{"id":33214,"date":"2019-06-05T18:12:02","date_gmt":"2019-06-05T18:12:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/navytimes\/uncategorized\/2019\/06\/05\/miracle-at-midway\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T19:32:41","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T19:32:41","slug":"miracle-at-midway","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/navytimes\/news\/your-navy\/2019\/06\/05\/miracle-at-midway\/","title":{"rendered":"Miracle at Midway?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Carved into the marble walls of the National World War II Memorial <\/a>in Washington, D.C., in letters six inches high, is a sentence from Walter Lord\u2019s 1967 prize-winning book on the Battle of Midway: \u201cThey had no right to win, yet they did, and in doing so they changed the course of a war.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Lord meant is that the odds against the Americans at Midway were so great that their eventual success was no less than incredible \u2014 hence the title of his book: Incredible Victory<\/i>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fifteen years later, Gordon Prange continued that theme in his book Miracle at Midway<\/i>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Embedded in these book titles, and in their conclusions as well, is the implication that the American victory in the Battle of Midway was largely the product of fate, or chance, or luck, or some other unworldly force \u2014 that it was a miracle after all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That the Americans at Midway changed the course of World War II is indisputable. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At 10 o\u2019clock on the morning of June 4, 1942, the Japanese were winning the Pacific War; an hour later, three Japanese aircraft carriers were on fire and sinking. The fate of nations and the course of history had changed in an astonishing five-minute flurry of American bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be sure, chance played a role at Midway, as it has in every military engagement throughout history. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But to attribute the American victory predominately to luck is a disservice to the principal players. A look at the actions of four Americans across the command chain at Midway \u2014 Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, task force commander Raymond Spruance, air group leader Clarence Wade McClusky, and dive-bomber pilot Richard \u201cDick\u201d Best \u2014 shows how courageous leadership and sound decision-making, not just fate and chance, determined the crucial American victory at Midway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Adm. Chester W. Nimitz inspects Midway Island damage after the battle was won. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Chester Nimitz<\/a> was easy to underestimate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At age 56, with snow-white hair and piercing light-blue eyes, he was a quiet man who seldom betrayed his emotions. Undemonstrative and restrained, he rarely swore or even raised his voice. When exasperated, his most confrontational declaration was: \u201cNow see here!\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He was not impersonal or cold \u2014 he was a gifted teller of stories and particularly fond of elegant puns \u2014 but his German heritage and his Texas Hill Country upbringing had bred in him a calm reserve that allowed him to remain apparently undisturbed in the midst of crisis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That was exactly the kind of man that President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted in command at Pearl Harbor after the disastrous Japanese attack on Dec. 7, 1941. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox remembered the president saying, \u201cTell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl Harbor and stay there till the war is won.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It wasn\u2019t much of a command when Nimitz took over on the last day of the year. America\u2019s vaunted battleships were either in repair facilities stateside or resting on the bottom of the harbor. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be sure, the Japanese had clearly demonstrated at Pearl Harbor that aircraft carriers had supplanted battleships as the principal offensive weapons of modern navies. But by late spring of 1942, both of America\u2019s two big carriers had been lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 36,000-ton Saratoga<\/i> had been victimized by a Japanese submarine in January and sent back to Puget Sound, Washington, for a full refit; the 37,000-ton Lexington<\/i> was sunk in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Americans had very nearly lost the Yorktown in that same engagement. The carrier came limping into Pearl Harbor on May 27, trailing a 10-mile-long oil slick, leaving Nimitz with only two fully operational aircraft carriers: the Enterprise<\/i> and the brand-new Hornet<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was the state of things when Nimitz learned that the Japanese were sending their so-far-undefeated \u2014 indeed not yet seriously challenged \u2014 Kido Butai, the Imperial Navy\u2019s mobile strike force, to attack Midway Atoll, an American-held territory 1,100 miles northwest of Hawaii. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
A Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless scout bomber from the aircraft carrier Enterprise’s Bombing Squadron 6, is parked on board sister flattop Yorktown after landing at about 1140 hrs on 4 June 1942. This plane, damaged during the attack on the Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga that morning, landed on Yorktown as it was low on fuel. It was later lost with the carrier. Its crew included Ensign George H. Goldsmith, pilot, and Radioman 1st Class James W. Patterson, Jr. (Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute, now in the collections of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

He knew about the impending attack thanks to the work of a dedicated group of code breakers that had predicted it would come toward the end of May or early June, with four or possibly five carriers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the crippled Yorktown<\/i> <\/a>could be repaired in time \u2014 which was problematic \u2014 Nimitz would have three carriers. But the Japanese force included at least two battleships (Nimitz had none), its strike aircraft had a greater range than the American planes, and its Zero fighters were superior in both range and maneuverability to the U.S. Navy\u2019s F4F Wildcats. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Nimitz decided to oppose the Japanese attack, all he could count on for sure were the two carriers of Rear Adm. William F. Halsey\u2019s Task Force 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then it turned out he didn\u2019t have Halsey himself. When \u201cBull\u201d Halsey brought his two carriers into Pearl Harbor on May 26, he was suffering from a severe psoriasis flare-up and had to be hospitalized. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Asked to recommend someone to replace him for the coming fight, he named Raymond Spruance, the rear admiral who commanded the vessels of his cruiser-destroyer screen. (If the Yorktown<\/i> became available, then Rear Adm. Frank J. Fletcher, the commander of Task Force 17 and Spruance\u2019s senior, would command the fleet.) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, photo taken on April 23, 1944, when he helmed Central Pacific Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. (National Archives)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

While Spruance was a reliable professional, however, he was a specialist in surface warfare, with no experience commanding naval aviation forces; Fletcher, too, was a surface officer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the superiority of the Japanese carrier force, Nimitz had to take into consideration the fact that the Allied grand strategy, crafted even before hostilities began and confirmed at least twice since, was to defeat Germany first. According to this plan, the United States was to avoid \u201cdecisive action\u201d against major elements of the Japanese fleet in the Pacific in order to concentrate on the European theater.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given all that, Nimitz had to ask himself if Midway was of such strategic importance that it justified risking his remaining aircraft carriers in an unequal fight with the Kido Butai. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be sure, Midway was a valuable mid-ocean outpost for the Americans, and Japanese occupation of it would have been a serious nuisance. But was it of greater strategic importance than the nation\u2019s few aircraft carriers? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One option for Nimitz was to avoid battle altogether and wait for the Saratoga<\/i> and Yorktown<\/i> to return to the fleet, when he would again have four carriers. By then the Japanese might well have seized Midway, but their grip \u2014 at the end of a 2,500-mile supply line from Japan \u2014 would be very tenuous, and the Americans could take it back rather easily. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was the conservative \u2014 and arguably the responsible \u2014 alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nimitz\u2019s other option, of course, was to fight for Midway. His advance knowledge of the Japanese navy\u2019s approach, thanks to the code breakers, transferred the invaluable element of surprise from the Japanese to the Americans, and gave Nimitz time to greatly reinforce Midway itself \u2014 especially with aircraft. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the Yorktown could join the Enterprise and Hornet, the Americans would have four airplane platforms, including Midway \u2014 the same number as the Japanese.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the circumstances, few would have faulted Nimitz if he had chosen the first option and avoided battle with the approaching Kido Butai. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The American chief of naval operations, Adm. Ernest J. King\u2014 who was no shrinking violet \u2014 implied as much when he suggested that Nimitz should send the Yorktown<\/i> to Puget Sound to keep it out of harm\u2019s way, and transfer the carrier\u2019s surviving airplanes to the airfields on Oahu as a defensive force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The choice belonged to Nimitz: His was the burden of command. He was certainly cognizant of the risks, but in his mind the decision to fight for Midway was no gamble. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He calculated the odds coolly and rationally, and believed that he held a winning hand. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Battle of Midway, June 1942. Torpedo Squadron 6 TBD-1 aircraft are prepared for launching on the aircraft carrier Enterprise at about 0730-0740 hrs on June 4, 1942. (National Archives)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Walter Lord stated that the Americans had no right to win, but Nimitz fully expected to. His decision to meet the Japanese north of Midway now seems fore\u00adordained, but at the time it was a bold stroke, and if someone besides Chester Nimitz had been in command at Pearl Harbor, the battle might not have happened at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rear Adm. Raymond Spruance was a man very much in the same mold as Nimitz: calm in his demeanor and courtly in his manners, reminding one interviewer of \u201ca soft-spoken university professor.