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Watanabe\u2019s mission was a reflection of the Imperial Navy\u2019s keen interest in the South Pacific, where the Japanese had taken over the Solomon Islands and were building an airfield on Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Allies were interested, too: by Aug. 15, when I-169<\/i> reached the Japanese base at Truk, American forces had been on Guadalcanal for a week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To stay alive, Allied invaders needed seaborne supply from their nearest bases: the New Hebrides island of Esp\u00edritu Santo, about 400 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, and Noum\u00e9a, another 450 miles south.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A motley fleet ranging from fast destroyer-transports to cargo vessels \u2014 even ocean tugs \u2014 labored to support the 10,000 American troops on and around Guadalcanal. From Esp\u00edritu, a fast ship could reach the island in a day and a half. A merchant vessel on the Noum\u00e9a-Guadalcanal run needed almost four days \u2014 and a naval escort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To beat back or blunt the first Allied offensive in the Pacific, Japan needed to cut that lifeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While Japanese battleships, cruisers, carriers, and other vessels fought on the surface to hold the Solomons, the Imperial Navy tried to starve Guadalcanal with airpower and submarines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The resulting aerial and surface battles are famous. But far less is known about the underwater offensive the Japanese waged in the Guadalcanal supply corridor that became known as Torpedo Junction,<\/a> and undeservedly so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Careful analysis shows Japanese submariners to have been as effective there as the empire\u2019s surface navy \u2014 that is, until Japan\u2019s submarine campaign foundered on the empire\u2019s rigid naval doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As soon as U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal, Japanese admirals at Rabaul, the empire\u2019s main base in the Solomons, ordered submarines to those waters \u2014 a move that effectively suspended the underwater war on merchant ships like the Tjinegara<\/i> off Australia until late January 1943.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based at Rabaul, 570 miles away, and commanded from there by Rear Adm. Setsuzo Yoshitome, the boats of Submarine Squadron 7 were to operate in the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Submarine Squadron 3, which had been hunting freighters off Australia under Rear Adm. Chimaki Kono, would come from Truk, 2,000 miles from Noum\u00e9a and 1,140 from Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Japan, Rear Adm. Shigeaki Yamazaki was poised to take Submarine Squadron 1 to the Indian Ocean; instead, Yamazaki was ordered south. He boarded I-9, and on Aug. 15 sailed with four more I-boats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japanese Combined Fleet commander Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto assigned Vice Adm. Nobutake Kond\u014d, his advance force leader, as the overall submarine commander.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kono, Yamazaki, and Kond\u014d each had strengths, though only Yamazaki was a full-fledged underwater man.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kond\u014d, 56, was academically brilliant. At the top of his class in the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, he taught at and later headed the Imperial Navy\u2019s war college. But he knew little about subs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yamazaki, 49, was a torpedo specialist with nearly 30 years of navy service. Thin-faced, with a prominent lower lip, Yamazaki was leading a division of subs as early as 1934, and by 1940 was a squadron commander. He had had a major role in submarine operations around Pearl Harbor, and later took his boats to Alaska\u2019s Aleutian Islands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kono, 50, was a radio expert who had a great deal of time as a staff officer \u2014 including assignments with the Combined Fleet and the Navy Ministry \u2014 and had captained battleships and cruisers. But before taking command of an I-boat squadron he had never served aboard a submarine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kond\u014d designated a corridor between San Cristobal in the Solomons and Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands, effectively creating Torpedo Junction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He detailed Yamazaki\u2019s six subs and Kono\u2019s Squadron 3 to patrol a line within that corridor, and would issue instructions as the battle evolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In essence, Kond\u014d treated subs like surface ships. But submarines on the surface sat too low to be practical for scouting\u2014and were even less useful for that purpose at periscope depth. Subs were more effective stationed at choke points where enemy vessels had to pass.