China denied it was operating unsafely, but Philippine officials were unassuaged. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian to express \u201cserious concern<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the days before the alleged Feb. 6 incident, the United States and the Philippines had announced an expansion<\/a> of their 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Instead of periodic access for U.S. forces to five Philippine installations, they will have access to nine. The U.S. Navy\u2019s top admiral has since offered Manila a chance for joint patrols: Philippine vessels cruising side by side with their American allies in the face of Chinese coercion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreement marked a striking reversal from Manila\u2019s flirtation with ending most military cooperation with the U.S.<\/a>, as it sought to balance relations with Washington and Beijing. It capped a wave of personal diplomacy, in which Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin<\/a> visited the Philippines in 2021, President Joe Biden called Marcos to congratulate him on his election and Vice President Kamala Harris visited Manila in November.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And now the newly strengthened defense relationship was on full display. Austin called his counterpart days after the reported incident to reiterate that \u201can armed attack on Philippine armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea, would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments,\u201d according to an official readout.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Pentagon\u2019s efforts to improve U.S. force posture in the Pacific have yielded a flurry of major agreements in recent months, with allies motivated by China\u2019s aggressive behavior to embrace the U.S. With new arrangements, the Pentagon aims to spread what it calls \u201ccombat credible\u201d forces closer to Taiwan as a way to deter China from invading the island and \u2015 if deterrence fails \u2015 win any resulting fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The U.S. military\u2019s problem is that heavy concentrations of its forces in Northeast Asia \u2015 50,000 in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea \u2015 offer fat targets for China\u2019s long-range missiles, which can reach areas as far away as Guam. Shifting to smaller, more distributed groupings not only complicates Chinese targeting, but increases the presence of U.S. troops in the arc of islands east of Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a rogue province, and has threatened to take it back by force if necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In early December, Ely Ratner<\/a>, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, publicly pledged that 2023 would be a \u201ctransformative\u201d year for U.S. force posture in the Pacific, and in the eight weeks that followed, the Pentagon made good with moves Ratner has said \u201cwill make our forward posture more distributed, resilient and lethal.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond increasing access to sites in the Philippines, the U.S. military is transforming a Marine regiment in Japan<\/a> into a quick-reaction force. At the same time, Australia rotations for U.S. Air Force bomber task forces<\/a> and fighters are due to increase this year, in addition to newer Army and Navy rotations there. Australia is also expected to agree to host U.S. submarines<\/a> when it announces March 13 the type of nuclear-propelled submarine it will obtain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With tension over Taiwan escalating in recent years, amid Chinese military flights near the territory and controversial visits by U.S. politicians, the Biden administration has pushed for deeper ties in the region. Three months after Ratner forecast the new arrangements, he said on March 2 that \u201cit\u2019s already been really a breakthrough year for U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe story of the U.S. position in the region, the degree to which we are deepening our partnerships with our allies and partners, the degree to which they\u2019re investing in their own capabilities, their ability to contribute to regional security and the degree which they\u2019re working with with each other is really cause for optimism,\u201d Ratner said in at event sponsored by the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank. \u201cIt is creating a more stable and enduring security environment, even as these challenges from [China] become more intense.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Avoiding a conflict with China over Taiwan before the end of the decade is \u201cdoable,\u201d Ratner added. \u201cIt\u2019s going to be really hard, but I think we\u2019re getting after it with urgency, but also with confidence that we can do it.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Philippines is a case that might give a defense watcher whiplash.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2020, then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced plans to cancel Manila\u2019s 1999 agreement to allow U.S. forces to visit, but he reversed course when Austin visited in June 2021 following a series of incidents that included a standoff with China over the contested Whitsun Reef. Fast forward to Austin\u2019s visit with Marcos in February, where the two nations agreed to expand U.S. military presence there with access to four more bases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Philippines has long been a target of China\u2019s maritime coercion in the resource-rich, busy South China Sea. There, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan are among the countries involved in a tense, decades-long territorial impasse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s unclear how a greater American presence will impact that dynamic. But the U.S. and the Philippines are planning high-level talks this spring to clarify the locations of the newly accessible sites \u2014 potentially in the northern Philippines, near Taiwan and the South China Sea. (The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, authorizes U.S. military use of Philippine sites, but rules out permanent basing.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Philippine government said it earmarked $66.5 million to construct facilities for training, storage and more. Further infrastructure improvements, including airfield repairs and pre-positioned fuel supplies, are on the table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cU.S. access to Philippine bases will offer a new level of training, exercises and interoperability between forces to modernize and develop the Philippines military \u2015 to enable us to respond to events more quickly,\u201d Ratner told Defense News. \u201cMeetings in the spring will afford an opportunity to clarify which airfields may need repairs or be suitable for pre-positioned equipment so that we can respond to contingencies in the South China Sea or conduct joint disaster relief missions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Stacie Pettyjohn<\/a>, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security think tank, said that because the existing sites have languished, it\u2019s unlikely that, without more investments, the runways or aprons are strong enough to support fully loaded U.S. fighters or bombers. The two countries also may be considering modest locations from where U.S. Marine or Army forces could operate surveillance drones or launch less expensive, mobile missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are several questions involved in the site selection process, according to Pettyjohn: \u201cIs it a mountainous area? What can it range from that place, and can they actually reach the targets the U.S. wants to be able to hold at risk or that they want to be surveilling if they have unmanned or manned aircraft conducting surveillance in that area?