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A lean 55-year-old, Spruance was a 1907 Academy graduate who had served in destroyers and cruisers his entire career. When Bull Halsey realized his illness meant he could not possibly command Task Force 16 in the forthcoming operation, he did not hesitate to recommend Spruance for the job.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Along with the assignment, Spruance also inherited Halsey\u2019s chief of staff, 45-year-old Capt. Miles Browning. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tall and ruggedly handsome, with a bad-boy allure that made him attractive to women, Browning was something of an eccentric in the aviation community. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Capt. Miles R. Browning, photographed on Feb. 25, 1944 when he helmed the aircraft carrier Hornet, which was underway to the Marshall Islands. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

He was an excellent pilot and an imaginative tactician, but he was also cocky and dismissive of others\u2014 characteristics that did not endear him to subordinates. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ebullient Halsey had gotten along well with Browning, and had recommended him for his promotion to captain. Before Halsey left for the hospital, he urged Spruance to rely heavily on Browning and his expertise in air operations during the coming fight. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Browning, for his part, clearly expected Spruance to defer to him in the management of the air assets of Task Force 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As it happened, the yard workers at Pearl Harbor did manage to patch up the Yorktown<\/i> in time to send it out to join Spruance\u2019s Task Force 16, at a rendezvous point the Americans had somewhat hopefully dubbed \u201cPoint Luck,\u201d 325 miles north of Midway. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

All three American carriers were there at a few minutes past 6 a.m. on June 4 when a PBY Catalina out of Midway reported seeing two Japanese carriers and two battleships about 170 miles to the southwest \u2014 a position at the extreme range of the American torpedo bombers and fighters. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At 6:07, Admiral Fletcher \u2014 on board Yorktown<\/i>, waiting for a group of aircraft to return \u2014 radioed an order to Spruance, on board the Enterprise<\/i>: \u201cProceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located. I will follow as soon as planes recovered.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The wind that day was very light \u2014 only about five knots \u2014 and it was coming out of the east. For their aircraft to launch, the Hornet and the Enterprise would have to turn into the wind, away from the target, and build up speed to at least 25 knots (nearly 29 mph). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since it would take most of an hour to launch air groups from two carriers, which would add another 20 miles to the flight by the time all planes were up and in their formations, Spruance decided to continue steaming toward the target for another 45 minutes before launching. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It would still be a long flight to the target, but the later launch should allow the attack planes sufficient time to get the job done and get back safely. Under Browning\u2019s management, the first planes began launching at 7:05.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Cmdr. Clarence Wade McClusky, Jr., photographed by the cockpit of a Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter, at Naval Air Station Alameda on Feb. 6, 1943. (Courtesy of Mrs. C.W. McClusky, Jr., 1982. now in the collections of U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The air group aboard the Enterprise<\/i> was under the command of Wade McClusky. Having turned 40 only days before, he was the oldest pilot on board. McClusky had spent most of his career as a fighter pilot, but by virtue of his seniority he now found himself in command of a bomber group. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bomber group was composed of the SBD dive-bombers of Scouting Squadron VS-6 and Bombing Squadron VB-6, as well as the TDB-1 torpedo bombers of VT-6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Launch delays cropped up almost from the start. The planes had been lined up on the flight deck for launch since well before dawn, but a number of them developed engine problems during the launch and had to be manhandled up to the forward elevator and lowered back down to the hangar deck in order to clear the flight deck. All of that took time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were other delays. Ordinarily, the crew would have started bringing up the planes of the second deck load via the carrier\u2019s rear elevator while the last of the dive-bombers were launching forward. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But VB-6\u2019s bombers, each lugging a 1,000-pound bomb, needed a full deck run to get aloft, so the crew did not start bringing up the 10 Wildcats of the Enterprise\u2019s fighter group, VF-6, and VT-6\u2019s 14 Devastator torpedo bombers from the hangar deck until after the last of the dive-bombers were aloft. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It took another 20 minutes to bring up the Wildcats via the forward elevator and the Devastators via the rear elevator. The Wildcats launched without mishap, but then one of the torpedo bombers had engine trouble. It was fixed but that, too, ate up time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, McClusky\u2019s bombers were circling over the task force, burning up precious fuel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
