Again and again, new legislation intended to improve policy, practices, and responsibilities in U.S. federal government acquisition is promulgated. However, the result of such attempts is often just an eventual return to how things already were, or to something similar.
Is there a better way to engender positive change in federal acquisition through legislation?
Recently, IT acquisition has been the target of such quickly-enacted legislation. Consider the Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA), the primary purpose of which is to increase the involvement and responsibility of agencies’ chief information officers in IT procurement and management.
While FITARA may ultimately produce positive results; no specific data exists as to whether forcing agency CIOs to become more involved in the acquisition of IT will improve agency effectiveness, business processes, the quality and/or prices of contracted IT products and services, etc. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that previous legislative actions sending more power to IT executives were not successful.
Similarly, proposed legislation within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 would push Department of Defense acquisition authority down to individual service chiefs and secretaries. While the 2016 NDAA was initially vetoed on October 22, few objections leading to that veto pertained to the proposed restructuring of defense acquisition authority, and the Senate approved of the revised language on November 10.
This will soon go to the president for signature. If passed, will it damage the long-stated intent for more innovative, joint collaboration between DOD components—an environment that taxpayers deserve and that continued budgetary pressure requires? To date, most joint acquisition has been mandated, not inspired from below. Thus, while government on the one hand is pushing internal and intra-agency cooperation through shared services, strategic sourcing, or category management, it may be strengthening individual agency “silos” on the other.
In the end, frequent shifts in acquisition responsibility—such as those mandated under FITARA and the 2016 NDAA legislation—always introduce confusion and loss of talent and expertise in the federal acquisition space, with a resulting initial slowdown in program progress to adjust to new requirements. A management and leadership vacuum is created when this happens.
It would appear that whenever such legislation is introduced, there is little supporting data for the required process changes. Given the history of ineffectiveness in many cases and the immediate effect of program confusion, along with lack of proof that the desired outcomes will be achieved, it begs the question: Why enact such drastic legislative change in the first place? What business or public administration theories, think tank examples, or previous acquisition reform legislation, studies, panels or commissions have led to such significant and governmentwide adoption of such dramatic changes? How are such changes thought up, tested, and proven effective before they become law?
Federal acquisition involves major decisions that determine the flow of billions of taxpayer dollars each year, and considering the enormity of that important fact, and the built-in requirement for experienced professionals to make those decisions, what deficiencies in the current acquisition process led to the decision to enact such a change, and what convincing argument or data led to the decision to change over to the new process by law? Just what is it that convinces lawmakers to move forward with change—or (frequently) to move back to previous models when those changes don’t deliver? For example, is the current agency slowness to adopt FITARA’s requirements due to government bureaucracy and confusion, or simply general lack of support?
To be fair, federal acquisition is not perfect. Certainly, there are ideas and untested methods out there that would improve the process. But is legally commanding how things are to be done based on subjective theory, as opposed to thoroughly tested and proven-effective methods, the best way to go about it?
In order to provide more certainty before implementing such risky experiments in management theory, perhaps we should borrow a lesson from the scientific community and test requirements with the “scientific method” before they become law? The scientific method can be defined as:
[A] body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge. To be termed scientific, a method of inquiry is commonly based on empirical or measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning…. [The scientific method is] a method or procedure…consisting [of] systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses…. Depending on how well the tests match the predictions, the original hypothesis may require refinement, alteration, expansion, or even rejection. If a particular hypothesis becomes very well supported, a general theory may be developed.
Agencies (and indeed all organizations) must take an enterprise-wide view of IT for mission success—along with everything else, from pencils to major weapons systems. If FITARA or the draft 2016 NDAA assumes that the power of one office over another is what determines program success, what follows is the presumption that government leaders work in separate “silos,” without a sense of teamwork, multifunctional expertise, or ultimate senior leader accountability. Such an agency leader simply referees disputes between internal functional executives, but doesn’t have final ownership. Mandating one position over another, instead of holding the top leadership accountable, further diffuses responsibility. Not discussed as often today as in the past, but just as applicable, is the concept of the “integrated product team,” whereby the first rule in significant acquisition is (or was) to get all the experts and functional stakeholders working together—with shared interest in program outcomes, led by an effective (and qualified) program manager.
Historically, periodic legislative/reorganization solutions have resulted in far less than positive effects on program outcomes. Nevertheless, it always offers low hanging fruit, with some new voices heard, but usually offering previous solutions repackaged to look new. They also offer a sense of what voices the drafters chose to listen to and believe to be correct about the right course to take. Consideration of existing data or what the “doers”—i.e., those actually performing acquisition—have to say doesn’t occur as frequently as listening to the “theorists.”
Unfortunately, the legislative process isn’t synonymous with the scientific method. If it were, the problem would first be measured, existing data or surveys reviewed or developed, benchmarking relevant private or public success models completed, demonstrated working expertise consulted, and relevant data compiled to formulate a truly considered hypothesis. Without an analytical process, acquisition reform degrades into a debate of opinion between various voices, all with their own agenda or personal theory.
Is this where current legislative initiatives have led? Are we doomed to again rearrange the bridge chairs instead of setting a new course? In three to five years, will we again return to previous processes and systems? Could a more rigorous, analytical, and scientific (and less political) approach yield a different result this time? It would seem to be worth a try.
Michael Fischetti is the executive director of the National Contract Management Association.
Applying the scientific method to acquisition
