\u2019s aggressive behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When there are no consequences for aggression, that just \u201calways ends with increased aggression,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Always preparing<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the Asia pivot in 2012 to now, the United States has reallocated resources \u2014 troops, rotations, deployments, equipment, infrastructure to the Pacific. The Army is designing helicopters and missile systems to reach and to defend far-flung distances it hasn\u2019t ever had to consider.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Navy is reorganizing its fleet to fight a true naval battle for the first time since World War II. The Air Force is taking a keen look at its drone capabilities, bombers, fuel capacity and space assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Marine Corps got rid of tanks and is restructuring its force to fire and defend with missiles instead of M4s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Army is shifting more rotational deployments, training partnerships, even purpose-built \u201cmulti-domain operations\u201d task forces to the Pacific to meet the challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All of this is aimed at keeping China at bay. For now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n