{"id":28016,"date":"2019-01-14T20:46:11","date_gmt":"2019-01-14T20:46:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/navytimes\/uncategorized\/2019\/01\/14\/a-warship-doomed-by-confusion-indecision-and-ultimately-panic-on-the-bridge\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T19:18:10","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T19:18:10","slug":"a-warship-doomed-by-confusion-indecision-and-ultimately-panic-on-the-bridge","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/navytimes\/news\/your-navy\/2019\/01\/14\/a-warship-doomed-by-confusion-indecision-and-ultimately-panic-on-the-bridge\/","title":{"rendered":"A warship doomed by \u2018confusion, indecision, and ultimately panic\u2019 on the bridge"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As the seconds ticked toward 1:30 a.m. on June 17, 2017, Lt. j.g. Sarah Coppock darted onto the Fitzgerald\u2019s<\/a> bridge wing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The sea air curled black around her as she gripped the alidade, frantic that she\u2019d be tossed overboard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cOh shit,\u201d she said. \u201cI\u2019m so fucked.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

She didn\u2019t know the name of the hulking merchant vessel looming out of the night off the coast of Japan, but it was the Philippine-flagged ACX Crystal<\/a>, and it was going to spear into the smaller guided-missile destroyer, tearing a gash in the hull before continuing into the darkness at 18 knots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coppock\u2019s fellow watchstanders on the bridge also had succumbed to \u201cconfusion, indecision, and ultimately panic,\u201d according to an internal Navy investigation into the Fitzgerald disaster obtained by Navy Times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Helmed by Rear Adm. Brian Fort<\/a>, a surface warfare officer with more than a quarter-century of service to the Navy, the secret probe was sent up the chain of command 41 days after the collision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was designed to both candidly describe to senior commanders what went wrong while helping federal attorneys defend against lawsuits from the ACX Crystal\u2019s owners and operators and, indirectly, the families of the seven sailors drowned in the berthing spaces below the bridge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Navy has paraded out a series of public reports addressing both the Fitzgerald tragedy and the Aug. 21, 2017, collision involving the John S. McCain<\/a> and the Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC that killed 10 more American sailors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But none of those investigations so starkly blueprinted the cascade of failures at all levels of the Navy that combined to cause the Fitzgerald disaster, especially the way the doomed crew of the destroyer was staffed, trained and led in the months before it the collision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fort\u2019s team of investigators described a bridge team that was overworked and exhausted, plagued by low morale, facing a relentless tempo of operations decreed by admirals far above them, distrustful of their superiors and, fatally, each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And Navy officials knew all of that at least a year before the tragedy.<\/p>\n\n\n

<\/atype-video-jwplayer>
A widow from the Fitzgerald collision talks about her husband, and the aftermath of the crash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n

Barreling into a shipping superhighway<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Publicly released accounts of the Fitz disaster state the warship was performing routine operations at the time of the collision<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Fort\u2019s report shows how grueling life had become for the crew and throughout the Japan-based 7th Fleet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The crew\u2019s workday began at 6 a.m. on June 16, 2017, and it involved \u201ca full schedule of demanding evolutions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By the time Coppock and her watchstanders arrived on the bridge 16 hours later for their four-hour shift, they were \u201cfatigued and without adequate rest,\u201d the report states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although they were moving through one of the world\u2019s busiest maritime corridors at night, neither their commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson<\/a>, nor his executive officer, Cmdr. Sean Babbit<\/a>, joined them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To Fort, that was inexplicable, but he soon discovered it was a routine practice on board the Fitz, dating back at least to the warship\u2019s previous commanding officer, Cmdr. Robert Shu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Benson was \u201ca little more active\u201d on the bridge than Shu, but \u201cit was not routine for the CO or (executive officer) to come up to the Bridge from (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.),\u201d Fort wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Out of 78 underway days from February to May of that year, the CO was on the bridge just four times between the dark hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., according to the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, both Benson and his XO Babbitt were in their quarters when the ACX Crystal collided with the Fitz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Benson was left dangling from the splintered hull above the sea, and his sailors had to break into his room to save him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and now faces court-martial, charged with dereliction in the performance of duties through negligence resulting in death and improper hazarding a vessel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Benson had been the XO to Shu before \u201cfleeting up\u201d to take command of the warship shortly before the collision. It was his first transit from Sagami Bay to the open sea as the Fitz\u2019s CO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shu said in an email to Navy Times that he \u201cvisited the bridge as well as all controlling stations daily.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI routinely stopped by controlling stations to see how the watch was going and if the watch had any questions about anything going on,\u201d he said. \u201cI always reminded them to keep things safe and call if they needed anything. I routinely stopped by the bridge every night before going to bed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before the collision, the Fitz was rounding Oshima Island, pointed toward the bustling sea lanes known as the Mikomoto Shima traffic separation scheme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s a shipping superhighway, and the Fitz was barreling into traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWatchstanders were unaware of this approaching and dynamic change in the surface traffic pattern and sailed headlong into this crossing traffic at 20 knots,\u201d Fort wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite a standing order to warn him when vessels got too close to his warship, no one bothered to awaken Benson as the Fitz neared the Crystal and two other commercial vessels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