The aircraft carrier Enterprise, steaming at high speed at about 0725 hrs, 4 June 1942, seen from the cruiser Pensacola. The carrier has launched Scouting Squadron 6 (VS-6) and Bombing Squadron 6 (VB-6) and is striking unlaunched SBD aircraft below in preparation for respotting the flight deck with torpedo planes and escorting fighters. The cruiser Northampton is in the right distance, with SBDs orbiting overhead, awaiting the launch of the rest of the attack group. Three hours later, VS-6 and VB-6 fatally bombed the Japanese carriers Akagi and Kaga. (National Archives)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

By 7:45, Spruance had run out of patience. Five minutes earlier his radio intelligence officer reported that he had intercepted a contact report from a Japanese scout plane. Soon the enemy would know where the Americans were and the opportunity for surprise would be lost. Time was running out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, Spruance had declined to interfere with Browning\u2019s management of air operations but, deciding that enough was enough, he ordered that McClusky be sent a message by flashing light to \u201cproceed on mission assigned\u201d without waiting for the torpedo bombers. Instead of a coordinated attack by bombers and torpedo planes, McClusky would have to do his best with dive-bombers only.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Released by Spruance, McClusky\u2019s group of 32 dive-bombers flew southwest toward the coordinates McClusky had calculated that morning. It was a long flight, and the wait over the task force and the climb to altitude had burned up a large amount of fuel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ensign Lew Hopkins looked at his fuel gauge and concluded that it was going to be a one-way flight. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI knew, and most everybody else knew that we didn\u2019t have enough fuel to get back,\u201d he later recalled, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But when McClusky arrived at 9:20 in the general area where he had expected to find the Kido Butai, he saw nothing below him but empty ocean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although low on fuel, McClusky continued the search. He turned the formation slightly to the right and flew due west for 35 miles, then he turned right again to the northwest, intending to conduct a standard box search. He scanned the horizon eagerly for the sign of any surface ships, his binoculars \u201cpractically glued,\u201d as he put it, to his eyes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two of his bomber pilots ran out of fuel and ditched in the water. Finally, at 9:55, well north of the plotted intercept position, McClusky spotted a single ship, all by itself, proceeding northward at great speed, its bow wave making a broad wake that looked for all the world like a white arrow painted on the surface of the sea. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

McClusky guessed at once that it was a laggard from the Kido Butai and, using that V-shaped bow wave as a guide, he altered course to follow the arrow just east of due north. Ten minutes later, at 10:05, he saw dark specks on the horizon ahead of him. As he flew closer, the specks resolved themselves into surface ships. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He had found the Kido Butai.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“Battle of Midway, US Dauntless Aircraft Dive On Japanese Carriers,” painting, oil on wood, by John Hamilton. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

One of the 32 pilots flying that perilous course with McClusky was Lt. Dick Best, the commanding officer of VB-6. At age 32, Best was younger than most of the squadron commanders, and looked younger still. Out of uniform he might have had trouble getting a Honolulu bartender to serve him a beer. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A New Jersey native, he was whippet thin with an aquiline nose and prominent ears. But he was a great pilot. Before assuming command of VB-6, he had been a flight instructor at Naval Air Station Pensacola. He often had to endure some good-natured banter because his middle name was Halsey and, indeed, he claimed a distant relationship with the admiral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As McClusky, Best, and the commander of VS-6, Lt. Earl Gallaher, approached the Kido Butai that morning, they saw so many valuable targets below them that there was confusion about which to attack. The nearest target was the big carrier Kaga<\/i>; five miles to its right and a few miles ahead of it was the Japanese flagship Akagi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to doctrine, Gallaher and Best were to lead their two squadrons against different ships. To do that, the lead squadron \u2014 Gallaher\u2019s \u2014 should fly past the first carrier and attack the more distant one, while the trailing squadron \u2014 Best\u2019s \u2014 attacked the near target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But McClusky, who had spent most of his career as a fighter pilot and had not internalized bombing doctrine, approached the situation with typical American straight\u00adforwardness. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He saw the two carriers not as near and far, but as left and right. McClusky could not give hand signals to Best, who was 5,000 feet below him, so he broke radio silence to order Gallaher to take the carrier \u201con the left\u201d and Best to take the carrier \u201con the right.