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By Aug. 23, Yamazaki and his I-boats lay east of Malaita Island, by the lower Solomons, about 250 miles from their destination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That day, aircraft from the American carrier Enterprise<\/i> caught Lt. Cmdr. Takakazu Kinashi\u2019s I-19<\/i> on the surface, forcing the sub to crash-dive to escape bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The next day an Enterprise<\/i> plane unsuccessfully pursued Lt. Cmdr. Hakue Harada\u2019s I-17<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the next night, Aug. 24, the subs reached their destination. The six boats set up a blockade line roughly 150 miles wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Early on Aug. 25, Commander Nobuo Ishikawa in I-15<\/i> saw an enemy fleet, and identified the carrier Enterprise<\/i> and the battleship North Carolina<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He tried unsuccessfully to signal nearby I-17<\/i>, sending Morse code by hydrophone. Haphazard attacks by Allied destroyers kept I-15<\/i> submerged, but eventually Ishikawa was able to surface and pursue the carrier. Yamazaki ordered I-17<\/i> to assist, but even working together the crews lost contact in the predawn darkness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also on Aug. 25, in an attempt to maneuver the subs to catch the Allied fleet, the Japanese command ordered its subs to a line bearing southwest from Ndeni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At midday, a destroyer in the U.S. carrier Saratoga\u2019s<\/i> screen spotted the I-9<\/i>. Three escorts joined together for five hours of depth charging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the attackers finally saw bubbles and an oil slick, they moved on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Americans had fallen for a classic ruse. At the helm of Yamazaki\u2019s command vessel, Lt. Cmdr. Akiyoshi Fujii, dumped fuel and belched air from a torpedo tube, faking the I-9\u2019s<\/i> demise and slipping away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, on board the I-19,<\/i> Kinashi had sighted two enemy ships but could not close.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More subs, working as a group west and south of Guadalcanal, reached position south of the Indispensable Reefs, a series of atolls at the western edge of the corridor that Japanese subs often used to refuel long-range scout bombers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Japanese lacked the submarine strength needed to saturate Torpedo Junction and trap American vessels. On Aug. 26, Kinashi\u2019s hydrophones detected a surface force \u2014 which happened to include the American carrier Wasp <\/i>\u2014 but the Allied vessels easily outran his submerged vessel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Aug. 28 the I-15<\/i> spotted another American carrier, which several subs pursued without success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such results made the Battle of the Eastern Solomons a disappointment for the undersea force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yamazaki, tired and perhaps dispirited from his trial by depth charge five days earlier, arrived at Truk on Aug. 30 and tied up I-9<\/i> for repair.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One by one, other I-boats straggled in. A few days later, accompanied by the 6th Fleet chief of staff, Rear Adm. Hisashi Mito, Yamazaki went to the Combined Fleet flagship, the superbattleship Yamato<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 6th Fleet had been Japan\u2019s top submarine command since 1940, and Mito, like Yamazaki, was a true submariner. Yamazaki had commanded his first boat in 1920; the 50-year-old Mito had received his first sub command in 1923. On board Yamato<\/i> the men met with Combined Fleet chief of staff Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki to discuss the subs\u2019 recent experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yamazaki said the Allies\u2019 precautionary measures had been good and their sound detection excellent \u2014 analysis that Mito seconded. Ugaki drew the correct conclusion: \u201cIf a chase is difficult and an underwater movement dangerous, the only thing we can do is lie in wait with many submarines.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n These were not fresh insights. The I-boats\u2019 meager results reflected the difficulties inherent in this kind of operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A spring 1941 exercise by Squadron 2 that ranged from Japanese waters to Micronesia had shown the subs to be too slow for pursuit and too few to monitor broad ocean expanses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To avoid detection, subs had to remain distant from enemy harbors, which allowed foes to sortie without warning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even when stationed right off enemy bases, subs had trouble engaging high-speed surface fleets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At Torpedo Junction, Allied task forces sped across the submarine patrol line, offering the undersea boats scant opportunity to maneuver.