I have argued that the Army can more rapidly achieve its vision for modern Mission Command if DoD adopts an acquisition model focused on buying non-developmental items (NDI) off the shelf rather than by sticking with the current typical Program of Record (POR) approach.
The Army just completed the first test of this thesis in its Limit User Test (LUT) of the Mid-Tier Network Vehicular Radio (MNVR) in the Network Integration Exercise (NIE) at Ft. Bliss, Texas. While the complete results must still be evaluated by the test community, I argue that the Army can claim victory. Victory because the Army defined the requirement, conducted a full and open competition, and then ran the winning systems through the rigors of developmental and operational testing with success—all without the Army investing a penny in R&D for the radio.
Once again, the NIE process showcased defense-marketplace competition at its finest, by proving the value of “unleashing private sector innovation to bring less expensive, quicker to marker, and effective solutions to the field.”
Breaking it down to the basic elements, here’s how the NDI acquisition process works: the Army lays out requirements and provides the necessary details to inform vendors’ thinking and development. Vendors—like Harris and others—then use their own funds to respond quickly, producing their own solutions. The Army then uses its normal testing process to evaluate the proposed technologies. The results are then measured against the equivalent testing process that a POR offering would use. If the system meets or beats the requirement, it moves to full rate production and fielding.
Clearly, some vendors want the Army to continue to pay all the R&D costs and assume all the risk for programs. These companies don’t want to take the risk of investing their own money in R&D only to have to compete the resulting offering against others’ efforts. But this process spurs participating companies, Harris included, to be more agile, dialed into the end user’s needs – in this case the soldier – and willing to take risks by betting on their technologies as the most beneficial to the warfighter.
Through this process, everyone wins: Soldiers get better capabilities sooner; taxpayers don’t have to foot the bill for R&D that may or may not pan out; and the DoD gets a model for acquisition that will stand the test of time, and result in innovative technologies that contribute to our nation’s defense.
The process, being used right now to procure the Army’s MNVR, also validates what Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall has been doing since 2012 in leading the way to remove barriers to commercial technology utilization across DoD acquisition programs.
As part of its new Operating Concept, “To Win in a Complex World,” the Army’s competition-driven acquisition approach intends to close technology gaps, beginning with five focused end states, explained on the Army website by COL Mark Elliott, director of the Army G-3/5/7 LandWarNet-Mission Command Directorate:
- Fielding network capabilities across formations, from infantry, Stryker and armored brigades to aviation and enabling forces.
- Delivering the common operating environment to give Soldiers a familiar look and feel for their mission command applications from garrison to foxhole.
- Simplifying and protecting the network to increase commanders’ operational agility.
- Improving tactical communications with joint, multinational and interagency partners.
- Creating smaller, lighter command posts for rapid deployment.
Every one of these end states is a tall order. History has shown that where advanced technology is concerned, the old POR model cannot deliver on time, on budget, and meet (let alone exceed) requirements. As the NIEs continue to prove, competition can and does deliver.