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth<\/a> said she\u2019s hopeful the Philippines, alongside Australia, Guam and Japan, will host logistics hubs for pre-positioned fuel and other supplies the Army wants to bring to the region. The service\u2019s role in a Pacific fight would be to furnish the joint force with long-range fires, as well as secure staging sites and communications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe folks in the Philippines have expanded the EDCA sites because of their concerns about what they see [China] doing,\u201d Wormuth said at a Feb. 28 event in Washington. \u201cI would like to see us continue to have wins like those four new sites. Our job in the Army certainly is to just be as ready as we can to take advantage of those agreements when they get signed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday<\/a> said in a Feb. 22 visit to Manila the U.S. is \u201ccommitted\u201d to joint maritime patrols with the country in the South China Sea, and that details will likely emerge from broader bilateral talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the meantime, the U.S., the Philippines and Australia plan to show off their strengthened ties with a bigger version of the joint Balikatan exercise, set for April. Last year\u2019s exercise with the U.S. and the Philippines was billed as the largest since 2015, with a combined 8,900 troops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cYou\u2019re going to see an increase with respect to the numbers. I think you\u2019re going to see an increase with respect to the joint mix of capabilities that we bring together this time in Balikatan,\u201d Gilday told reporters, adding that the drill \u201cwould provide a very powerful optic of assurance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the Chinese military\u2019s large-scale drills near Taiwan last August managed to send some missiles into the waters of Japan\u2019s exclusive economic zone, Japan saw it as a warning. And it reacted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In January, Washington and Tokyo announced a new U.S. Marine quick-reaction force on Okinawa and unveiled plans to deepen military cooperation on Japan\u2019s other southwest islands near Taiwan. The Okinawa-based 12th Marine Regiment, an artillery unit, will become the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment<\/a> \u2015 with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-ship and transportation capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan has also announced it will acquire new counterstrike capabilities and raise defense spending<\/a> to 2% of its gross domestic product, which would total about 43 trillion yen (U.S. $315 billion) through 2027. This marks a dramatic change for a nation that forged a pacifist approach to its defense after World War II and historically kept defense spending below 1% of its GDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan wants to buy American-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles that can reach potential targets in China \u2015 and extend the range of its Type 12 land-based anti-ship missile. Tokyo also announced plans to buy all 400 of the Raytheon Technologies-made Tomahawks it is seeking from the U.S. at once this year, rather than over several years as initially planned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The U.S. and Japan also agreed to the shared use of U.S. facilities on Okinawa. Marine officials say the littoral regiment will bolster the U.S. presence beyond Okinawa, into the first island chain, which stretches from Japan\u2019s East China Sea islands through the Philippines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Japan may use Okinawa as it adds bases, radars and air defense units on its chain of southwestern islands, which extend from Japan\u2019s largest island to Yonaguni, which is 70 miles east of Taiwan. The deal also opened up these islands for joint training \u2015 offering U.S. forces a greater familiarity with the terrain on which they\u2019d operate in a confrontation over Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThese islands are proximate to where the [Taiwan] conflict would be playing out, and in concept at least they would allow these small [American] units to place Chinese naval assets at risk,\u201d said Christopher Johnstone, a former White House director for East Asia who is now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. \u201cThe idea of this distributed presence with self-reliant comms, ISR capabilities and weapons has a pretty strong logic if it plays out according to concept.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marine littoral regiments are designed with stealth, speed and military prowess in mind. From beaches and straits throughout the region, they\u2019d have naval strike missiles with 100-mile ranges capable of conducting anti-ship strikes or gaining sea control with just the threat of being able to target enemy ships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHaving the [Marine littoral regiment] outfitted with anti-ship cruise missiles would allow them to really go after a potential Chinese invasion fleet, if China were to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,\u201d said Becca Wasser<\/a>, who leads the Center for a New American Security\u2019s gaming lab. \u201cIn line with the Marine Corps concept of stand-in forces, the Marines are supposed to be able to conduct sea-denial [missions] and be able to bottle up Chinese forces to ensure they don\u2019t go outside the first island chain.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marine littoral regiments are also designed to use MQ-9A Reaper drones for extended-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance \u2015 sensing what\u2019s happening in the region and passing those findings to joint force commanders in the theater or directly to Marines with the anti-ship missiles to take immediate action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to a Marine Corps spokesman, Marine Corps Air Station at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, will be home to two General Atomics-made Reapers later this year, and six by fiscal 2025 \u2015 replacing the smaller Boeing Insitu RQ-21 Blackjack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A new squadron on base and activated in January, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 153 will this year absorb the first of six KC-130J tankers. The aerial refueling aircraft are meant to allow more Hawaii-based Marines to move throughout the vast region in the event of a crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Speaking at the West naval conference in February, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith<\/a>, teased that the Reapers and refueling aircraft were just two on a \u201claundry list\u201d of U.S. military moves in the Pacific that \u201cgets a lot longer and a lot sexier\u201d at the classified level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Australia is expected to announce this month how it will acquire a fleet of submarines powered with U.S. nuclear technology as part of the trilateral AUKUS pact. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese<\/a> recently called the program \u201cthe single biggest leap in our defense capability in our history.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Options to replace the Australian-built Collins-class diesel-electric submarines that went into service more than 20 years ago include a next-generation U.S. Virginia-class sub, a British Astute-class boat or a new hybrid design.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But whatever the decision, Australia is also expected to host new rotations of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines as it begins a long ramp-up to 2040, when the plans call for the boats to arrive. That would give Australia\u2019s naval personnel a chance to acclimate themselves to operating and maintaining the complex submarines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe rotation issue, I would be shocked if that\u2019s not openly discussed in the next couple of weeks,\u201d Connecticut Rep. Joe Courtney<\/a>, the top Democrat on the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, said during a March 3 interview.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/45_global_laser.jpeg.jpg\")
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A change of pace in Manila<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Watching Taiwan from Japan<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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Australian modernization<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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