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Placing subs under a surface officer like Kond\u014d brought other problems. Assumptions were critical in this hide-and-seek contest, and commanders unfamiliar with underwater combat tended to make the wrong ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Imperial Navy\u2019s fleet-centered operational concept dictated that subs remain in a line rather than patrol an area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As seen at Midway and now at the Eastern Solomons, this stiffness negated many of the advantages of group operations \u2014 but at least the repeated cruises familiarized Japanese sub skippers with Torpedo Junction and the behavior of the Allied forces crossing it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And while the Allies evaded the I-boats at the Eastern Solomons, Torpedo Junction featured a steady stream of American interlopers trying to outsmart their foes, which constantly presented the Japanese with fresh opportunities made challenging by the Imperial Navy\u2019s perceived wisdom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, on the night of Aug. 24, the I-boat group occupied exactly the waters from which the American carriers had fought that day \u2014 arriving roughly 12 hours late.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Yamazaki\u2019s subs reached their Aug. 25 positions, they were behind every American except the Wasp<\/i>, which had gone to refuel and then steered north. By then, most enemy targets were headed home, not obliged to maintain position to do battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subs had done as ordered and hewed to Imperial Navy doctrine, which was both visionary and constraining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan intended its I-boats to act in conjunction with the navy\u2019s advance force, whittling down foes before decisive battles. The navy was ahead of its American and German counterparts, and in the 1930s had developed the group assault tactics for use against warships that Germany would make famous with its convoy-hunting wolf packs. Japan had even built specialized command boats to lead formations into battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its regular subs had range and endurance \u2014 16,000 miles and 90 days, compared with the 11,000 miles and 75 days of America\u2019s mainstay Gato-class subs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan had also developed a submarine-based floatplane along with a number of subs with facilities for storing, launching, and retrieving them, which enabled subs to scout remotely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Japan\u2019s sub command had serious flaws.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While 6th Fleet staff chief Mito was a true submariner, his boss, Vice Adm. Teruhisa Komatsu, was not. Komatsu, 54, once led a sub squadron, but the only warship he had skippered was a cruiser and he had never driven an undersea boat. Komatsu, who had also taught at the naval academy and the navy war college, was drafted into the submarine command in early 1942 when the previous 6th Fleet boss was wounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now Komatsu was being called upon to oversee the subs at and around Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the night of Aug. 31, Lt. Cmdr. Minoru Yokota\u2019s I-26<\/i> was running on the surface northwest of Esp\u00edritu Santo, charging its batteries, when a lookout spotted lights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Diving cost Yokota contact, but hours later he regained it \u2014 and discovered that the lights belonged to the Saratoga\u2019s<\/i> task force. At periscope depth I-26<\/i> could not keep up, but a zigzag put the carrier right in front of the sub.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A torpedo broached Saratoga\u2019s <\/i>aftermost fire room and compromised its electrical circuits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Destroyers responded, but I-26<\/i> disappeared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The temporary loss of the Saratoga<\/i> sapped Allied strength and stoked concern about submarines. Fearing the Japanese might penetrate their harbors, Allied commanders ordered Esp\u00edritu\u2019s minefields augmented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A key passageway \u2014 Segond Channel \u2014 was liberally seeded. (In August an American destroyer had blundered into the field and been sunk; the same fate awaited the transport President Coolidge<\/i> in October.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Off Noum\u00e9a, the Allies mounted a 24-destroyer watch at Amedee Light, where the barrier reef opened to the sea. When a fleet or convoy departed, escort vessels first cleared the approaches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And Allied ships routinely went to battle stations at sunset and dawn, when the light favored subs but surface sailors might be tired after a long day or not quite ready for a new one. The rest of the time the surface vessels generally remained at the ready.