defense and security analyst, Izmir University of Economics (Author of “Missile Threat and NATO’s Missile Shield.”
Pullquote: The closing months of 2015 brought what could be viewed as the most dramatic turnabout in Turkey’s security environment since the end of Cold War
The past year 2015 brought multiple, diverse and diversifying security challenges for Turkish policymakers. ItThe year opened with Turkey gradually becoming a primary target of the Islamic State group (IS) suicide bombers. This included the bloodiest terrorist attack ever in Turkey’s history, when two IS human bombs exploded themselves in Ankara and took the lives of more than 100 on Oct. 10.
What has been evident for security analysts and international observers became a priority concern for the general public as well: Turkey’s porous border with Syria allowed for two-way movement of terrorist groups, some of which posed a direct danger for Turkey the country. Consequently, Turkey’s recurring statements over the years to tighten and seal its borders to the south and east gained a new momentum, and its patchy and piecemeal border security programs could finally be expected to make some true progress. pick some pace and substance.
Another result second outcome of the IS bombings inside Turkish territory has been to push Turkey solidly toward the anti-IS collation coalition. Turkey had already allowed its Incirlik airbase to be used by the US for unarmed UAV and reconnaissance flights inside Syrian territory. Throughout 2015, not only did those flights have gradually expanded to cover bombing raids conducted by an ever-increasing number of US combat aircraft, but the Turkish Air Force has also joined in with airstrikes of its own against IS targets.
These threats and possible conflict with Russia will mean growing orders for domestic industry in certain critical fields. Apparently, the Turkish Air Force prefers precision-guided munitions for those air raids, signifying a dramatic increase in demand and the consequent fresh orders for guided aircraft bombs and missiles, some of which have already begun arriving. even before 2015 came to an end. Turkish industry has a number of local designs to satisfy those requirements, but not all achieved of them reached the phase of high-volume serial production, therefore, thence the slack is certain to be taken up by international suppliers.
Further complicating Turkish policymakers’ task has been the breakdown of the fragile cease-fire with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an insurgent group that Turkey and the U.S. have listed as a terrorist group. From July 2015 onward, hundreds of soldiers and policemen lost their lives when they were ambushed by IEDs improvised bombs that were apparently placed in by the PKK during the elusive cease-fire.
Besides, Rocket-propelled grenades RPGs and in a few instances, even anti-tank guided weapons, have taken their took their toll on Turkish armored vehicles. In Turkey’s southeast, security forces rely heavily on their wheeled armored vehicles for operations, but to operate and move around; yet, Turkish operators are learning first-hand that the protection provided by bare armor is not always sufficient.
High demand should be expected for technologies and add-on kits to improve vehicle survivability. of armored vehicles could be expected to be on high demand. Likewise, high-tech ISR assets and capabilities to identify and combat terrorist activity in rural and urban areas are certain to score high on the wish list of Turkish security forces.
The closing months of 2015 also brought what could possibly be viewed termed as the most dramatic turnabout in Turkey’s security environment since the end of Cold War ended: confrontation and real possibility of an armed conflict with Russia. The latter’s deployment in September 2015 of combat aircraft in western Syria was promptly followed by airstrikes on groups opposed to President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, some of which turned out to be the insurgents and opposition forces assisted, replenished and trained by Turkey and its Western and Gulf allies.
The unease felt with the target set of Russian air raids was magnified by recurring violations of Turkish airspace by Russian jets. The tragic outcome of this dangerous escalation was the shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkish fighters on Nov. 24. Russia’s very strong reaction was not confined to economic and political spheres, but it also included deployment of some of its most sophisticated military assets inside Syria. Those included S-400 air defense systems whose range extend well into Turkish airspace, and some of Russia’s Navy’s most capable surface combatants deployed directly across from Turkey’s southern shores.
After a 25-year lull, the renewed prospects of a conventional, old-style military confrontation with a major military power like Russia will certainly have its repercussions not only on Turkey’s procurement plans and priorities, but also on her geostrategic positioning and orientation.
An early victim was In fact, an early toll has been the famous (or infamous?) T-LORAMIDS program aimed at acquiring a long-range air and missile defense system, whose tender two had resulted 2 years ago favored resulted in favor a Chinese manufacturer, and this, at the expense of US, European and Russian contenders.
The US and NATO had made no secrets of their unease with the decision and they had declared that they would not allow integration of a non-Western system into NATO’s command-control and air/missile defense architecture.
Shortly after the dramatic downturn of her relations with Moscow, Ankara has canceled the tender in question, and announced that systems in this category would be developed by Turkish industry, with assistance from foreign parties. Against the background of Turkey’s totally altered security circumstances, those “foreign parties” are most unlikely to be Russian or Chinese.
Likewise, early rumors of a British contender as being selected as the technology partner for Turkey’s F-X indigenous fighter aircraft could also be seen as yet another sign of this new direction and orientation.
Egeli is a defense and security analyst at Izmir University of Economics.
Commentary: Growing Threats Reorient Turkish Military, Industry