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Best never heard the order. He later speculated that his radio didn\u2019t work, which is possible; another probable explanation is that Best and McClusky sent their reports of the ship sightings to each other simultaneously, which meant neither would have heard the other. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In any event, both squadrons under McClusky\u2019s command prepared to dive on the Kaga<\/i>. The Americans had gained a crucial advantage by arriving over the Kido Butai at a critical moment; now the confusion in assigning targets threatened to waste it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Best used hand signals to prepare the pilots of his squadron to dive on the target. Then, just as he was about to push over into the dive, the 16 bombers of Gallaher\u2019s VS-6, plus McClusky, all came flashing down directly in front of him. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Best later recalled that his first thought was, \u201cThey had jumped my target!\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But thinking fast, he closed his flaps and waggled his ailerons as a signal to the rest of his squadron to hold back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Too late. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already committed to the dive, 10 of the VB-6 pilots joined the onslaught on the Kaga<\/i>. Only Best\u2019s two wingmen, Ed Kroeger and Fred Weber, were close enough to see his frantic signals and hold up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twenty-seven American planes dove on the Kaga<\/i>. They plastered it with bombs, and within minutes it was a smoking wreck. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But this left only three planes for the attack on the Akagi<\/i>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
The burning Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu, photographed by a plane from the carrier Hosho shortly after sunrise on 5 June 1942. Hiryu sank a few hours later. Note collapsed flight deck over the forward hangar. (Donation of Kazutoshi Hando, 1970, now in the collections of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Best gathered his two wingmen, one on each side, and the three American planes flew toward the Akagi in a shallow V formation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was \u201ca calm placid morning,\u201d Best recalled, and he remembered thinking that it felt just like a \u201cregular individual battle practice drill.\u201d As they dove from 14,000 feet, Best put his bomb sight in the middle of the Akagi\u2019s flight deck, just forward of its small island, and released his bomb at about 1,500 feet. Kroeger and Weber released their bombs at almost the same moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Best\u2019s 1,000-pound bomb struck square on the Akagi<\/i>\u2019s flight deck and penetrated to its crowded hangar deck. The immediate damage was extensive, but the secondary damage was catastrophic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Akagi<\/i>\u2019s hangar deck was crowded with 18 big \u201cKate\u201d torpedo bombers, all of them with fuel tanks filled to the top and armed with 1,870-pound Type 91 torpedoes. Other ordnance lay on the carts and on the racks along the bulkhead. Within minutes, that ordnance began to cook off, and once the explosions started, the aviation fuel from the wrecked planes fed the fires. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The error that sent 27 of McClusky\u2019s 30 planes against the same carrier turned out not to matter: By 10:25, both the Kaga<\/i> and Akagi<\/i> were burning out of control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, approximately 10 miles to the north, Yorktown\u2019s<\/i> planes were hitting the carrier Soryu<\/i>. In an electrifying five-minute period, three-quarters of the Kido Butai was destroyed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The aircraft carrier Yorktown burning, photographed during the Battle of Midway, June 1942. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

This history-changing strike had been made possible because:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022 Chester Nimitz made the bold decision to meet the Japanese challengers, despite the apparent mismatch;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022 Raymond Spruance overruled Miles Browning, and ordered Wade McClusky to \u201cproceed on mission assigned.\u201d Had he instead waited for the torpedo planes to launch so that the whole air group could fly to the target together, McClusky would not have had enough fuel to conduct his decisive search;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022 Wade McClusky continued searching when his fuel gauge read half empty, a bold choice that led him to the Kido Butai;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022 Dick Best reacted instantly when he realized an entire air group was diving on the same target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is not to imply that these four men were the only ones whose actions mattered. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hundreds of others, from flag officers to plane pushers, played crucial roles as well in the victory that turned the tide in the Pacific War and triggered the American counteroffensive in the Solomon Islands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two months after Midway, 10,000 Marines went ashore on Guadalcanal, and the American offensive did not stop until August of 1945. There was luck involved, to be sure \u2014 but sometimes bold and courageous men make their own luck.<\/p>\n\n\n\t