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By early September the Japanese had eight subs cruising Torpedo Junction and several more off Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Sept. 6, off Esp\u00edritu, I-11<\/i> got inside the carrier Hornet\u2019s <\/i>screen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It might have done some damage but for an alert patrol plane crew. The airmen dropped bombs whose explosion diverted I-11\u2019s<\/i> torpedoes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The counterattack was fierce. Aircraft damaged I-11<\/i> so badly that the sub had to leave Torpedo Junction on the surface, barely making Truk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since I-11<\/i> was Kono\u2019s command ship, his role in Squadron 3 was compromised. So on Sept. 8, the day after Yamamoto ordered Guadalcanal blockaded, the 6th Fleet transferred control of all subs in Torpedo Junction to Yamazaki. Kond\u014d followed with particular instructions for the blockade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Sept. 13, a Japanese flying boat sighted another American carrier, prompting Yamazaki to order the patrol line to shift south 100 miles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Sept. 15, I-19<\/i> skipper Kinashi spotted Allied warships. The enemy sped away but, as in the Saratoga<\/i> incident, zigzagged right to I-19<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kinashi launched a full spread of six torpedoes, sinking the carrier Wasp<\/i> and the destroyer O\u2019Brien<\/i>, and damaging the battleship North Carolina <\/i>\u2014 the most successful Japanese sub attack of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the blockade, submarine patrol strength remained problematic. By Sept. 23, a dozen I-boats were on station, with seven in port for service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Sept. 29, I-4 <\/i>damaged the 7,400-ton merchant ship Alhena<\/i> on its return from Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In October, illness forced the warhorse Yamazaki to leave Truk; Mito replaced him as head of Squadron 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In one respect the change reduced difficulties: with Yamazaki gone, Kono, the other submarine squadron commander, became the key man. Kono still lacked sub savvy, but his deep radio expertise made him well equipped to handle the chronic radio problems that underwater crews experienced in the tropics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the Japanese Combined Fleet was readying a major operation to reinforce Guadalcanal, overwhelm the Americans there, and cripple any fleet the Allies sent to save them. Subs would have a key role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In early October, Komatsu took direct control of four I-boats to put floatplane scouts over key Allied bases. Nine other subs were undergoing upkeep at Truk and Rabaul. Only five subs were patrolling Torpedo Junction; one, I-22<\/i>, was apparently lost on Oct. 6 to an American PBY\u2019s bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At mid-month, when the Japanese surface fleet went on the move, the blockade force surged. Kono suddenly put 16 I-boats, divided into two forces, into Torpedo Junction waters, continually adjusting their patrol lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The payoff came Oct. 20. On board the I-176<\/i>, Lt. Cmdr. Yahachi Tanabe thought he spied a battleship, but what he torpedoed amidships was the heavy cruiser Chester<\/i>, which limped back to Esp\u00edritu with 11 dead and 12 wounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The carrier battle of the Santa Cruz Islands began on Oct. 25, northwest of Guadalcanal. As Allied vessels withdrew, I-boats gave chase, with the usual detection and pursuit problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lt. Cmdr. Kanji Matsumura\u2019s I-21<\/i> fired at the American battleship Washington<\/i>, but his torpedo exploded in the ship\u2019s wake. In the melee, the battleship South Dakota <\/i>and the destroyer Mahan<\/i> collided, badly damaging each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Except for the Chester<\/i>, Japanese subs drew scant blood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even so, the running scorecard for Torpedo Junction was clear: the Imperial Navy had lost I-22<\/i>, and other subs had suffered damage. But thanks to the Japanese submariners the Allies had lost a carrier and a destroyer, and had a carrier, a battleship, and a heavy cruiser damaged \u2014 not counting the vessels damaged in minefield accidents and scrambles to avoid I-boats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And since the Enterprise<\/i>, badly damaged by Japanese aircraft at Santa Cruz, had withdrawn to Noum\u00e9a, the Allies in the South Pacific had no combat-ready carrier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A significant portion of American losses was thus the work, direct or indirect, of Japanese subs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After the Battle of Santa Cruz ended on Oct. 27, the Japanese sub commanders wasted no time on the next move: a special mission conceived by Mito against Esp\u00edritu Santo and Noum\u00e9a, codenamed Button and Poppy. As with the creation of Komatsu\u2019s special reconnaissance force before Santa Cruz, Mito\u2019s plan was shaped by the Japanese thinking strategically rather than woodenly following procedure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The raid was sure to be non-standard: its leader was Capt. Hankyu Sasaki, and if the Imperial Navy had a commando submariner, he was it. Sasaki, 46, had led the midget subs at Pearl Harbor, and a May 1942 midget raid on the port at Sydney, Australia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Well-connected \u2014 he and Ugaki were naval academy classmates \u2014 Sasaki had helmed subs since 1920, and had led Submarine Division 3 since 1939.