‘Your people are exhausted mentally and physically.\u2019 <\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coppock wasn\u2019t communicating with her CO or his XO but she also wasn\u2019t talking to the ship\u2019s electronic nerve center \u2014 the Combat Information Center, or CIC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bridge and CIC teams are supposed to constantly share information on what they\u2019re seeing and their sensors detecting, working together to navigate a ship safety through the night.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Coppock wouldn\u2019t talk with the CIC because her counterparts there \u201chad given her bad information in the past,\u201d according to the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The CIC was led by Lt. Natalie Combs. Testifying under oath at a hearing last year to determine if Combs should stand court-martial, Fort said it was \u201cunfathomable\u201d that the bridge didn\u2019t talk to the CIC on the night of the disaster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Fort found that was far from the only fissure splitting the warship\u2019s crew, a systemic problem of mistrust that he believed superiors failed to properly address long before the catastrophe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another junior officer told Fort\u2019s investigators \u201cshe could not trust the person next to her.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This issue had been echoed in command climate surveys by other crewmembers in both 2016 and early 2017 that should\u2019ve been briefed up the chain of command to Destroyer Squadron 15, but Fort found that never happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shu said in an email to Navy Times that he debriefed his first survey to Destroyer Squadron 15, but wasn\u2019t able to debrief on the March 2017 survey \u201cdue to the schedule and changes.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe Commodore did have a copy of the survey as well and didn\u2019t ever express any concerns to me about it,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2016 survey included comments showing \u201csignificant issues with communication across the chain of command, particularly levied at the (chief mess) and Department Heads,\u201d the report states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By the 2017 survey, those signs pointing to miscommunication and distrust had multiplied, Fort found, but there were other problems, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cYour people are exhausted mentally and physically,\u201d one sailor wrote, a feeling shared by the bridge team on the night of the ACX Crystal calamity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
An internal Navy investigation into the fatal June 2017 warship Fitzgerald collision chided both the skipper at the time, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, left, and his predecessor, Cmdr. Robert Shu, for not addressing morale problems aboard the ship. They are shown here at a change of command in May 2017. (U.S. Navy)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A \u2018turn for the worse\u2019<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2017 survey results \u201cidentified continued and significant issues with communication throughout the command, concerns for stress being levied on the crew by the ship\u2019s OPTEMPO, and significant concerns for the leadership and effectiveness of the Command Master Chief,\u201d according to Fort\u2019s investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the aftermath of the Fitz tragedy, numerous officers, chiefs and sailors voiced similar complaints to Fort\u2019s investigators about the warship\u2019s most senior enlisted leader, Command Master Chief Brice A. Baldwin<\/a>, a career electronics technician who also had served on board the destroyer McFaul, amphibious warship Boxer and the guided-missile cruiser Antietam.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fort\u2019s report concluded that CMC Baldwin seemed \u201cdisengaged and\/or not respected\u201d inside the chiefs mess and the \u201cCMC was unaware that Deck Division Sailors had had no sleep prior to standing the 2200-0200 watch on 16 June 2017 and yet were part of every evolution prior to assuming watch.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the collision, Baldwin was relieved of duty along with CO Benson and XO Babbitt and left the Navy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He could not be reached for comment by Navy Times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appointed as the Consolidated Disposition Authority<\/a> to mete out discipline in the wake of the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions, early last year Adm. James F. Caldwell<\/a> ruled that Baldwin and Babbitt were derelict in their duties and issued them punitive letters of reprimand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During Fort\u2019s investigation, his team interviewed a junior officer who reported she was asked to fleet up to a second-tour division officer assignment on the Fitz \u201cbut she declined to do so, noting the poor command climate,\u201d Fort wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2017 survey results arrived shortly before Shu handed over command to his XO, Benson.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cShu stated he was generally happy with the results and did not wish to stand up a Command Assessment Team \u2026 to conduct small group discussions with the crew following the survey,\u201d Fort wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fort\u2019s report faults the Fitz\u2019s command failing to act on the \u201cvolume of comments\u201d compiled in the 2017 survey, which \u201cwere well articulated and a clear case for change.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAlthough conducted under CDR Shu, CDR Benson was XO during the 2016 and 2017 surveys, and once in command should have been attuned to the fact that command climate had taken a turn for the worse,\u201d Fort added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shu said he recalled concerns about Baldwin \u201cbut other than that there were no other comments that concerned me.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After consulting with his junior leaders, Shu determined \u201cthat we didn\u2019t need to conduct any focus groups on the survey we had just completed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI did talk with (CMC Baldwin) and (XO Benson) about the comments in the survey regarding him and we determined some things we as the command triad could do to change the perception of the crew,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\t