US defense leaders have been warning since 2012 about the destructive effects of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). The BCA set in motion approximately $1 trillion in defense reductions over 10 years from projected budget baselines, including a midyear sequestration in fiscal 2013 that grounded air wings, halted training and maintenance across the military, and furloughed civilian personnel.
The severe damage from sequestration was so obvious that Congress amended the BCA to slightly ease the reductions for fiscal 2014 and 2015 and get through the recent election cycle. But without additional modification or repeal, the BCA’s impact will return with a vengeance when the president submits the fiscal 2016 budget early next year. This will further complicate defense planning in a strategic environment rich with geopolitical risks and continuing demand for US forces.
Congress and the president need a full and open conversation on the future of defense spending to reconcile, at least for the next few years, the tension between the BCA and the need for adequate defense resources.
A new Republican majority in the Senate makes this all the more urgent. To be clear, funding defense should not be partisan work, but figuring out internal Republican budget priorities now seems among the most urgent and necessary conditions for the new congressional majority to engage with the president.
This debate must address the realities of the strategic environment, very real budget constraints, and the balance of military capabilities and capacity necessary for current and future forces. Congress needs to start connecting the dots.
The president has made a commitment to a long-term campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and may ask Congress to endorse it, yet there is potential for wider complications and more significant US regional commitments.
There will likely be continuing challenges in the Afghan transition and a requirement for ongoing counterterrorist operations against extremists throughout the greater Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel.
A resurgent Russia is challenging international boundaries in Europe and Iran continues to harbor nuclear ambitions. In Asia, a resurrection of territorial disputes coincides with growing Chinese military capabilities; and there is always the perpetual unpredictability of a nuclear North Korea. There are also serious challenges in the cyber and space domains.
Congressional disinclination to revisit the BCA suggests it is simply waiting and hoping for this environment to improve, but this is a weak and increasingly risky strategy. Defense capabilities take years to develop; so waiting for an international crisis before reversing defense cuts is an even worse approach.
At the same time, budget constraints are real and the BCA is unlikely to be repealed. A more likely scenario would see the BCA being replaced, but getting sufficient votes for a new consensus on taxes and spending will not be easy.
In finding the right numbers for defense, Congress and DoD together must consider current readiness and operations — including the longstanding and much abused overseas contingency operations account and how DoD gets weaned off it — as well as long-term needs for modernization. So, even facing urgent challenges in the strategic environment, DoD cannot expect a blank check.
For its part, DoD must articulate its priorities and the necessary trade-offs between the size of US forces and their capabilities. There is a broad need to rebuild and protect readiness; modernize air, space, naval and nuclear forces; evolve special operations, intelligence and cyber capabilities to meet rapidly changing requirements; strengthen capacity for more frequent international training and exercises with NATO and Pacific allies but also with less-developed partners; and retain land forces necessary for rapid crisis response. Finding the right mix of active duty, Guard and reserve forces will be key.
Just as important, DoD needs to present a compelling, strategy-driven rationale for its priorities, backed by a united phalanx of senior military and civilian leaders combined with an effective congressional engagement plan.
Congress would be most helpful if its leadership and relevant military oversight committees could produce consensus with DoD on strategic priorities. Lately, it has been least helpful in its pre-election survival mode, when members ignore the advice of military leaders and succumb to constituent-driven prohibitions against change, blocking implementation of difficult choices DoD has been recommending.
Without repeal or amendment of the BCA, DoD faces a frustrating and predictably grim future, at risk of leaving the president and his successors short of the tools needed to meet the national security challenges we face. For Congress and DoD, it is time to set priorities. It is time to choose. ■
Donley, is a former US Air Force secretary.