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Oct. 28, Mito created the independent E Force under Sasaki and sent it to Noum\u00e9a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The timing was ideal. September through October is Noum\u00e9a\u2019s dry season, averaging only nine rainy days a month with temperatures in the 70s. November is slightly warmer and wetter, but with almost identical sunshine \u2014 optimal conditions for deploying floatplanes and scout submarines off ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Japanese had thought of hitting the Allied bases \u2014 they even discussed an October raid on Noum\u00e9a using naval infantry inserted by submarine \u2014 but the intended boat was diverted and preparations for Santa Cruz occupied most subs. The three-vessel E Force mission seemed more practical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sasaki sailed on board I-21<\/i>, commanded by Matsumura, a veteran of a patrol off Noum\u00e9a and among the top-scoring sub captains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second boat, I-9<\/i>, was helmed by Fujii, the lieutenant commander who had evaded American destroyers with his oil-and-air trick. A scouting maven, Fujii had launched floatplanes against Pearl Harbor and in the Aleutians. He and Matsumura were both from one of Kono\u2019s forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The trio\u2019s third sub, Kinashi\u2019s I-19<\/i>, came from Komatsu\u2019s recon force. Kinashi had killed the Wasp<\/i>, and E Force was after the Enterprise<\/i>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fujii began the mission by reconnoitering Noum\u00e9a on Oct. 31, the day after the Enterprise<\/i> anchored there. An outside I-boat, I-8<\/i>, did likewise at Esp\u00edritu two days later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At dawn on Nov. 4, Fujii sent his floatplane over Noum\u00e9a. The pilot reported one carrier, several cruisers, and other ships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sasaki was having the problems near Allied bases that the spring 1941 exercises had exposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under ordinary circumstances he would not have dared let subs get too close to an enemy harbor, but this situation was special.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps Sasaki intended to raid directly into the harbors, as U-boat skipper G\u00fcnther Prien famously did at Scapa Flow, Britain\u2019s main naval base, in 1939. However, there is no record and Sasaki, Fujii, and Kinashi did not live to write postwar memoirs. Sasaki\u2019s scouting pattern suggests he was angling for some kind of attack on the harbor at Noum\u00e9a, but could not get past the destroyer patrols at Amedee Light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In any event the subs held off, while inside Noum\u00e9a\u2019s harbor American sailors swarmed the Enterprise<\/i> around the clock, along with every engineer and repair specialist the U.S. Navy could find. Men from the repair ship Vulcan<\/i> and Seabees labored alongside the carrier\u2019s damage control people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Assayers said repairs would take three weeks; the work was done in 11 days. Enterprise<\/i> crewmen were recalled from liberty \u2014 pulled out of downtown bars where a can of beer was 15 cents and whiskey was a quarter a slug.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As E Force circled, Japan\u2019s Combined Fleet was readying a fresh naval offensive against Guadalcanal that demanded more floatplane reconnaissance. However, the floatplane on Komatsu\u2019s I-7<\/i> was too damaged to scout Esp\u00edritu Santo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The admirals ordered Sasaki to detach I-9<\/i> from E Force so its plane could replace I-7\u2019s<\/i>. That took Sasaki\u2019s best scout boat away from the Enterprise\u2019s<\/i> lair. Off Esp\u00edritu, I-9<\/i> would be too distant to play a role at Noum\u00e9a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The climax came on Nov. 9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Enterprise<\/i>, refurbished enough to get under way, left Noum\u00e9a with two battleships for company and repair crews still toiling on board. From both Noum\u00e9a and Esp\u00edritu, cruisers and destroyers departed to convoy half a dozen transports to Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Japanese learned their quarry had exited that day, when I-21\u2019s<\/i> floatplane overflew Noum\u00e9a. At sunset on Nov. 11, Fujii\u2019s airmen reconnoitered Esp\u00edritu, reporting that harbor empty as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subs had been too far from the enemy bases to detect ship movements or attack Allied vessels. Nor had it dawned on the submariners to attack the U.S. escort carrier Kitty Hawk<\/i>, then nearing Esp\u00edritu with a load of planes for Guadalcanal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After Enterprise<\/i> fled, the Japanese got a small consolation prize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Torpedo-failed.jpg.jpg\")
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